Cities and the ‘War on Terror’

Programmes of organized, political violence have always been legitimized and sustained through complex imaginative geographies. These tend to be characterized by stark binaries of place attachment. This article argues that the discursive construction of the Bush administration’s ‘war on terror’ since September 11th 2001 has been deeply marked by attempts to rework imaginative geographies separating the urban places of the US ‘homeland’ and those Arab cities purported to be the sources of ‘terrorist’ threats against US national interests. On the one hand, imaginative geographies of US cities have been reworked to construct them as ‘homeland’ spaces which must be re‐engineered to address supposed imperatives of ‘national security’. On the other, Arab cities have been imaginatively constructed as little more than ‘terrorist nest’ targets to soak up US military firepower. Meanwhile, the article shows how both ‘homeland’ and ‘target’ cities are increasingly being treated together as a single, integrated ‘battlespace’ within post 9/11 US military doctrine and techno‐science. The article concludes with a discussion of the central roles of urban imaginative geographies, overlaid by transnational architectures of US military technology, in sustaining the colonial territorial configurations of a hyper‐militarized US Empire.     

PAYING FOR LOYALTY: PRODUCT BUNDLING IN OLIGOPOLY*

In recent times, pairs of retailers such as supermarket and retail gasoline chains have offered bundled discounts to customers who buy their respective product brands. These discounts are a fixed amount off the headline prices that allied brands continue to set independently. We show that a pair of firms can profit from offering a bundled discount to the detriment of other firms and consumers whose preferences are farther removed from the bundled brands. Indeed, when both pairs of firms negotiate bundling arrangements, there are no beneficiaries and consumers simply find themselves consuming a sub‐optimal brand mix.     

Large‐Sample Evidence on Firms’ Year‐over‐Year MD&A Modifications

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has expressed concern about the informativeness of firms’ Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) disclosures. A firm's MD&A is potentially uninformative if it does not change appreciably from the previous year after significant economic changes at the firm. We introduce a measure for narrative disclosure—the degree to which the MD&A differs from the previous disclosure—and provide three findings on the usefulness of MD&A disclosure. First, firms with larger economic changes modify the MD&A more than those with smaller economic changes. Second, the magnitude of stock price responses to 10‐K filings is positively associated with the MD&A modification score, but analyst earnings forecast revisions are unassociated with the score, suggesting that investors—but not analysts—use MD&A information. Finally, MD&A modification scores have declined in the past decade even as MD&A disclosures have become longer; the price reaction to MD&A modification scores has also weakened, suggesting a decline in MD&A usefulness.     

Journal Influence on the Design of Finance Doctoral Education

This article surveys the influence of research journals on finance doctoral education. Influence is measured by citations from syllabi of finance seminars. A sample of 101 distinct syllabi submitted by 33 finance doctoral programs yields a list of 1,031 articles cited by at least two schools. These 1,031 articles generate 3,273 citations referencing 17 finance, economics, and accounting journals, where multiple citations from a single school are counted as a single citation. The most notable findings are the wide variety of seminar content across finance doctoral programs and the dominance of five finance journals in providing this diverse content.     

Two Models of the Auditor - Client Interaction: Tests with United Kingdom Data*

Abstract. Accounting research contains two distinct approaches to the interaction between accounting management and the independent auditor. Game theory suggests that the auditor's testing strategy will affect the manager's reporting strategy and that the two strategies form an equilibrium. The game-theoretic approach views the auditor as active, in that the auditor acknowledges the effect that his or her testing strategy has on the manager's reporting. In contrast, in the decision-theoretic approach, the auditor tests reports, but ignores the effect that such testing might have on the manager's reporting behavior. Essentially, the decision-theoretic approach views the auditor as passive, taking the reporting strategy as given when designing tests. We use United Kingdom data to estimate both models and test their validity using nested hypothesis tests. Our results demonstrate that the active, game-theoretic model better describes the auditor-manager interaction. This is the first empirical validation of the game-theoretic model using archival accounting data.