Intrinsic Motivations of Public Sector Employees: Evidence for Germany

We examine differences in altruism and laziness between public sector employees and private sector employees. Our theoretical model predicts that the likelihood of public sector employment increases with a worker's altruism, and increases or decreases with a worker's laziness depending on his altruism. Using questionnaire data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel Study, we find that public sector employees are significantly more altruistic and lazy than observationally equivalent private sector employees. A series of robustness checks show that these patterns are stronger among higher educated workers; that the sorting of altruistic people to the public sector takes place only within the caring industries; and that the difference in altruism is already present at the start of people's career, while the difference in laziness is only present for employees with sufficiently long work experience.     

Free‐riding in multi‐party alliances: The role of perceived alliance effectiveness and peers' collaboration in a research consortium

Research summary : Multi‐party alliances rely on partners' willingness to commit and pool their efforts in joint endeavors. However, partners face the dilemma of how much to commit to the alliance. We shed light on this issue by analyzing the relationship between partners' free‐riding—defined as their effort‐withholding—and their perceptions of alliance effectiveness and peers' collaboration. Specifically, we posit a U‐shaped relationship between partners' subjective evaluations of alliance effectiveness and their free‐riding. We also hypothesize a negative relation between partners' perceptions of the collaboration of peer organizations and their free‐riding. Results from a mixed‐method study—combining regression analysis of primary data on a major inter‐organizational research consortium and evidence from two experimental designs—support our hypotheses, bearing implications for the multi‐party alliances literature. Managerial summary : Free‐riding is a major concern in multi‐party alliances such as large research consortia, since the performance of these governance forms hinges on the joint contribution of multiple partners that often operate according to different logics (e.g., universities, firms, and government agencies). We show that, in such alliances, partners' perceptions have relevant implications for their willingness to contribute to the consortium's shared goals. Specifically, we find that partners free‐ride more—that is, contribute less—when they perceive the effectiveness of the overall alliance to be either very low or very high. Partners also gauge their commitment to the alliance on the perception of the effort of their peers—that is, other organizations similar to them. These findings provide managers of multi‐party alliances with additional levers to motivate partners to contribute fairly to such joint endeavor. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Economic Impact of SFAS NO. 157

Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, “Fair Value Measurements,” (SFAS 157) defines fair value, establishes a three tiered framework for measuring fair value and expands the required disclosures about fair value measurements. The objective of this study is to examine and evaluate the benefits of the information disclosed by SFAS 157. The results of our study indicated that a large majority of the inputs are observable in that 93.5% of the sample financial assets and 93.1% of the sample financial liabilities were measured by level 1 or 2 criteria. However, we found a mismatch between assets and liabilities subject to the three tiers of fair value measurements. The companies in our sample disclosed $18.8 trillion in total assets, with 51%, or $18.8 trillion in total assets, with 51%, or 9.5 trillion reported at fair value. Whereas, sample company liabilities totaled 16.1 trillion with only16.1 trillion with only 3.7 trillion or 23% reported at fair value.     

Information and trade sizes: The case of short sales

In this study, we examine short selling of NASDAQ stocks and observe that more information about future returns is contained in small short sales than in medium-sized and large short sales, thus supporting the idea that NASDAQ short sellers stealth trade. These results are robust to different subsamples of stocks with and without tradable options and stocks that are more likely to face binding borrowing constraints. Further, these findings are contrary to the results in Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2008) who find that large NYSE short sales contain the most information. Combined, our study supports the idea that NASDAQ's bid test is less restricting than the NYSE's uptick rule and therefore attenuates the likelihood of stealth trading (Diether, Lee, & Werner, 2009a).     

扁平证券市场线和融资限制——中国股票市场的实证检验

资本资产定价模型（CAPM)在国际金融市场的实证检验结果往往呈现扁平证券市场线现象。一些学者认为融资限制是该现象的产生原因。本文旨在研究扁平证券市场线现象是否存在于中国股市,同时分析融资限制对中国股市证券市场线的影响。本文采用投资组合分析法对A股主板市场进行实证检验。本文研究发现：（1)扁平的证券市场线现象同样存在于中国股票市场中;（2)在中国股票市场中,融资限制与证券市场线的斜率呈负相关,与截距呈正相关,这符合融资限制理论;（3)以上两点发现同样存在于多因子定价模型中,这表明本文研究结果具有稳健性。       

MEGA‐EVENTS AND TOURISM: THE CASE OF BRAZIL

Mega‐sporting events such as the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup are expensive affairs. Host countries often justify the spending required to stage these events by predicting that mega‐events will draw large numbers of tourists. This paper analyzes monthly foreign tourist arrivals into Brazil between 2003 and 2015 and finds that the 2014 FIFA World Cup increased foreign tourism by roughly 1 million visitors. This number far exceeded expectations, but we show that roughly a quarter of this increase in foreign tourism was caused by the fortuitous advancement of Argentina's national team, and potential hosts should not count on the event to consistently produce out‐sized tourism figures. We conclude that on‐field results can greatly influence FIFA World Cup tourism. (JEL L83, F14)     

On Nudging: A Review of Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health,Wealth and Happiness by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein

This paper reviews the case for libertarian paternalism presented by Thaler and Sunstein in Nudge. Thaler and Sunstein argue that individuals’ preferences are often incoherent, making paternalism is unavoidable; however, paternalistic interventions should ‘nudge’ individuals without restricting their choices, and should nudge them towards what they would have chosen had they not been subject to specific limitations of rationality. I argue that the latter criterion provides inadequate guidance to nudgers. It is inescapably normative, and so allows nudgers’ conceptions of well‐being to override those of nudgees. Even if nudgees’ rationality were unbounded, their revealed preferences might still be incoherent.     

Measuring a boom and bust: The Sydney housing market 2001–2006

The Sydney housing market peaked in 2003. The period 2001–2006 is, therefore, of particular interest since it captures a boom and bust in the housing market. We compute hedonic, repeat-sales and median price indexes for five regions in Sydney over this period. While the three approaches are in broad agreement regarding the timing of the turning point in the housing market, some important differences also emerge. In particular, we find evidence of sample selection bias in our hedonic and repeat-sales data sets (with the former focusing more on better quality dwellings and the latter more on lower quality dwellings). These sample selection biases could in turn cause bias (in opposite directions) in our hedonic and repeat-sales indexes. Median indexes may likewise be biased as a result of an apparent decline in the average quality of dwellings sold in the latter part of the sample. We also find evidence of convergence in prices across regions during the boom and divergence in the subsequent bust.     

Getting Shut Out of the International Capital Markets: It Doesn't Take Much*

We use a simple model of international lending to show that an emerging market borrower who might default can be shut out of international capital markets without warning. A modest haircut on obligations, for example, can shut down lending.