Gestaltung der Abschlussprüferhaftung – Implikationen theoretischer Modelle

Namen wie Enron, WorldCom oder Parmalat sind l?ngst nicht mehr nur tragische Firmengeschichten, sie sind Synonyme für korrupte Manager, aber auch für die vermeintlich schlechte Arbeit von Wirtschaftsprüfern. So wundert es kaum, dass die Gesetzgeber mit aller Sch?rfe reagieren: Neue Gesetze werden in immer kürzeren Abst?nden verabschiedet, von denen auch Wirtschaftsprüfer betroffen sind. Für Deutschland hei?t das insb., dass eine Dritthaftung der Abschlussprüfer thematisiert wird und auf lange Sicht wohl unausweichlich ist. Daher stellt sich die Frage, ob das Bestreben einer Haftungsausweitung theoretisch fundiert werden kann. Der Artikel stellt spieltheoretische Forschungsarbeiten, insb. deren wesentlichen Annahmen und Ergebnisse, vor und vergleicht bzw. würdigt diese kritisch. Dabei wird insb. auf haftungsgestaltende Merkmale wie die proportionale vs. gesamtschuldnerische Haftung, die Gef?hrdungs- vs. Verschuldenshaftung oder auf die Begrenzung der Haftung durch fixe Obergrenzen eingegangen.     

Coevolution and stable adjustments in the cobweb model

The paper is concerned with genetic algorithm learning in a cobweb economy. Besides discussing several specification details in the genetic operators, the model includes four different types of firm forecasting rules and subjects the demand side to serially correlated random shocks. The main finding of the simulation experiments is that the genetic algorithm is a reasonably good approximation of the moving Walrasian equilibria, and that this process is characterized by the coevolution of different strategies. Accordingly, it is just the persistent heterogeneity of firms, and the persistently changing composition of this heterogeneity, that achieves stability. In this world, convergence is improved by weak, rather than strong, evolutionary pressure.     

Technical Change and a Falling Wage Share if Profits are Maintained

In the framework of a multi-sectoral and fixed-coefficients Leontief model with capital stock matrix B, the paper addresses the issue of the impact of technical change on income distribution. Comparing two steady-state positions, it is shown that with cost-reducing, capital-using and (uniformly) labour-saving technical change the equilibrium rate of profit will fall, if it is the aggregate wage share which remains fixed, not the absolute level of the real wage. Conversely, the wage share falls if the profit rate does not change. The reactions are ambiguous if, instead of the coefficients of the matrix B, the coefficients of the input–output matrix A increase.     

Bond Rate,Loan Rate and Tobin's q in a Temporary Equilibrium Model of the Financial Sector

The paper sets up a portfolio model of the financial sector with markets for equity, government bonds, money and debt. The comparative statics of the temporary equilibrium are studied analytically and numerically. Subsequent simulations explore the reactions of financial markets in response to stylized oscillations of some of the exogenous variables. These include economic activity, income distribution, inflation, investors' sentiment, and banks' perceived bankruptcy risk of firms. Special emphasis is put on the resulting cyclical pattern of Tobin's q and the interest spread between loan rate and bond rate.     

The Impact of Audit Quality Indicators on the Timeliness of Goodwill Impairments: Evidence from the German Setting

This study investigates whether goodwill impairments are perceived as timely and whether specific auditor characteristics affect the perceived timeliness. It therefore contributes to central questions in accounting research: is managerial discretion over accounting numbers (accounting choice) good or bad for stakeholders and does audit quality have an impact on this relationship? It is motivated by the IASB's post-implementation review on business combinations and the Goodwill and Impairment project based on it, the ongoing debate on the decision usefulness of impairment testing, and the question whether auditors have an impact on firms’ reporting of impairment losses. Based on a sample of German listed firms for the period 2006 to 2013, the results indicate that goodwill impairments are not recognized in a timely manner and delayed by at least one to two years. Moreover, the findings suggest that the recognition of impairment losses is influenced by auditor characteristics. In particular, firms seem to report goodwill impairments in a more timely fashion when they are audited by a Big 4 auditor, whereas the timeliness seems to decrease with a higher non-audit fee ratio and a longer auditor tenure. Moreover, additional analyses indicate that higher audit fees lead to more timely impairments.     

In the eye of the beholder: How regulatory focus and self-efficacy interact in influencing opportunity recognition

Although there is evidence that regulatory focus is associated with opportunity exploitation, there is a lack of research examining its role at the early stages of opportunity recognition. The present study makes two major contributions to address this gap. First, we demonstrate that entrepreneurs' promotion focus is positively related to opportunity recognition, whereas prevention focus is not significantly related to opportunity recognition. Second, integrating two theories of self-regulation – regulatory focus theory and self-efficacy theory – our findings reveal that a high promotion focus compensates for entrepreneurs' low levels of creative and entrepreneurial self-efficacy in opportunity recognition. Our study extends extant cognitive theories of opportunity recognition.     

A comparative analysis of the voting behavior of constituents and their representatives for public debts

We explore the quality of political representation of constituents?? preferences for budgetary decisions within a quasi-experimental setting. In the Swiss referendum process, constituents reveal their preferences for budgetary proposals which are either expected to increase or decrease public debts. We match individual politicians?? voting behavior on debt increasing and debt reducing legislative proposals with eight real referendum decisions on exactly the same issues from 2008 to 2011. Thereby, we directly explore deviations of politicians from constituents?? preferences with respect to budgetary policies.     

A Supplementary Note on Professor Hein's (2013) Version of A Kaleckian Debt Accumulation

Within the framework of the Kaleckian baseline model where firms finance investment by equities and debt, this note is concerned with a recent proposal by E. Hein to replace the common concept of a given retention rate with a given dividend rate. Considering in more detail the implications of his additional assumption of constant stock prices, it is revealed that the retained earnings of the firms will then be non‐positive in a long‐run financial equilibrium. It is furthermore shown that another and empirically more plausible assumption on the firms’ equity issuance policy overcomes this deficiency and can also imply numerically acceptable retention rates.     

The effect of nominal exchange rate volatility on real macroeconomic performance in the CEE countries

This paper analyzes the relation between nominal exchange rate volatility and several macroeconomic variables, namely real output growth, excess credit, foreign direct investment (FDI) and the current account balance, in the Central and Eastern European EU member states. Using panel estimations for the period between 1995 and 2008, we find that lower exchange rate volatility is associated with higher growth, higher stocks of FDI, higher current account deficits, and higher excess credit. At the same time, the recent evidence seems to suggest that following the global financial crisis, “hard peg” countries may have experienced a more severe adjustment process than “floaters”. The results are economically and statistically significant and robust.     

The political economy of corporatism in medicine: Self-regulation or cartel management?

This paper seeks to explain why delegation of regulatory authority to medical associations (medical Corporatism) is so prominent in health care. It argues that the interests of politicians and physicians in limiting access to medical markets rather than the interests of patients in the control of quality of medical care determines this delegation. Recent trends in physician densities, their impacts on physician incomes, and rates of return to a medical career in several industrialized countries are adduced as evidence to support this claim.