Subjective Performance Indicators and Discretionary Bonus Pools

Key indicators of managerial performance are frequently subjective, that is, they are difficult to specify and/or verify for contracting purposes. When a principal must rely on subjective information to create incentives for a group of agents, discretionary bonus pools are shown to be optimal mechanisms. Despite their optimality, however, discretionary bonus pools entail an additional agency cost relative to the benchmark of optimal contracts based on objective and verifiable information. Our analysis identifies circumstances under which this additional agency cost is small, for example, the subjective information signals are precise, or the number of agents participating in the bonus pool increases. When incentive schemes can be based on both objective and subjective performance indicators, the relative weights to be placed on alternative signals are shown to differ from the ones predicted by models with objective signals only. We also demonstrate that correlation in measurement errors has a different impact on the structure of optimal incentive schemes when the performance indicators are merely subjective.     

STRATEGIC GROUPS AND RIVALROUS FIRM BEHAVIOR: TOWARDS A RECONCILIATION

This research examines the question of whether rivalry is greater between or within strategic groups by utilizing more direct, dynamic and fine-grained measures of rivalry. Examining the competitive actions of firms in different strategic groups to determine if competitive responses were more likely to occur from firms in the same strategic group, or from firms in different strategic groups, the research found that competitive responses cannot be predicted by strategic group membership. Importantly, however, strategic group membership is a predictor of the manner by which firms compete with one another, or the frequency with which they undertake competitive actions, cut prices, instigate warfare and imitate rivals. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

USING COMMERCIAL DISCIPLINE TO IMPROVE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE PROCUREMENT: MISPLACED ENTHUSIASM?

Australia, like other democracies, has long sought to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of procurement for national defence. A recent review exhorted Defence procurement managers to exert greater “commercial discipline.” Similar calls have been made in other countries. This paper tests such public sector emulation of commercial practice by comparing the relative effectiveness of procurement via in‐house arrangements; a public procurement agency detached from Defence; and privatized provision. We show that what matters is not public or private ownership but how ownership and management are integrated and what incentive structures are applied. (JEL H44)     

A Prudential Paradox: The Signal in (Not) Restricting Bank Dividends

By restricting dividends in the weakest banks, prudential regulators counterintuitively induce more capital payouts in marginal banks. The potential for bank runs exacerbates the incentive to signal strength through dividend payments. Regulatory restrictions on those payments can be used to achieve the first-best outcome, but only if the prevailing capital requirements are sufficiently high. In a crisis, the optimal dividend policy is more restrictive, since it allows the weak but solvent banks to pool with the strong. Finally, we show that the optimal release of regulatory bank information depends critically on the regulator's information and dividend restriction policies.     

CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND THE MONETARY INSTRUMENT PROBLEM

We study the monetary instrument problem in a dynamic noncooperative game between separate, discretionary, fiscal and monetary policy makers. We show that monetary instruments are equivalent only if the policy makers' objectives are perfectly aligned; otherwise an instrument problem exists. When the central bank is benevolent while the fiscal authority is short‐sighted relative to the private sector, excessive public spending and debt emerge under a money growth policy but not under an interest rate policy. Despite this property, the interest rate is not necessarily the optimal instrument.