How do investors react under uncertainty?

It has long been accepted that risk plays an important role in determining valuation where risk reflects that investors are unsure of future returns but are able to express their prior expectations by a probability distribution of these returns. Knight (1921) introduced the concept of uncertainty where investors possess incomplete knowledge about this distribution and so are unable to formulate priors over all possible outcomes. One common approach for making uncertainty tractable is to assume that investors faced with uncertainty will base their decisions on the worst case scenario (i.e. follow maxmin expected utility). As a consequence it is postulated that investors will become more pessimistic as uncertainty increases, upgrading bad news and downgrading good news. Using Australian data, we find evidence that investors react to bad news at times of high market uncertainty but largely ignore good news which is consistent with them taking on a pessimistic bias. However, we also find evidence of the reverse when market uncertainty is low with investors taking on an optimistic stance by ignoring bad news but reacting to good news. We also find that the impact that market uncertainty has on the reaction of investors to new information is modified by the prevailing market sentiment at the time of the announcement. Besides throwing light on the question of how uncertainty impacts on investor behaviour, our findings seriously challenge the common assumption made that investors consistently deal with uncertainty by applying maxmin expected utility.     

Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995

This paper investigates the reaction ofstock prices to enactment of the Private Securities LitigationReform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). Based on a sample of 489 high-technologyfirms, we find that the PSLRA was wealth-increasing, on average,and that the market reaction is more positive for firms at greatestrisk of being sued in a securities class action. However, wealso show that the PSLRA was less beneficial for firms likelyto be the subject of a meritorious lawsuit. Collectively, ourevidence implies that shareholders generally benefit from restrictionson private securities litigation, although these benefits aremitigated when other mechanisms for curbing fraudulent activityare inadequate.     

Are Incentives the Bricks or the Building?

The efforts of economists to emphasize the importance of incentives as determinants of organizational performance, while successful to some degree, may have left the mistaken impression that "getting the incentives right" is the only task requiring the attention of senior executives when designing corporate organizations. The author identifies the incentive-intensive companies envisioned by economists as "mercenary organizations" (or MOs), or companies whose distinguishing feature is near-complete reliance on financial rewards and controls. Citing the difficulties of devising an effective incentive system that cannot be gamed (which he calls the organizational equivalent of "an anti-gravity machine"), the article questions whether such organizations are likely to yield superior performance.
As an alternative to paying more attention to incentive design, the author suggests devoting more corporate resources to seeking and attracting individuals with low "monitoring costs." After holding up examples of top executives who appear committed to that search, the author posits a "character-rich" organization (CRO) as an alternative to the MO of the economists.
Then, viewing all companies as occupying points on a continuum with the MO and CRO as its poles, the author argues that all companies combine elements of both kinds of organizations. And perhaps most important, the CEOs of many of the most successful large organizations, without minimizing the importance of incentives, pay even greater attention to the search for trustworthy individuals and the creation of a culture of teamwork and accountability.     

Equilibrium prices in the presence of delegated portfolio management

This paper analyzes the asset pricing implications of commonly used portfolio management contracts linking the compensation of fund managers to the excess return of the managed portfolio over a benchmark portfolio. The contract parameters, the extent of delegation, and equilibrium prices are all determined endogenously within the model we consider. Symmetric (fulcrum) performance fees distort the allocation of managed portfolios in a way that induces a significant and unambiguous positive effect on the prices of the assets included in the benchmark and a negative effect on the Sharpe ratios. Asymmetric performance fees have more complex effects on equilibrium prices and Sharpe ratios, with the signs of these effects fluctuating stochastically over time in response to variations in the funds' excess performance.     

An Institutional Theory Perspective on Corruption: The Case of a Developing Democracy

The purpose of this paper is to use quantitative data to describe corruption in the SANPS, and use Luo's ( 2005 ) institutional theory to gain insights into how corruption develops and remains entrenched despite the introduction of anti‐corruption legislation. A total of 1,500 questionnaires were distributed to public servants in nine provinces, but predominantly in Kwa Zulu Natal and Gauteng. There were 702 returned giving a response rate of 47%. We conclude that the findings discussed in this paper lend support for Luo's theoretical model being able to provide insight into the development of corruption, its consequences and possible remedies.     

Altera:ROI说了算！

Altera是市场容量相对较小却又十分重要的可编程市场上两家占有统治地位的公司之一。虽然PLD的销售额名列第2,但是Altera已经从首要竞争者赛灵思公司手中抢夺了一定的市场份额,这部分地要归功于Altera不断探求什么才是FPGAs和ASICs在当今工业中的合适定位？EDN执行主编Ron Wilson和Altera总裁兼首席执行官John Daane进行了一次对话,后者的经历给予他一个独一无二的窗口来观察半导体工艺、全球芯片工业和系统设计之间的交互性。     

Preservation or Conversion? Valuation and Evaluation of a Mangrove forest in the Philippines

Mangrove ecosystems are rapidly declining in many parts of the world. This has resulted in the loss of important environmental and economic products and services including forest products, flood mitigation and nursery grounds for fish. The aquaculture industry was the single biggest threat to mangroves in the Philippines until 1981 when conversion of the remaining mangrove stands was prohibited by law. However, the decreasing yield from capture fisheries is putting pressure for the re-examination of this policy. To understand the importance of mangroves, insight is needed into the value of products and services provided is needed. This article compares the costs and benefits of mangrove preservation with those generated by alternative uses such as aquaculture and forestry. Equity and sustainability objectives are taken into account, in addition to economic efficiency and analyzed according to the perspectives of the different types of decision makers involved.     

The value of pharmaceuticals--some direction for employers

The costs of drugs keep rising. Are they worth it? Employers should consider value over cost, and make decisions based on diagnostics and research. They should thoroughly examine their organizations' experience to determine high-priority health conditions and do cost-effectiveness studies (using experienced consultants if necessary) that focus on all of the consequences of conditions and indicate the best medical and pharmaceutical therapies to treat them. Doing so should produce both human and financial dividends.     

Board 3.0: What the Private‐Equity Governance Model Can Offer Public Companies∗

The authors view board structures as an adaptive institution that responds to the key challenges faced by public companies: helping management solve the problems of production and organization of large‐scale enterprise; limiting managerial agency costs; serving as a delegated monitor of the firm's compliance obligations; and responding to the governance environment of changing shareholder ownership patterns. U.S. company board structures are shown to have evolved over time, often through discontinuous lurches, as particular functions have waxed and waned in importance. This article is part of a larger project that traces two iterations of the public company board, what the authors call Board 1.0 (the “advisory board”) and Board 2.0 (the “monitoring board”). The authors argue in particular that Board 2.0, as embedded in both current practice and regulation, now fails the functional fit test for many companies. First, it does not scale to match the dramatic increase in the size and complexity of many modern public corporations. Second, at a time of reconcentrated ownership achieved through institutional investors and increased activism, it does not have the expertise and commitment needed to resolve the tension between managerial or market myopia, or “short‐termism,” and managerial “hyperopia.” This article holds out an optional alternative, Board 3.0, which would bring to the public company board some strategies used by private equity firms for their portfolio company boards. Such “Portco” boards consist of directors who are “thickly informed,” “heavily resourced,” and “intensely interested.” Bringing such “empowered directors” to public company boards could facilitate evolution of the public company board model in response to dramatic changes in the corporate business environment. The authors also suggest possible routes for implementing Board 3.0, including the enlisting of PE firms as “relational investors” that would have both capacity and incentives to engineer changes in board structure.