On Limits of Uniquely Best Linear Estimators

In a general linear model, it is shown that all admissible linear estimators are limits of linear estimators that are uniquely best at some point in an extended parameter set. The principal result shows that a linear estimator that is uniquely best at a pointW ₂ among multiple linear estimators that are best at a pointW ₁ is the limit of uniquely best estimators at points approachingW ₁ along the line joiningW ₁ andW ₂. Research supported in part by U.S.A.F. Aerospace Research Laboratories under contract F33615-71-C-1463, summer 1973, and in part by Grant DMS-9104811 from the National Science Foundation.     

Strategy as ecology

Microsoft's and Wal-Mart's preeminence in modern business has been attributed to any number of factors--from the vision and drive of their founders to the companies' aggressive competitive practices. But the authors maintain that the success realized by these two very different companies is due only partly to the organizations themselves; a bigger factor is the success of the networks of companies with which Microsoft and Wal-Mart do business. Most companies today inhabit ecosystems--loose networks of suppliers, distributors, and outsourcers; makers of related products or services; providers of relevant technology; and other organizations that affect, and are affected by, the creation and delivery of a company's own offering. Despite being increasingly central to modern business, ecosystems are still poorly understood and even more poorly managed. The analogy between business networks and biological ecosystems can aid this understanding by vividly highlighting certain pivotal concepts. The moves that a company makes will, to varying degrees, affect the health of its business network, which in turn will ultimately affect the organization's performance--for ill as well as for good. Because a company, like an individual species in a biological ecosystem, ultimately shares its fate with the network as a whole, smart firms pursue strategies that will benefit everyone. So how can you promote the health and the stability of your own ecosystem, determine your place in it, and develop a strategy to match your role, thereby helping to ensure your company's well-being? It depends on your role--current and potential--within the network. Is your company a niche player, a keystone, or a dominator? The answer to this question may be different for different parts of your business. It may also change as your ecosystem changes. Knowing what to do requires understanding the ecosystem and your organization's role in it.     

The twilight of science-Last of the ‘gods’

That technology is the world's dominant religion and science its theology, is a theme which I have developed over two decades. Once linguistic hurdles are cleared, this thesis appears self-evident, even trite. The newer proposition in this paper is that just as with all other religions, the public which will no doubt continue to want the fruits (and pay the price) of the techno-religion is not at all sure about the value of the science-theology. We are definitely witnessing the beginning of the end for the first universal theology and its god, science.     

Optimal stationary consumption with stochastic production and resources

Uncertainty about technology and resources is represented in terms of uncertainty about an (exogenous) environment whose successive states form a stationary stochastic process, with probabilities that are unaffected by economic decisions. The successive states of the economy depend both on the environment and on the decisions taken with regard to production and consumption. It is shown that, under conditions that are natural extensions of “neoclassical” conditions in the case of certainty, (1) Capital saturation is possible, i.e., an optimal stationary stochastic program exists, and (2) An optimal program can be sustained by a price system that takes the form of a stationary stochastic process of price vectors. In other words, an optimal stationary program can be sustained by a stochastic “equilibrium,” in which at each date the optimal production decisions maximize expected intertemporal profit, and the optimal aggregate consumption vector has minimum cost among all aggregate consumption vectors yielding no less (social) utility.     

Model assisted survey sampling strategy in two phases

Postulating a super-population regression model connecting a size variable, a cheaply measurable variable and an expensively observable variable of interest, an asymptotically optimal double sampling strategy to estimate the survey population total of the third variable is specified. To render it practicable, unknown model-parameters in the optimal estimator are replaced by appropriate statistics. The resulting generalized regression estimator is then shown to have a model-cum-asymptotic design based expected square error equal to that of the asymptotically optimum estimator itself. An estimator for design variance of the estimator is also proposed.     

International trade warfare: Economic and political strategic considerations

An actor government may seek to change a policy of a target state by exerting an economic toll. Trade warfare can only impose high economic costs on the target if the actor can withhold noncompetitive exports or irreplaceable markets. Economic damage may not be sufficient. Decision-makers in the target will be more concerned with their own benefits and costs than with those of the national economy. Governments seem likely to continue to use economic warfare, despite its weak record of identifiable success, because the measures are valuable as signals to domestic constituencies, the target government and third nations.     

FOMC VOTING BEHAVIOR AND ELECTORAL CYCLES: PARTISAN IDEOLOGY AND PARTISAN LOYALTY

The influence of partisan and electoral considerations on the monetary policy voting behavior of Federal Reserve Governors is investigated in the context of a model permitting the estimation of reaction functions on the basis of FOMC voting records. The results suggest that once we have controlled for the state of the economy and for the prevailing stance of monetary policy, both partisan ideologies and partisan loyalties appear to play an important role in the Governors'voting calculus.