Constitutional safeguards against centralization in federal states: An international cross-section analysis

This paper contains an international cross-section analysis of the share of central government expenditure in total government expenditure for a sample of about 50 countries and a subsample of 23 industrial countries in 1989–91. The expenditure shares, their changes and the unexplained residuals for each country are reported in Table 1. As the analysis demonstrates, the share of central government is significantly lower, if income per capita and the country's area are large and if it is a federal state. The explanatory power of the equation rises considerably if the binary dummy for federalism is replaced by quantitative constitutional variables. The most powerful single explanatory variable is the age of the constitutional court in the complete sample or the constitutional court's independence of union institutions in the sample of industrial countries. The equation's explanatory power (adjusted for degrees of freedom) can be raised by allowing also for the degree of control which provincial institutions have over the constitution and over the second chamber and by taking into account whether an increase in federal tax rates requires a popular referendum. Other types of constitutional referenda and the relative age of the federal constitution do not seem to matter. Among the federal states, the share of central government is much larger than predicted in the United States and Mexico, and it is much smaller than predicted in Argentina and Canada. The constitutional variables are particularly helpful in explaining the relatively small share of central government in Switzerland, Malaysia, Germany and Austria. The last section draws conclusions for the design of constitutions with some special applications to the European Union.     

The maastricht fiscal criteria: Required but ineffective?

The paper investigates the rationale for, and the effectiveness of the fiscal criteria in the Maastricht treaty against the background of two questions: What are the incentives for an unsound fiscal policy in EMU, and what are the (potential) negative externalities if such a policy were to occur. The paper argues that EMU creates both incentives for a higher fiscal deficit while respecting solvency, and incentives for not rectifying a potentially unsustainable debt level once one is a member. Unsound fiscal policy could trigger important negative extermalities for the other member countries. The paper concludes that the current fiscal provisions of the Maastricht treaty are not sufficiently well defined and the envisaged sanctions not strong enough to enforce a disciplined fiscal stance. This leads to proposals of supplementary measures for surveillance and alternative sanctions. Staying within the framework of the Maastricht treaty, it is strongly suggested that both debt and deficit criteria should be strictly surveyed, but in view of their conceptual and operational deficiencies they should be supplemented by additional indicators. Based on this broader measurement concept, it is proposed to use semi-automatic and market-led sanctions to enforce a disciplined fiscal stance.     

Transition as a process of large-scale institutional change

After several years of transition experience the theory is very poorly developed except in regard to macroeconomtc stabilization. Another key dimension of transition is institutional change to provide the organizational infrastructure for a market economy. Such issues are analysed here through a series of models focusing on: uncertainty of outcomes, complementarities and interactions between reforms, and political constraints. The choice between “big bang” and more gradualist strategies is studied under various conditions and the paper also examines specific incentive and allocative aspects of the transition from socialism to capitalism.     

Reasons for the low valuation of Russian shares

This note analyses the valuation of Russian assets focusing on the market capitalization of major Russian firms trading in Moscow. It documents that valuations are very low compared to similar assets in mature economies. Several reasons are advanced to explain this phenomenon. The most important of these seems to be the poor record of Russian firms with respect to honouring shareholder rights. Some policy proposals are made to address this problem.     

Gesamtwirtschaftliche Wirkungen der Haushaltspolitik

In der Januarausgabe des WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST ver?ffentlichten wir einen Aufsatz von Ullrich Heilemann, Georg Quaas und Jens Ulrich zu den gesamtwirtschaftlichen Wirkungen der Haushaltspolitik des Koalitionsvertrages.¹ Hierzu eine Replik von Gy?rgy Barabas, Roland D?hrn und Heinz Gebhardt und eine Erwiderung von Ullrich Heilemann, Georg Quaas und Jens Ulrich. Dr. Gy?rgy Barabas, 48, ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, Dr. Roland D?hrn, 51, ist Leiter des Kompetenzbereichs „Wachstum und Konjunktur“ und Heinz Gebhardt, 53, Dipl.-Volkswirt, ist wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter im Kompetenzbereich „Staatsaktivit?t, ?ffentliche Finanzen und Steuern“ des Rheinisch-Westf?lischen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung in Essen. ¹ Vgl. U. Heilemann, G. Quaas, J. U l r i c h : Gesamtwirtschaftliche Wirkungen der Haushaltspolitik des Koalitionsvertrages, in: WIRTSCHAFTSDIENST, 86. Jg. (2006), H. 1, S. 27-36.