Asset Revaluations in the Accounts of UK National Health Service Trusts

This paper reports the results of an investigation into the impact of the revaluation of fixed assets on the reported results of NHS ambulance services. It recalculates the accounting rate of return of individual trusts after removing revaluation adjustments and examines the published responses of trusts. The numerical analysis demonstrates that, in general, revaluation has depressed the stated rate of return in an inconsistent manner. Failure to meet the required rate of return may cause a trust to be subjected to additional monitoring and management reorganisation while the trusts respond by explaining deviations in the accounting return measure by referring to revaluations and other technical adjustments. Management decisions made in response to these accounting measures may be sub-optimal in delivering health care but appropriate in achieving the desired accounting outcome.     

Auditor Expertise and the Estimation of Dollar Error in Accounts

A major task that auditors undertake in formulating their audit opinion is to estimate the dollar error that might exist in accounts in light of their evaluation of internal control strengths and weaknesses. The research that has been undertaken to evaluate the quality of auditor performance on this task, however, has produced mixed results. The current study tries to overcome some theoretical limitations and measurement limitations that have undermined prior studies. Forty practising auditors rated their abilities on fourteen characteristics derived from a model of expertise. They then undertook an experiment where they judged the extent of dollar error that might exist in the inventories of a manufacturing company. They based their judgments on working papers provided to them that contained, among other information, an evaluation of the company's internal control system. An estimate of the 'true' dollar error in the inventories was calculated using a program that simulated the company's internal control and accounting system. This estimate was then used to calculate the accuracy of the auditors' judgments. Their ratings on the expertise characteristics were not related to their judgment accuracy. Their ratings were related, however, to their confidence in their judgment accuracy. Auditors who considered themselves more expert at the task were more confident in their judgment accuracy but they were, in fact, no more accurate than auditors who considered themselves to be less expert at the task.     

Tax management strategies with multiple risky assets

We study the consumption-portfolio problem in a setting with capital gain taxes and multiple risky stocks to understand how short selling influences portfolio choice with a shorting-the-box restriction. Our analysis uncovers a novel trading flexibility strategy whereby, to minimize future tax-induced trading costs, the investor optimally shorts one of the stocks (or equivalently, buys put options) even when no stock has an embedded gain. Alternatively, an imperfect form of shorting the box can reduce aggregate equity exposure ex post. Given these two short selling strategies, it is common for an unconstrained investor to short some equity while a constrained investor holds a positive investment in all stocks. With no shorting, the benefit of trading separately in multiple stocks is not economically significant.     

Do firms understate stock option-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 123?

Focusing on the four key option pricing model inputs—expected option life, expected stock price volatility, expected dividend yield, and the risk-free interest rate for the expected life of the option—this study finds that firms understate option value estimates and, thus, stock-based compensation expense disclosed under SFAS 123. As predicted based on incentives and opportunities for management to understate SFAS 123 expense, the understatement of option value estimates is increasing in proxies for the magnitude of the expense, is greater for firms with weaker corporate governance, and, to a lesser extent, is increasing in the excessiveness of executive pay. The findings are strongest for the expected option life and expected stock price volatility input assumptions, consistent with firms’ greater latitude in determining these inputs. We find weaker evidence of understatement associated with the expected dividend yield assumption, and none for the interest rate assumption, consistent with these inputs being less amenable to discretion. Taken together, our findings raise some concern that the exercise of management discretion adversely affects the overall reliability of SFAS 123 expense.

Buyer-Type Effects in Conservation and Preservation Property Values

Properties can be bought by government agencies, land trusts, or private entities for conservation and preservation purposes, such as farmland preservation, wildlife refuges, other conservation, and cultural and historical preservation. There is variation in the dollars paid per acre across properties and across buyer type. An option value model based on future potential land uses is used to explain much of this variation. The data used in our analysis is sales transactions data for conservation and preservation purposes from throughout the United States. We find that much of the value of conservation properties is derived from future potential land uses, including housing, timber, recreation, and conservation. We confirm that public versus private buyers value options differently, which makes sense from a public good point of view, if markets are thin.     

Baylor University Roundtable on The Corporate Mission, CEO Pay, and Improving the Dialogue with Investors

A small group of academics and practitioners discusses four major controversies in the theory and practice of corporate finance:

• • What is the social purpose of the public corporation? Should corporate managements aim to maximize the profitability and value of their companies, or should they instead try to balance the interests of their shareholders against those of “stakeholder” groups, such as employees, customers, and local communities?
• • Should corporate executives consider ending the common practice of earnings guidance? Are there other ways of shifting the focus of the public dialogue between management and investors away from near-term earnings and toward longer-run corporate strategies, policies, and goals? And can companies influence the kinds of investors who buy their shares?
• • Are U.S. CEOs overpaid? What role have equity ownership and financial incentives played in the past performance of U.S. companies? And are there ways of improving the design of U.S. executive pay?
• • Can the principles of corporate governance and financial management at the core of the private equity model—notably, equity incentives, high leverage, and active participation by large investors—be used to increase the values of U.S. public companies?

     

The high volume return premium: Cross-country evidence

We examine the high volume return premium across 41 different countries and find it to be a phenomenon found in both developed and emerging markets. The premium is not caused by systematic differences in risk or liquidity. Using Merton's (1987) investor recognition hypothesis as a guide, we find the magnitude of the premium is generally associated with country and firm characteristics hypothesized to affect returns subsequent to a change in a stock's visibility. We also characterize the time-series properties of the premium and consider economic trading strategies.     

Technological innovation and real investment booms and busts

We investigate why new, high-risk technologies can attract excessive and often unprofitable investment. We develop an equilibrium model in which rational, risk-averse agents overinvest in a risky technology, possibly to the point that its expected return is negative. Overinvestment results from relative wealth concerns which arise endogenously from the imperfect tradability of future endowments. Competition over future consumption leads to an indirect utility for wealth with “keeping up with the Joneses” properties that can induce herding. Because overinvestment increases with the risk of the technology, our model can explain why new, risky technological innovations may promote investment bubbles.     

Competition and Efficiency after Privatization: The Role of the NAO

One of the arguments for privatization is to promote market competition in order to facilitate efficiency gains. This review of NAO privatization reports shows that the promotion of competition is rarely stated as an objective of a privatization and, where it is, it can lead to difficulties in drawing objective audit conclusions. The work of the regulators is of considerable importance after privatization; and a more recent role for the NAO is that of responsibility for the financial audit and value-for-money studies of these regulators. These NAO studies provide new opportunities to review the effectiveness of the regulators and to promote accountability in competition policy after privatization.