Reference Dependence Effects on WTA and WTP Value Functions and Their Disparity

In this study we investigate two reference dependence effects in a choice experiment. The first is the effect of the well-known distinction between gains and losses, the second is the effect of changing the reference value on willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept (WTA). The latter has to our knowledge not been studied before. We hypothesize that there are differences between WTA and WTP, and that both value functions and their disparity are affected by the absolute value of the reference point. We test our hypotheses using a choice experiment with trade-offs between changes in flood probabilities and costs. The choice experiments elicit WTP and WTA, using two flood probability reference values, yielding four separate value functions. Our findings show that a substantial WTA–WTP disparity exists, and that this disparity increases when moving away from the reference point. Also, both WTA and WTP value functions are affected by the flood probability reference value, and the WTA–WTP disparity increases when the flood probability reference point increases. Both findings suggest that welfare effects caused by changes in public good provision depend not only on the direction of change (loss aversion), but also the reference value. Moreover, our results show that the latter effect is larger for losses than for gains. We introduce the concept of reference point updating as a possible explanation for these findings.     

Democracies cooperate more: even where it threatens to bite?

Estimating two-step selection models, we find that more democratic governments are more likely to conclude preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and to agree to stricter investment provisions related to pre-establishment national treatment and investor–state dispute settlement in PTAs. This is surprising when considering the potentially high costs of litigation.     

JOINT VENTURES, POLLUTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

We examine the impact of emission taxes on the pollution level in a duopoly framework with endogenous market structure. We demonstrate that an increase in emission taxes could trigger a regime switch from joint ventures to Cournot competition, causing the pollution level to increase. Such a phenomenon is likely to happen when the concerned industry is reasonably profitable, and the synergistic gain between joint venture partners is not too strong. Moreover, emission taxes can implement the first best outcome if and only if the industry is not too polluting. In case it is, the second best level of taxes may or may not equal the optimal tax under either joint venture or Cournot competition.     

The effect of labor market monopsony on economic growth

In this endogenous growth model, a minimum efficient scale of production and workers’ home-to-work travel costs combine to give firms monopsony power, and this monopsony power leads to slower growth. Monopsony drives the wage below the marginal product of labor. This lower wage leads to lower investment in human capital and thereby to a lower growth rate. This makes investment in human capital – and therefore the growth rate – suboptimal. We provide evidence from a cross-country panel to support our model: Urbanization, which we assume is determined by a country’s exogenous population density and cropland area, positively impacts the wage share of output; the wage share positively impacts educational attainment; higher-income countries have higher wage shares; and within-country upticks in the wage share have a positive lagged effect on the growth rate.     

Borrower Targeting under Microfinance Competition with Motivated Microfinance Institutions and Strategic Complementarity

We examine how increased competition among motivated microfinance institutions (MFIs) impacts the poorest borrowers' access to microfinance. We find that competition depends on inequality, technology, and the possibility of double‐dipping (borrowing from several sources). Without competition, even a motivated MFI may lend to the not‐so‐poor in preference to poor borrowers. If double‐dipping is feasible, competition may encourage lending to the poor. The presence of double‐dipping is critical for MFI competition to have a positive effect. When double‐dipping is feasible, MFI coordination may worsen borrower targeting whenever inequality is intermediate. We discuss policy implications dealing with double‐dipping, MFI coordination, and competition.     

Improving value transfer through socio‐economic adjustments in a multicountry choice experiment of water conservation alternatives

This study tests the transferability of the nonmarket values of water conservation for domestic and environmental purposes across three south European countries and Australia applying a common choice experiment design. Different approaches are followed to test the transferability of the estimated values, aiming to minimise transfer errors for use in policy analysis, comparing both single‐ and multicountry transfers, with and without socio‐economic adjustments. Within Europe, significant differences are found between implicit prices for environmental water use, but not for domestic water use. In the Australian case study, alleviating restrictions on domestic water use has no significant value. Pooling the three European samples improves the transferability of the environmental flow values between Europe and Australia. Results show that a reduction in transfer error is achieved when controlling for unobserved and observed preference heterogeneity in the single‐ and multicountry transfers, providing additional support for the superiority of socio‐economic adjustment procedures in value transfer.     

On the robustness of the trade-inducing effects of trade agreements and currency unions

Regional trade agreements (RTAs) and currency unions (CUs) are potentially endogenous trade cost proxies in equations estimating their effects on bilateral trade. In case of both, this problem is magnified by the paucity of reliable instruments. Instead of resorting to the oft-employed alternative of panel data to address selection on just the time-invariant unobservables, this paper assesses the extent to which a positive association between CU or RTA membership and bilateral trade can be considered causal. In addition, it attends to recent concerns over the extensive margin of trade (at the country-level) and the issue of zero trade observations in log-linearized gravity models by relying more on a bivariate probit analysis. Despite not identifying point estimates, striking results are obtained. While most cross-sections exhibit a positive association between both RTAs and CUs and trade, the evidence in favor of a robust causal effect is strong mainly for CUs. However, the magnitude of the CU effect is still sensitive to the amount of selection on unobservables. Moreover, selection into RTAs (CUs) is mostly found to be positive (negative). Finally, the presence of spillovers across the policy regimes is also detected.     

IJV Partner Trustworthy Behaviour: The Role of Host Country Governance and Partner Selection Criteria

This study provides new insight into the interplay between partner‐ and institution‐level bases of trustworthy behaviour in international joint ventures (IJVs). The results of the study, based on survey and archival data collected on 144 IJVs across six Asian countries, revealed that host country governance quality directly and positively influences IJV partner trustworthy behaviour. It was also found that weak host country governance undermined the effectiveness of certain partner selection criteria in serving as a tool for establishing an IJV with a trustworthy partner. Furthermore, through distinguishing between two dimensions of trustworthiness (benevolence and competence), it was demonstrated that partner benevolence is facilitated by relationship‐oriented criteria, whereas partner competence is facilitated by task‐oriented criteria. The implications of these results for the establishment and management of IJVs are discussed.     

Do Customs Union Members Engage in More Bilateral Trade than Free‐Trade Agreement Members?

This paper provides the first empirical analysis directly comparing the effects of customs unions (CUs) and free‐trade agreements (FTAs) on members’ bilateral trade, while addressing the biases arising from log‐linearization of the gravity model and crucial time‐invariant unobservables. Since Fiorentino et al. (2007 ) question the popularity of CUs relative to FTAs, considering the latter to be more practical in the current trading climate, such a comparison seems especially relevant. While Baier and Bergstrand (2007 ) find an FTA to approximately double members’ bilateral trade after 10 years, the results of this paper find CUs to have had a much larger impact than FTAs.