Outsourcing of Unionized Firms and the Impact of Labor Market Policy Reforms

This paper shows that outsourcing of parts of the workforce in unionized firms leads to wage moderation both in the case of strategic and flexible outsourcing. As long as the share of the outsourced workforce is not too large, this wage‐moderation effect on domestic employment outweighs the direct substitution effect so that domestic employment increases in unionized firms as outsourcing costs fall. With respect to the impact of labor tax reform changes in the wage tax rate, the tax exemption and the unemployment benefit payments affect domestic wage setting in the same way as in the absence of outsourcing. Furthermore, increasing the degree of tax progression by keeping the relative tax burden per worker constant continues to be good for employment. However, except for low outsourcing activities, the impact of these policy measures will become smaller as outsourcing costs fall.     

Do time limits in the sickness insurance system increase return to work?

This article analyzes the effect of stricter enforcement of the eligibility criteria in the Swedish sickness insurance (SI) system. In 2008, time-restricted assessments of the individual’s working capacity on the 91st and 181st sick day was introduced. Taking advantage of the quasi-experimental feature of the intervention, I find a large and significant increased exit rate around the 181-day assessment. The impact is the result of longer spells outside SI-benefits, indicating that the stricter rules create disincentives to report sick.     

The value of extended delegation in dynamic agency

One of the main advantages of delegation is that specific department level information is used. Its main disadvantage is probably that central management looses direct control over certain actions. In this paper we challenge this widely accepted trade-off. We show that delegation might be favorable even if specific knowledge is completely absent. We consider a firm that lives for two periods. Due to its organizational structure part of the tasks and decision rights is inevitably delegated to a subordinate (agent). The agent performs the tasks assigned to him, tantamount to personal effort, in each of the two periods. Besides this effort the decision to implement a particular project has to be made at the beginning of period two. With regard to the project choice, central management can decide to delegate it to the agent (decentralization). Alternatively it can make it personally (centralization). If the project choice is decentralized it remains unobservable for central management. Along with second period effort it must be motivated via an incentive contract written on period output.We analyze two different contracting regimes: long-term commitment and long-term renegotiation-proof contracts. With full commitment we find that centralization is indeed favorable as compared to delegation if no informational advantage exists. This confirms conventional wisdom. However, the result does not necessarily hold with renegotiation-proof contracts. Renegotiation-proofness may force central management to set too low second-period incentives. Delegation counteracts this effect as it allows central management to implicitly commit to a higher second-period incentive rate. This arises as both, personal effort and the project choice, rather than effort alone need to be motivated. A necessary condition for too low second-period incentives, and thus for delegation to be favorable, is a negative intertemporal correlation of output.     

Should the Good and the Selfish be Taxed Differently?*

In this paper, we consider an environment where individual actions have externalities and two types of agents exist: agents with social preferences (the good) and selfish agents. Selfish agents have pay‐off functions that do not take into account social welfare. The pay‐off of an agent is a linear combination of social welfare and the pay‐off of a selfish agent. We demonstrate that the corrective tax rates that maximize social welfare do not depend on the degree of social preferences. Hence, the good and the selfish should not be taxed differently.     

Productivity and technical change: the case of Taiwan

This paper analyses productivity growth in 16 of Taiwan's manufacturing industries during the period 1978–1992. The non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis approach is used to compute Malmquist productivity indexes. These are decomposed into efficiency change and technical change. The latter is further decomposed into an output bias, an input bias and a magnitude component. In addition, the direction of input bias is identified. Empirical results indicate that the sector's TFP increased at a rate of 2.89% per annum, which could be ascribed to a technical progress (2.56%) and an efficiency improvement (0.33%).     

Erhöht Solvency II den Bedarf an Rückversicherung im Schaden-/Unfallgeschäft in Deutschland?

Reinsurers and reinsurance brokers are often of the opinion that the introduction of Solvency II will lead to changes in how re-insurance is purchased. Our analysis of these assumptions for the German property and casualty insurance market lead to a market survey. This survey revealed that overall the participating insurance companies expect no significant changes for their companies, although they do anticipate changes in buying patterns of the rest of the market and in the overall market environment. This paper examines the reasons for this difference in expectations between those of individual companies and those of the overall market.