Satiated Consumers: Allocation of Consumption Time in an Affluent Society

Based on Ian Steedman's seminal contribution ‘Consumption Takes Time’, we propose a formal activity‐based model for consumer behaviour. The model simultaneously incorporates choices over consumption time, as well as quantities and qualities of products consumed. We identify and examine preconditions for satiation with products and draw implications for economic policy. Satiation with products explains the limited effects of price or income changes on demand and questions the pertinence of economic growth for development. It further highlights the relevance of working time reductions for well‐being.     

TREATMENT OF SUBSIDIES IN NATIONAL ACCOUNTS*

This document contains a critical analysis of some aspects of the treatment of subsidies in the present system of national accounts (United Nations SNA and the ESA, i.e. the European System of Integrated Economic Accounts) as background to the current discussion of their revision. One of the conventions used is that subsidies are recorded as a resource in the accounts of the market producer units which actually receive them. Should this rule of the receiver be applied in every case? The paper suggests that it would be preferable to attribute subsidies to the beneficiary in those cases where a subsidy received by one unit is the counterpart of a reduction in price which he grants to another unit which buys something from him (and which is the real beneficiary), so long as the discount is only granted to specific categories of purchasers. Recording in the accounts of the beneficiary results in a better distribution in the branch accounts and moreover greater stability of the national accounts in the face of minor institutional changes. The problem of allocation arises also for transfers designed to cover social risks or needs (illness, invalidism, old age, maternity). For this category of “social” goods and services for which general government wholly or partially assumes the costs to households, the transfer is treated either as a subsidy to collective consumption or a social benefit. The institutional arrangements, which vary from country to country, product to product and over time, give rise to profoundly different recording in the accounts. In order to restrict these differences, improve comparability between countries, permit analysis of trends over time, make the accounts less sensitive to different institutional arrangements and obtain a figure for household consumption which does not depend on the particular way in which the costs of such consumption is borne, the present document suggests that consumption subsidies should be treated as individual consumption expenditure of general government.     

Bargaining with a possibly committed seller

We consider negotiations with an open time horizon where a buyer has private information about his valuation and does not know whether the seller is committed to the advertised price. This setting combines two common specifications made in the non-cooperative bargaining literature: one side is privately informed about its valuation, which is drawn from a continuum, and the other side is possibly committed to a fixed offer. We analyze the game both in discrete and in continuous time and show convergence of the two settings, which extends results from Abreu and Gul [2000. Bargaining and reputation. Econometrica 68, 85–117]. One interesting result is that as time proceeds, the non-committed seller becomes less likely to concede in a given period, i.e., it appears as if he becomes more “stubborn.” We further show that a seller may prefer to negotiate with a “worse” buyer as this enhances the value of his possible commitment.     

Indirect versus Direct Constraints in Markets with Vertical Integration

For an assessment of market power on the wholesale (or merchant) market in the presence of vertically integrated firms, we analyze the interaction of direct constraints, arising from competition on the wholesale market, and of indirect constraints, arising from substitution on the retail market. A vertically integrated firm that still participates in the merchant market exerts both direct and indirect constraints. We analyze the factors that determine the importance of indirect constraints. We find that, in contrast to a common presumption, indirect constraints are sometimes more powerful than direct constraints. We furthermore analyze the incentives of integrated firms to still participate in the merchant market, provided that this is technologically feasible.     

On exact pricing of FX options in multivariate time-changed Lévy models

In this paper we discuss foreign-exchange option pricing in conditionally Gaussian models, namely in the variance-gamma and in the normal-inverse Gaussian models. It happens that in the both models closed-form pricing is attainable. The used method developes the one of the work by Madan et al. (Eur Finance Rev 2:79–105, 1998) where the price of the European call is primarily derived. The obtained formulas are based on values of the Gauss and the Appell hypergeometric functions.