Using HMDA Data as a Regulatory Screen for Fair Lending Compliance

This paper describes and evaluates the Federal Reserve System's recently developed program designed to use HMDA data as a screening device for fair lending enforcement. The program is designed to identify institutions showing potentially discriminatory patterns in their treatment of minority mortgage applicants vis-a`-vis nonminority applicants. The program also selects specific loan files to pull for additional information in cases where a more comprehensive evaluation might be appropriate. This paper discusses the motivation behind the adoption of the program and its innovative matched-pair method and assesses its value and potential shortcomings.     

Nineteenth Century Urban Market Failure?: Chadwick on Funeral Industry Regulation

This essay analyzes the regulatory theory and policy preceptions of Edwin Chadwick (1800-1890), the premier Benthamite utilitarian reformer. We focus on and analyze Chadwicks economic diagnosis of the London funeral market in the first half of the nineteenth century. In his view, externalities and market failure in both the burial and funeral service markets demanded socialization of property rights and implementation of a franchise bidding scheme. Chadwicks rationales for government intervention, including high taxes and information costs—unique, we believe, for his time—provide the basis for numerous forms of contemporary regulations at all levels in the United States today.     

'An awkward fence to cross': railway capitalization in Britain in the inter-war years

This paper examines the related problems of the capitalization and financial performance of the railway companies in the inter-war period. It examines the critics' view that the railways were over-capitalized, and places the debate in context by analysing the dividend and accounting policies of the companies and the consequences for investment. It also examines the conflicting views of railway management and shareholders over capital expenditure. The paper concludes that the railways were both financially over-capitalized and physically under-capitalized, and so faced very serious financial problems that were incapable of resolution within the existing ownership structure.     

Delivering Better Transport? An Evaluation of the Ten–Year Plan for the Railway Industry

In July 2000, the Government published Transport 2010, its ten–year plan to improve Britain's transport. This article reviews the proposals to improve the railway system, and examines their likely effects on investment by the railway companies and on passenger safety. The plan is analysed in the context of the structure of the privatized railway industry and its regulatory bodies, with particular reference to the performance of Railtrack (now in administration). The authors conclude that the Government was over–confident in believing that a defective privatized structure could deliver the expansion it wanted. The article shows that the Government has been relying on inadequate and under–performing instruments, over some of which it had little control. This will probably continue unless Railtrack is restructured and taken back into public ownership. Progress so far has been limited, and the prospects of success are not good.     

Spreads, Depths, and Quote Clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq: Evidence after the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Changes

This paper examines liquidity and quote clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq using data after the two market reforms—the 1997 order–handling rule and minimum tick size changes. We find that Nasdaq–listed stocks exhibit wider spreads and smaller depths than NYSE–listed stocks and stocks with higher proportions of even–eighth and even–sixteenth quotes have wider quoted, effective, and realized spreads on both the NYSE and Nasdaq. This result differs from the findings by Bessembinder (1999, p. 404) that "trade execution costs on Nasdaq in late 1997 are no longer significantly explained by a tendency for liquidity providers to avoid odd–eighth quotations," and "odd–sixteenth avoidance has little relevance for explaining post–reform Nasdaq trading costs."     

Research Note: Revisiting Fair Value Accounting––Measuring Commercial Banks' Liabilities

IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (IASB, 2000), requires assets to be marked to fair value if held-for-trading, available-for-sale purposes, or if they are derivatives; held-to-maturity securities, originated loans and originated securities are measured at amortized cost, providing they are not held-for-trading. Financial liabilities are measured at amortized cost except those that are held-for-trading or derivatives. A proposed amendment would accommodate improved fair value measurement of financial instruments. Commercial banks are greatly affected by any accounting standard concerning the recognition and measurement of financial instruments, whether related to assets or liabilities. This article demonstrates that the existing and proposed standards perpetuate the mismeasurement of interest rate risk for commercial banks. Under IAS 39 banks that have a balanced position, that is, no interest rate risk, counterfactually could show large changes in income through interest rate changes. An alternative accounting treatment, full fair value reporting of financial assets and liabilities, including all loans and deposits, is offered. Presently fair value data are mandated as footnote disclosure.     

Uncertainty and Financing Constraints

Using a panel of Dutch listed firms this paper provides empirical evidence for the hypothesis that more risky firms are confronted with more severe capital market constraints than relatively less risky firms. The paper also contributes to the discussion on the usefulness of cash flow as a measure of financial constraints. We present a stochastic version of the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) model. We show that cash flow sensitivity can be used as a meaningful indicator of financing constraints if firms are classified by the degree of uncertainty they face and if the uncertainty originates from cost uncertainty.