Which Firms are More Sensitive to Public Disclosure Schemes for Pollution Control? Evidence from Indonesia’s PROPER Program

This paper analyzes differences in firms’ responsiveness to PROPER, Indonesia’s public disclosure program for industrial pollution control. The overall effectiveness of this program at achieving emissions reductions and its low regulatory costs have earned it a good reputation around the world. PROPER had no deterrents or incentives other than those that arose indirectly from publicly disclosing information about the environmental performances of firms. We analyzed plant-level data to relate short- and longer-term environmental responses to facility characteristics. The results revealed that foreign-owned firms were consistently more likely to respond to the environmental rating scheme, compared to private domestic firms. This is a clear and important insight with consequences for a number of issues, such as understanding the pollution haven debate. Also, firms located in densely populated regions, particularly in Java, responded more positively to the public disclosure of PROPER ratings. The main observed effect was however given by the initial level of environmental performance of firms. Those firms that had bad environmental performance records felt pressure to improve, but if the initial abatement steps had already been taken, the incentives to improve further appeared to diminish.     

Payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game: a note

We examine whether the payoff dominant sequential-move (Stackelberg) outcome is realized when timing is endogenized. We adopt the observable delay game formulated by Hamilton and Slutsky [Games Econ Behav 2(1):29–46, 1990]. We find that if one sequential-move outcome is payoff dominant, either (i) the outcome both players prefer is the unique equilibrium; or (ii) two sequential-move outcomes are equilibria and the one both players prefer is risk dominant. In other words, no conflict between payoff dominance and risk dominance in the observable delay game exists, in contrast to other games such as (non pure) coordination games. We also find that even if one of two sequential-move outcomes is the unique equilibrium outcome in the observable delay game, it does not imply that the equilibrium outcome is payoff dominant to the other sequential-move outcome.      

The political economy of state-level adoption of natural resource damage programs

U.S. states can implement programs to pursue damage recovery when firms cause natural resource damages (NRDs). We present new empirical evidence that such programs have effectively reduced oil spills in states that adopt them. However, only 34 states had implemented such programs by 2003. We analyze data on 50 states and the District of Columbia from 1980 to 2003 to ascertain the likely determinants of NRD program adoption. We find that states with many environmental accidents adopt programs more rapidly, while income and interest-group pressure have no significant impact on the process. While non-adopting states might benefit from such programs, at least NRD programs are being adopted most rapidly where they can do the most good.      

Consumption externalities with endogenous time preference

This paper shows that in a model with inelastic labor supply, consumption externalities have impacts on stationary consumption and capital. The key element in observing the effects of consumption externalities on stationary consumption and capital is the endogeneity of the time preference rate, which depends on future-oriented resources rather than on private consumption. We conclude that when individuals experience jealousy, they become more impatient, leading to a lower level of capital stock and a higher level of consumption relative to those of the social optimum, while when they experience admiration, these relationships are reversed. We examine an optimal tax policy that replicates the socially optimal path in the centrally planned economy. Finally, using numerical analysis we explore how this economy evolves through time.      

The effect of pay-for-performance contracts on wages

I investigate the role played by learning and self-selection according to comparative advantage in the often reported result that piece rate workers (including commissions) earn more on average compared to other workers. With comparative advantage, the returns to skills differ across pay methods. I find that comparative advantage along with learning about worker skills seem to play a role for workers who are either at an early stage in their career or who are observed for the first time in a given job-match. For older workers, the return to skills is basically the same across pay methods.     

Pricing farm-level agricultural insurance: a Bayesian approach

This paper applies Hierarchical Bayesian Models to price farm-level yield insurance contracts. This methodology considers the temporal effect, the spatial dependence and spatio-temporal models. One of the major advantages of this framework is that an estimate of the premium rate is obtained directly from the posterior distribution. These methods were applied to a farm-level data set of soybean in the State of the Paraná (Brazil), for the period between 1994 and 2003. The model selection was based on a posterior predictive criterion. This study improves considerably the estimation of the fair premium rates considering the small number of observations.      

Optimal Timing of Climate Change Policy: Interaction Between Carbon Taxes and Innovation Externalities

This paper addresses the impact of endogenous technology through research and development (R&D) on the timing of climate change policy. We develop a model with a stock pollutant (carbon dioxide) and abatement technological change through R&D, and we use the model to study the interaction between carbon taxes and innovation externalities. Our analysis shows that the timing of optimal emission reduction policy strongly depends on the set of policy instruments available. When climate-specific R&D targeting instruments are available, policy has to use these to step up early innovation. When these instruments are not available, policy has to steer innovation through creating demand for emission saving technologies. That is, carbon taxes should be high compared to the Pigouvian levels when the abatement industry is developing. Finally, we calibrate the model in order to explore the magnitude of the theoretical findings within the context of climate change policy.      

An Analytical Framework for Joint vs Separate Decisions by Couples in Choice Experiments: The Case of Coastal Water Quality in Tobago

This paper offers an analytical framework for analyzing joint and separate decisions by couples in the context of choice experiments for nonmarket valuation. It reports results from an attribute-based stated preference study in which members of couples are asked to conduct a choice-experiment first individually and then jointly. The choice context was the selection of which beach to visit while on vacation in Tobago. Available alternatives differed in attributes related to coastal water and beach quality such as level of coastal development and fish abundance. Tests of preference equality are reported and structured so as to identify the intra-couple decision-making patterns under taste heterogeneity with both finite and continuous mixed logit. Results from the latter suggest that women’s preferences are found to be predominant in the joint choice-experiment. Results suggest caution in using individual choice rather than joint couple choice when valuing quality changes impacting on couple activities, such as water and beach quality in Tobago, and call for further research on the topic.     

The short and long-run interdependencies between the Eurozone and the USA

We estimate quarterly cointegrating vector autoregressive models for the Eurozone and the USA based on long-run restrictions derived from a dynamic open economy model. Three long-run relations between the Eurozone and the USA emerge: relative purchasing power parity, international interest parity and a stationary output gap between the two economies. Generalized impulse response functions show differences in the dynamic adjustment of the two economies. Due to the I(1)-characteristic of both output series and the stability conditions imposed by the long-run equilibrium relationships, shocks to the model produce level effects only, while growth rates converge to their long-run averages.