Productivity growth and biased technological change: Credit banks in Japan

This paper investigates the productivity change of Japanese credit banks with a Malmquist index and the input technological bias during 2000–2006. Our results indicate that the traditional growth accounting method, which assumes Hicks neutral technological change, is not appropriate for analyzing changes in productivity. Our analysis unambiguously shows that management of Shinkin banks has to be improved. These must be based on the improvement of technical efficiency and/or technological change, emulating the procedures of the best-practice banks, i.e., those banks with Malmquist productivity scores higher than one and simultaneously with technical efficiency and technological change higher than one.     

Market selection with learning and catching up with the Joneses

We study the market selection hypothesis in complete financial markets, populated by heterogeneous agents. We allow for a rich structure of heterogeneity: individuals may differ in their beliefs concerning the economy, information and learning mechanism, risk aversion, impatience and ‘catching up with the Joneses’ preferences. We develop new techniques for studying the long-run behavior of such economies, based on Strassen’s functional law of the iterated logarithm. In particular, we explicitly determine an agent’s survival index and show how the latter depends on the agent’s characteristics. We use these results to study the long-run behavior of the equilibrium interest rate and the market price of risk.     

Austrian exporters: unique or alike? New insights and missing puzzle pieces

In this paper we provide detailed evidence on the performance of exporters compared to non-exporters in Austrian manufacturing industries based on firm-level data. The centrepiece of the study is the issue of the export premium, i.e. the size and productivity advantages of exporting firms compared to their purely domestic peers. We present evidence for the existence of sales, labour productivity and wage premia. These results are largely in line with the results found for other European countries. Furthermore we document the existence of large differences in these premia across industries and provide explanations for this finding. Our results are robust with regards to including additional firm control variables such as employment and R&D-related variables though the magnitudes of the export premia become much smaller. We also propose a new interpretation of the export premium estimation with firm fixed effects which we interpret as a result on export switchers. Finally, we employ a probit model to document the importance of sunk export costs for the decision to export.     

The Interplay of Project Control and Interorganizational Learning: Mitigating Effects on Cultural Differences in Global,Multisource ISD Outsourcing Projects

Research into global, multisource, information systems development outsourcing projects has uncovered management challenges, including cultural differences on multiple levels. While control mechanisms and interorganizational learning have been shown to contribute to the mitigation of cultural differences in such projects, a gap persists regarding the effect of the interplay between these mechanisms. This study employs an exploratory single-case study design to analyze how formal and informal control mechanisms and interorganizational learning interact and thus contribute to the mitigation of cultural differences in global, multisource, information systems development outsourcing projects. With the key finding that the influence of informal controls and interorganizational learning on formal controls changes over time, this research helps expand the domain of control dynamics in global IS projects. This study also contributes to literature on ways to handle cultural differences in global, multisource, IS outsourcing projects.     

Corporate social responsibility and tax aggressiveness: An empirical analysis

This study examines the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate tax aggressiveness. Based on a sample of 408 publicly listed Australian corporations for the 2008/2009 financial year, our regression results show that the higher the level of CSR disclosure of a corporation, the lower is the level of corporate tax aggressiveness. We find a negative and statistically significant association between CSR disclosure and tax aggressiveness which holds across a number of different regression model specifications, thus more socially responsible corporations are likely to be less tax aggressive in nature. Finally, the regression results from our additional analysis indicate that the social investment commitment and corporate and CSR strategy (including the ethics and business conduct) of a corporation are important elements of CSR activities that have a negative impact on tax aggressiveness.     

Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable: Bank Capital as a Substitute for Prudential Regulation

The Financial CHOICE Act recently passed by the House proposes to create an “off‐ramp” that would allow banks to escape burdensome prudential regulation if the ratio of their equity capital to their total assets is 10% or more. The Financial Economists Roundtable supports this idea as a means of reducing regulatory costs, but believes some additional safeguards are needed. A capital ratio of 10% may not be high enough to discourage banks from excessive risk taking. A solution is to have two capital requirements for banks choosing the off‐ramp: one absolute (as proposed in the act) and one risk‐based. The FER believes that many banks will prefer this regime to the current burdensome prudential regulation, especially if regulators simplify the setting of risk weights and make them more rule‐based. Regulators setting minimum capital requirements should consider not only a bank’s stand‐alone risk, but also the systemic risk posed by banks, as well as the tendency of accounting measures of income and assets to overstate the economic value of banks’ equity capital. The Financial Choice Act would also eliminate useful elements of ongoing supervision and regulation, not all of which can be addressed by higher capital alone. Furthermore, to facilitate regulatory learning about risks, off‐ramped banks should continue to report the data that regulators use for stress tests, even if they are no longer subjected to the discipline of stress tests. Finally, the act is viewed as too permissive in its treatment of off‐ramped banks that get into trouble. To prevent gaming of regulation, FERC recommends that off‐ramped banks that subsequently fall below the minimum requirements should be required to raise new capital immediately.