Transparency and trust: the case of the European Central Bank

We examine how the transparency of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy affects the amount of trust that the citizens of the European Union have in this institution. We use nearly half a million individual responses from the European Commission’s Eurobarometer survey from 2000 to 2011 and estimate probit regressions with sample selection. We find that transparency exerts a non-linear effect on trust. Transparency increases trust, but only up to a certain point; too much transparency harms trust. This result is robust to controlling for a number of macroeconomic conditions, financial stability transparency measures, and economic and socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, including examining respondents in European Union countries that do not use the euro and addressing clustering issues.     

The impact of taxes and wasteful government spending on giving

We examine how taxes impact charitable giving and how this relationship is affected by the degree of wasteful government spending. In our model, individuals make donations to charities knowing that the government collects a flat-rate tax on income (net of charitable donations) and redistributes part of the tax revenue. The rest of the tax revenue is wasted. The model predicts that a higher tax rate increases charitable donations. Surprisingly, the model shows that a higher degree of waste decreases donations (when the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption is high enough). We test the model’s predictions using a laboratory experiment with actual donations to charities and find that the tax rate has an insignificant effect on giving. The degree of waste, however, has a large, negative and highly significant effect on giving.

     

Incentives for input foreclosure

We analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm to foreclose downstream rivals in a model of upstream price competition between suppliers of only imperfectly substitutable inputs. Our main motivation is a critical assessment of common assertions that draw inferences from pre-merger observable variables to post-merger incentives to foreclose. In particular, we find that, contrary to some commonly expressed views, high margins on the downstream and low margins on the upstream market are not good predictors for the incentives of a newly integrated firm to foreclose rivals. Besides this contribution to policy, our model also extends existing results in the literature on vertical foreclosure through allowing for the interaction of product differentiation on the upstream and on the downstream market.     

INCIDENCE AND DETERMINANTS OF HOUSING UPGRADING IN CAIRO

Cairo is a very high density metropolis, where informal multi-unit housing accounts for a large share of the housing stock. Combined with a low residential mobility rate, this argues for dwelling improvements as a key element by which lower income homeowners can improve their housing circumstances. The article reports the extent of dwelling upgrading for this group and analyzes the determinants separately of both maintenance and major improvements. The analytic model is based on prior work, adjusted to the Egyptian context and available data. The incidence of improvements appears to be lower in Cairo than in more tropical megacities. However, the findings broadly confirm a general similarity in the determinants of housing investments by lower-income Cairene owners with those of lower income owners in more tropical locations. Three factors stand out: tenure security, household income, and the stimulation effects on investment of better infrastructure and poor dwelling conditions.     

Accounting for preference dependency in target costing – a note

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - Target costing is a well-established strategic cost management tool in theory and practice. The original target costing model implies independence of...     

A lender-based theory of collateral

We consider an imperfectly competitive loan market in which a local relationship lender has an information advantage vis-à-vis distant transaction lenders. Competitive pressure from the transaction lenders prevents the local lender from extracting the full surplus from projects. As a result, the local lender inefficiently rejects marginally profitable projects. Collateral mitigates the inefficiency by increasing the local lender's payoff from precisely those marginally profitable projects that she inefficiently rejects. The model predicts that, controlling for observable borrower risk, collateralized loans are more likely to default ex post, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. The model also predicts that borrowers for whom local lenders have a relatively smaller information advantage face higher collateral requirements, and that technological innovations that narrow the information advantage of local lenders, such as small business credit scoring, lead to a greater use of collateral in lending relationships.     

What is the impact of problem loans on Japanese bank productivity growth?

This paper examines for the first time the impact of problem loans on Japanese productivity growth. We exploit a new data set of Japanese problem loans classified into two categories: bankrupt and restructured loans. We opt for a novel and flexible productivity growth decomposition that allows to measure the direct impact of these problem loans on productivity growth. The results reveal that Japanese bank productivity growth was severely constrained by bankrupt and restructured loans early in 2000s, whilst some persistence of the negative impact of problem loans on productivity growth is observed in the late 2000s. Thereafter, there is only some partial recovery in the productivity growth from 2012 to 2015. Further, we also perform cluster analysis to examine convergence or divergence across regions and over time. We observe limited convergence, though Regional Banks seem to form clusters in some regions.