An Empirical Investigation of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory

Empirical tests are reported for Ross' [48] arbitrage theory of asset pricing. Using data for individual equities during the 1962–72 period, at least three and probably four priced factors are found in the generating process of returns. The theory is supported in that estimated expected returns depend on estimated factor loadings, and variables such as the own standard deviation, though highly correlated (simply) with estimated expected returns, do not add any further explanatory power to that of the factor loadings.     

Why Do Managers Explain Their Earnings Forecasts?

Managers often explain their earnings forecasts by linking forecasted performance to their internal actions and the actions of parties external to the firm. These attributions potentially aid investors in the interpretation of management forecasts by confirming known relationships between attributions and profitability or by identifying additional causes that investors should consider when forecasting earnings. We investigate why managers choose to provide attributions with their forecasts and whether the attributions are related to security price reactions to management earnings forecasts. Using a sample of 951 management earnings forecasts issued from 1993 to 1996, we find that attributions are more likely for larger firms, less likely for firms in regulated industries, less likely for forecasts issued over longer horizons, more likely for bad news forecasts, and more likely for forecasts that are maximum type. Furthermore, attributions are associated with greater absolute price reactions to management forecasts, more negative price reactions to management forecasts (forecast news held constant), and a greater price reaction per dollar of unexpected earnings. Our findings hold after control for the aforementioned determinants of attributions and after control for other firm‐ and forecast‐specific variables that are often associated with security prices.     

Optimal Futures Positions for Large Banking Firms

In this paper, we extend earlier work on hedging models so that uncertainty about both deposit supply and loan demand is incorporated as well as random rates of return on loans and CD's. Our model suggests that the optimal forward position is the sum of three ratios that should be estimated simultaneously. Using bank-specific data, the optimal hedge ratios are estimated in both the pre-deregulation and deregulation subperiods. Our results show that previous studies of bank hedging with interest rate futures have greatly overstated (a) the volume of short futures positions that banks should take and (b) the degree of homogeneity of optimal hedge ratios across the banking system. Similarly, deregulation has not uniformly affected the interest rate risk borne by different institutions.     

GOVERNANCE AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN TEAM SPORTS

Antitrust law distinguishes vertical and horizontal restraints. A horizontal restraint is one which exists between competing firms supplying rival products in a market, and a vertical restraint is one which exists between firms that jointly contribute to supplying a particular product in a market. Horizontal agreements receive much closer antitrust scrutiny because they often enable firms to limit competition at the expense of consumers, while vertical restraints may be legal or illegal depending on whether they tend to enhance or reduce competition or the exploitation of market power. This paper argues that there are important vertical restraints that operate in sports leagues which have been mostly neglected in the literature but have a significant impact. We focus on intraleague restraints, where member clubs of a league agree to control the organization of league competition, and interleague restraints, where horizontal agreement such as the Reserve Clause relies on agreements not to compete for players competing in senior or junior leagues. ( JEL L83, L42, L44)     

Financial Forecasting,Risk and Valuation: Accounting for the Future

Valuation involves forecasting payoffs and discounting expected payoffs for risk. Forecasting is often seen as the province of the statistician, risk determination the province of asset pricing. This paper elaborates on the idea that financial forecasting, risk determination and valuation are a matter of accounting. Accounting not only provides information to forecast payoffs but also specifies the payoffs to be forecasted. Further, accounting determines the transition from the present to the future and thus implicitly the evolutionary parameters that a statistician might estimate for forecasting. Accounting also bears on risk determination in the way it handles uncertainty. Accordingly, accounting is involved in both the numerator and the denominator of a valuation model. Indeed, a valuation model is a model of accounting for the future, and the effectiveness of a valuation model rides on the accounting principles employed.     

Accounting for Intangible Assets: There is Also an Income Statement

Accounting is often criticized for omitting intangible assets from the balance sheet. This paper points out that the omission is not necessarily a deficiency. There is also an income statement, and the value of intangible (and other) assets can be ascertained from the income statement. Thus, calls for the recognition of 'intangible assets' on the balance sheet may be misconceived. The paper lays out the property whereby the income statement corrects for deficiencies in the balance sheet. It then explores the case where the income statement perfectly corrects for a deficient balance sheet and the case where it does so imperfectly. In the latter case, the paper then asks whether accounting in the balance sheet—by capitalization and amortization of intangible assets or carrying them at fair value—could remedy the deficiency in the income statement (or makes it worse). The investigation involves an analysis and valuation of Microsoft Corporation and Dell Inc., two companies presumed to posses a good deal of 'intangibles assets'. The paper is instructive, not only to those concerned with accounting issues but also to analysts attempting to value firms, like Microsoft and Dell, with assets missing from the balance sheet.     

Options,Short Sales,and Market Completeness

This paper presents empirical evidence that trading in options contributes to both transactional and informational efficiency of the stock market by reducing the effect of constraints on short sales. The significantly higher average level of short interest exhibited by optionable stocks supports the argument that options facilitate short selling. We also find significant effects on option prices, related to the short interest in the underlying stock. We then present evidence that options also increase information efficiency. Earlier work, that is replicated and extended here, has suggested that short sale constraints cause stock prices to underweight negative information. Options appear to reduce that effect.