Durable-Goods Monopoly with Varying Demand

This paper solves for the profit-maximizing strategy of a durable-goods monopolist when incoming demand varies over time. We first characterize the consumers' optimal purchasing decision by a cut-off rule. We then show that, under a monotonicity condition, the profit-maximizing cut-offs can be derived through a myopic algorithm, which has an intuitive marginal revenue interpretation. Consumers' ability to delay creates an asymmetry in the optimal price path, which exhibits fast increases and slow decreases. This asymmetry creates an upward bias in the level of prices, pushing them above the price charged by a firm facing the average level of demand. The optimal policy outperforms renting and can be implemented by a time-consistent best-price provision.     

FEDERAL ACQUISITION OF WATER THROUGH VOLUNTARY TRANSACTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PURPOSES

Throughout U.S. history public land management agencies have attempted to achieve environmental objectives by relying on a broad range of policy tools, including both regulatory and voluntary mechanisms. An important component of these policies has been oriented toward the acquisition of land or partial interests in land from voluntary sellers. However, it has become clear that preserving or restoring damaged ecosystems increasingly requires more than land and easement acquisitions. The procurement of water for environmental purposes is becoming increasingly common. In some regions such acquisitions also represent a significant share of the local water market activity. Given the increasingly important role these transactions play in achieving federal environmental objectives, it makes sense to consider the alternative mechanisms available that could be used for such acquisitions. This paper examines the situations where the federal government has acquired water for environmental purposes and the extent to which competitive mechanisms—such as auctions—could be used in future acquisition efforts.     

THE DISTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH PERFORMANCE ACROSS AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES, 1992–2003, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR 'BUILDING DIVERSITY'

We contribute to the debate on research performance by comparing the distribution of research inputs and outputs across Australian universities during 1992–2003. We have calculated annual Gini coefficients for various performance measures and Lorenz curves for the final year of the study. Various findings are evident. Research-input measures have remained relatively unevenly distributed across universities. Output measures were more evenly distributed and this exhibited a gradual and rather consistent convergence through time, supporting the view that the research output is being generated gradually more equally across Australia's universities. The exclusion of the 'Group of Eight' (Go8) universities results in a more even distribution of performance. However, in 2003 this group took the lion's share of research inputs but produced a smaller share of outputs. Our findings are relevant to current funding policy discussion.     

Industry Self‐Regulation: A Game‐Theoretic Typology of Strategic Voluntary Compliance

We analyse the possibility of successful industry self‐regulation in terms of the strategic interactions between industry members and government. In particular, this article presents a game‐theoretic typology of generic self‐regulatory scenarios and evaluates these in terms of the resulting likelihood of collective compliance. We discuss the advertising, press and life insurance industries in the UK as examples of the scenarios. Conclusions for corporate and public policy are offered.     

The Effect of State Workers’ Compensation Program Changes on the Use of Federal Social Security Disability Insurance

In addition to traditional forms of private and public medical insurance, two other large public programs help pay for costs associated with ill health. In 2008, Workers’ Compensation (WC) insurance provided $57.6 billion in medical care and cash benefits to employees who are injured at work or contract a work‐related illness, and Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) provided $106 billion to individuals who suffer from permanent disabilities and are unable to engage in substantial gainful activity. During the 1990s, real DI outlays increased nearly 70 percent, whereas real WC cash benefit spending fell by 12 percent. There has been concern that part of this relationship between two of the nation’s largest social insurance programs may be due to individuals substituting toward DI as state WC policies tightened. We first show that this negative correlation between the national series does not hold over time within states, the level at which a causal relationship should operate. We then test for a causal effect of changes in WC enrollment on DI applications and new DI cases within states over time, using state policy (the maximum WC benefit) as an instrument for WC enrollment. Despite a strong first stage fit, we find no statistically significant evidence that WC tightening caused DI rolls to increase, although the standard errors are large enough that we cannot reject effects of substantial magnitude. We conclude it is unlikely that state WC changes were a meaningful factor in explaining the rise in DI during our study period of 1986–2001, although further study using individual level data is warranted.     

The Cost of Capital and the Relevance of Non-diversifiable Risk

The conventional solutions to the corporate investment decision have been seriously challenged by recent developments in portfolio theory. In this paper, the author argues that, assuming the security market is composed of efficient diversifiers, there is no need, in the evaluation of investment projects, to adjust the time value of money to take account of risk. He concludes that the appropriate cut-off rate for any investment is equal to the yield on a 'risk-free' security such as undated or long-dated Government Stock.     

Bidding into the Red: A Model of Post-Auction Bankruptcy

This paper investigates auctions where bidders have limited liability. First, we analyze bidding behavior under different auction formats, showing that the second‐price auction induces higher prices, higher bankruptcy rates, and lower utilities than the first‐price auction. Second, we show that the cost of bankruptcy critically affects the seller's preference over the choice of auction. If bankruptcy is very costly, the seller prefers the first‐price auction over the second‐price auction. Alternatively, if the bankrupt assets are resold among the losers of the initial auction, the seller prefers the second‐price auction.