Employer-Provided Training and Tenure-Earnings

This article examines the tenure-earnings profiles and suggests that the more training is provided to the individual by the employer, the steeper is the tenure profile of earnings. The provision of training by the employer is modelled as endogenous and subject to choice decisions using an ordered probit model corresponding to three levels of training. The earnings equations of three groups of employees are then adjusted for potential effects of bias due to selectivity by using Lee's procedure, and heterogeneity bias using the Altonji and Shakotko instrumental variable procedure.     

The State of Charity Accounting – Developments, Improvements and Continuing Problems

This paper is based on a survey of charity accounts undertaken for the Office for National Statistics during the period 1995–1996, and reviews current charity accounting practices of some of these charities in 1994/5 prior to the inception of the new accounting regime from 1996. We look at the accounting practices identified by Bird and provide a comparison between the original Bird analysis in 1981 and current practices in 1994/5. We also consider smaller surveys undertaken in 1989 and 1990. The paper concludes that whilst there has been some progress – particularly among larger charities – since the Bird study there are still major accounting anomalies and examples of poor practice. The paper calls upon auditing firms to be less tolerant of inadequate sets of accounts and points to their pivotal role in improving charity accounting pratices.     

Criteria used by venture capitalists to evaluate new venture proposals

A questionnaire was administered to one hundred venture capitalists to determine the most important criteria that they use to decide on funding new ventures. Perhaps the most important finding from the study is direct confirmation of the frequently iterated position taken by the venture capital community that above all it is the quality of the entrepreneur that ultimately determines the funding decision. Five of the top ten most important criteria had to do with the entrepreneur's experience or personality. There is no question that irrespective of the horse (product), horse race (market), or odds (financial criteria), it is the jockey (entrepreneur) who fundamentally determines whether the venture capitalist will place a bet at all.The question is if this is the case, then why is so much emphasis placed on the business plan? In a business plan there is generally little to indicate the characteristics of the entrepreneur—it is generally devoted to a detailed discussion of the product/service, the market, and the competition. To us, the implications are obvious—such content is necessary, but not sufficient. The business plan should also show as clearly as possible that the “jockey is fit to ride” —namely, indicate by whatever feasible and credible means possible that the entrepreneur has staying power, has a track record, can react to risk well, and has familiarity with the target market. Failing this, he or she needs to be able to pull together a team that has such characteristics and show that he or she is capable of leading that team.Factor analysis of the results indicate that venture capitalists appear to assess ventures systematically in terms of six categories of risk to be managed. These are: risk of losing the entire investment: risk of being unable to bail out if necessary; risk of failure to implement the venture idea; competitive risk; risk of management failure; and risk of leadership failure.Finally, three clusters of venture capitalists were identified: those who carefully assess the competitive and implementation risks: those who seek easy bail out; and those who deliberately keep as many options open as possible.     

Technical efficiency and region The U.S. manufacturing sector 1972–1977

In this paper we estimate the extent of technological bias in an interregional context for U.S. manufacturing during the period 1972–1977 using a factor augmenting production function approach. We present estimates of the elasticity of factor substitution for each of the 48 states in the sample using a variable elasticity of substitution production function. Next, we use these estimates to generate estimates of the rates of change in the efficiencies of capital and labor inputs and compare these estimates across states and census regions. We also examine and compare estimates of total factor productivity across states and regions. We ,find that the average annual rates of growth of capital efficiency during the period are 5.5 percent in the Northeast, 5.3 percent in the Northcentral, 5.6 percent in the West and 3.1 percent in the South. The rates of change of the efficiencies of labor are found to be negative across all regions except the South. The rates of change of total factor productivity are found to be 1.7 percent in the Northeast, 2.3 percent in the Northcentral, 2.4 percent in the West and 1.7 percent in the South. We also find that between 33 percent and 56 percent of the growth of output across regions is due to technical progress.     

Cash balance pension plans: A case of standard-setting inadequacy

Accounting for and ownership of U.S. private employee pensions has long been a controversial and politically contested terrain. The uniqueness in the U.S. of using employers as the principal provider of pensions makes the reporting of pensions more problematic since the corporate employers providing pensions are not strictly accountable to only the pensioners. Over the last quarter century there has been a marked swing in power toward management and away from employees making it possible for increasing numbers of U.S. companies to switch from conventional defined benefit plans to cash balance plans. This paper provides a “case” study of how accounting standard-setters framed the pension reporting problem vis-à-vis how they frame the “reporting problem” in general. Utilizing various sources of commentary about the phenomenon of cash-balance conversions, we triangulate on the pension problem to demonstrate how current FASB disclosure rules fail to satisfy the condition of neutrality and how those rules have facilitated the shifting of economic risk from shareholders to employees.