Projecting Canadian Grain Shipments

The magnitude of future grain exports will profoundly affect many segments of the Canadian economy besides agriculture. Changes in structure of the existing grain transportation system, for example, may be required because of substantial increases in grain movement from country elevators to terminal positions. Grain trade projections are reviewed and the implications discussed. Results indicate that Canadian grain exports may increase from the past five-year average of 534 million bushels to a 1980 level of 811 million bushels and with the possibility of a billion bushel export level being achieved. All segments of the economy affected by the Canadian grain industry must be prepared to adjust their future operations to efficiently accommodate the increased level of grain exports .     

EFFECTS OF PRICE AND AVAILABILITY ON ABORTION DEMAND

Over 1.5 million legal abortions were performed in the United States in 1988. State-level regulation affecting the price or availability of abortion services may expand given recent Supreme Court decisions. This paper uses state-level data pooled over time to estimate abortion demand. Using single cross-sections of state data, past studies find abortion demand per 1,000 pregnancies to be price inelastic and find income elasticity to be positive and significant. The analysis here shows that price elasticity estimates in a single cross-section are sensitive to the choice of state characteristics used to control for "abortion attitudes" within a state. Ajixed-efects model design with pooled data gives more robust abortion demand price elasticity estimates. The results suggest that any new state regulations that increase the costs of obtaining abortions will reduce abortion use and increase unintended fertility .     

Incentive Regulation and The Cost Structure of The Local Telephone Exchange Network

This paper combines an engineering process model of the cost of local exchange telecommunications firms with an analytical model of optimal incentive regulation (with ex post cost observability), to study empirically the properties of the optimal regulatory mechanism. Relying on detailed properties of the cost function, we examine three issues: (i) the extent of natural monopoly when informational rents associated with regulation are taken into account; (ii) the extent of incentive correction, which expresses the divergence of pricing under the optimal mechanism from optimal pricing under complete information; (iii) the implementation of optimal regulation through a menu of linear contracts. Our findings are that, for fixed territory, strong economies of scale allow local exchange telecommunications to retain monopoly characteristics even when the (informational) costs of regulation are properly accounted for, the incentive correction term is small in magnitude, and that optimal regulation can be well approximated through relatively simple linear contracts.     

A quantitative approach to stakeholder interests

In an age when the role, behaviour and performance of the firm are under greater scrutiny than ever before, it is important to pursue quantitative empirical research in the area of social auditing. Using data relating to one particular company, the various inputs and outputs attributable to the firm's different stakeholders, (shareholders, employees, consumers and the community) are examined and corresponding rates of return calculated. Considerable methodological and data problems arise and consequently the results need careful interpretation.