Information Cascades in the Labor Market

A model of herding behavior in the labor market is presented where employers receive signals with limited precision about the workers types, and can observe previous employers decisions. Both the employer and the worker can influence the signal probabilities. In particular, the employer tries to increase the precision of the signal about the workers type whereas the worker wants to get a good signal, independent of her type. In a two-period model, we derive conditions for an equilibrium in which only down-cascades occur, i.e., the second employer does not hire a worker with a bad history even if he receives a favorable private signal about the workers type, but he follows his own signal if the workers history is good.     

Restructuring the public sector: examples from the Swedish School Administration Board

This research note begins with a discussion of recent changes in the Swedish labour market, with special reference to employment changes in the public sector from a gender perspective. These changes are illustrated with a discussion of results from a study of the closing of the National Board of School Administration, an agency with a high proportion of women on its staff. Changes are compared to observations made during the restructuring of the industrial sector. The research note concludes with a short discussion on employment trends for the future, with special reference to the importance of the public sector.     

Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types

This paper studies optimal auction design when the seller can affect the buyers? valuations through an unobservable ex ante investment. The key insight is that the optimal mechanism may have the seller play a mixed investment strategy so as to create correlation between the buyers? otherwise (conditionally) independent valuations. Assuming that the seller announces the mechanism before investing, the paper establishes conditions on the investment technology so that a mechanism exists which leaves buyers no information rent and leaves the seller indifferent between his investments. Under these conditions, the seller can, in fact, extract the first best surplus almost fully.     

Motives of multis in Germany

This article which — like the subsequent one — is essentially based on a recently concluded expertise¹, is concerned with the different motivational structures of German and foreign multinational corporations (MNCs). Whereas German direct investments abroad reveal an offensive character, the policy of foreign MNCs in the Federal Republic of Germany is much more defensive. There are also significant differences between German and foreign MNCs as regards the internal division of labour.