Innovation management in organizations

This paper poses the question of how a firm should optimally choose both its organization and its compensation in the pursuit of innovation. One key result is that incentive pay arises as a robust instrument of innovation management both with and without delegation, although in the present model its primary purpose is not to elicit more effort for the creation of new ideas, but to ensure that new ideas are implemented if and only if this is efficient. While without delegation, the firm may “underinvest” in innovation, with delegation the opposite bias may arise as new ideas may be implemented too often (“overinvestment”). The optimal organizational choice trades off these two biases.     

Media,sentiment and market performance in the long run

This paper investigates the impact of media pessimism on financial market returns and volatility in the long run. We hypothesize that media sentiment translates into investor sentiment. Based on the underreaction and overreaction hypotheses [Barberis, N., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny. 1998. “A Model of Investor Sentiment.” Journal of Empirical Economics 49 (3): 307–343], we suggest that media pessimism has an effect on market performance after a lag of several months. We construct a monthly media pessimism indicator by taking the ratio of the number of newspaper articles that contain predetermined negative words to the number of newspaper articles that contain predetermined positive words in the headline and in the lead paragraph. Our results indicate that media pessimism is associated with negative (positive) market returns 14–17 (24–25) months in advance and positive market volatilities 1–20 months in advance. Our results are statistically and economically significant. We find evidence for Granger causality of media pessimism on market performance. Our media pessimism indicator possesses additional predictive power for the Baker and Wurgler [2006. “Investor Sentiment and the Cross-section of Stock Returns.” Journal of Finance 61 (4): 1645–1680] investor sentiment index and the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index.     

Calling circles: network competition with nonuniform calling patterns

We introduce a flexible model of telecommunications network competition with nonuniform calling patterns, accounting for the fact that customers tend to make most calls to a small set of similar people. Equilibrium call prices are distorted away from marginal cost, and competitive intensity is affected by the concentration of calling patterns. Contrary to previous predictions, jointly profit‐maximizing access charges are set above termination cost in order to dampen competition if calling patterns are sufficiently concentrated. We discuss implications for regulating access charges as well as on‐ and off‐net price discrimination.     

Differential Migration Prospects,Skill Formation,and Welfare

This paper develops a one sector, two‐input model with endogenous human capital formation. The two inputs are two types of skilled labor: “engineering,” which exerts a positive externality on total factor productivity, and “law,” which does not. The paper shows that a marginal prospect of migration by engineers increases human capital accumulation of both types of workers (engineers and lawyers), and also the number of engineers who remain in the country. These two effects are socially desirable, since they move the economy from the (inefficient) free‐market equilibrium towards the social optimum. The paper also shows that if the externality effect of engineering is sufficiently powerful, everyone will be better off as a consequence of the said prospect of migration, including the engineers who lose the migration “lottery,” and even the individuals who practice law.     

Fractional Integration of Nominal Exchange Rates: Evidence from CEECs in the Light of EMU Enlargement

This paper uses fractional integration models to describe the long‐run dependence of nominal exchange rates in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). The analysis is validated using nonparametric, semiparametric and parametric techniques. From comparing the results across the three approaches, it was clear that mean reversion takes places only for the euro exchange rates in Bulgaria, Estonia, and Slovenia. Other exchange rates based on the euro also display mean reversion with the parametric methods. For the US dollar rates, the unit‐root null hypothesis cannot be rejected in any single country, indicating that shocks affecting the exchange rates against the US dollar are of a permanent nature, while those directed against the euro are less persistent, and tend sometimes to disappear in the long run. Policy implications are derived.     

Status and the demand for visible goods: experimental evidence on conspicuous consumption

Some economists argue that consumption of publicly visible goods is driven by social status. Making a causal inference about this claim is difficult with observational data. We conduct an experiment in which we vary both whether a purchase of a physical product is publicly visible or kept private and whether the income used for purchase is linked to social status or randomly assigned. Making consumption choices visible leads to a large increase in demand when income is linked to status, but not otherwise. We investigate the characteristics that mediate this effect and estimate its impact on welfare.     

Capacity constrained firms in (labor) markets with adverse selection

Summary. We discuss a competitive (labor) market where firms face capacity constraints and individuals differ according to their productivity. Firms offer two-dimensional contracts like wage and task level. Then workers choose firms and contracts. Workers might be rationed if the number of applicants exceeds the capacity of the firm. We show that under reasonable assumptions on the distribution of capacity an equilibrium in pure strategies (by the firms) exists. This result stands in contrast to the case of unlimited capacity. The utility level is uniquely determined in equilibrium. No rationing occurs in equilibrium, but it does off the equilibrium path. Received: December 29, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2000     

Austrian exporters: unique or alike? New insights and missing puzzle pieces

In this paper we provide detailed evidence on the performance of exporters compared to non-exporters in Austrian manufacturing industries based on firm-level data. The centrepiece of the study is the issue of the export premium, i.e. the size and productivity advantages of exporting firms compared to their purely domestic peers. We present evidence for the existence of sales, labour productivity and wage premia. These results are largely in line with the results found for other European countries. Furthermore we document the existence of large differences in these premia across industries and provide explanations for this finding. Our results are robust with regards to including additional firm control variables such as employment and R&D-related variables though the magnitudes of the export premia become much smaller. We also propose a new interpretation of the export premium estimation with firm fixed effects which we interpret as a result on export switchers. Finally, we employ a probit model to document the importance of sunk export costs for the decision to export.     

Monetary business cycle accounting

This paper investigates the quantitative importance of various types of distortions for inflation and nominal interest rate dynamics by extending business cycle accounting to monetary models. Representing various classes of real and nominal distortions as ‘wedges’ in standard equilibrium conditions allows a quantitative assessment of those distortions. Decomposing the data into movements due to these wedges shows that distortions generating movements in TFP and wedges in equilibrium conditions for asset markets are essential. In contrast, wedges capturing the effects of sticky prices play less important role. These results are robust to alternative implementations of the accounting method.     

Öffentliches und Geheimes

In the second half of 2009, the entire media agenda in Germany was dominated by the swine flu, next to the German Federal Parliament elections. Criticism was voiced in the media against the pharmaceutical industry for lobbying the nationwide swine flu vaccination, which was widely considered nothing but a product of the industry’s lobbying power. In order to avoid the usual interviews with lobbyists, we attempted to apply a new methodological framework approach in analysing lobbying processes and key stakeholders in the public sphere—and outside. Crucial to the diversified approach, which involves quantitative content analysis of media coverage and press releases, are interviews with journalists, lobbyists’ network analysis and internet research on biographies. Although a conspiracy could not be conclusively proven, the results do indicate associations that validate the criticism of the industry’s lobbying activities.