Further Evidence on Nontrading-Period Information Release*

Abstract. Using a sample of 856 management earnings forecasts, we provide evidence that managers release larger shock-earnings forecasts in nontrading periods. Our results do not depend on whether the magnitude of the shock is measured exogenously (unexpected accounting earnings) or endogenously (security market reaction). The timing effects are more pronounced for less-precise (i.e., open-interval and closed-interval) forecasts. Also, we provide evidence of an overnight reaction to closed-period management forecast releases. Our results are consistent with explanations for voluntary disclosure that rely on a precommitted policy of information asymmetry reduction (see Diamond 1985; King, Pownall, and Waymire 1990). These explanations lead to predictions of strategic timing of greater shocks in the nontrading period in order to provide the less-informed with a period for information evaluation. Résumé. À partir d'un échantillon de 856 prévisions de bénéfices publiées par la direction de diverses entreprises, les auteurs démontrent que les prévisions publiées par les gestionnaires en période où les titres ne sont pas négociés ont davantage d'impact. Les résultats qu'ils obtiennent ne dépendent pas du caractère exogène (bénéfices comptables inattendus) ou endogène (réaction du marché des valeurs mobilières) de la mesure de l'impact. L'effet du choix du moment est plus prononcé pour les prévisions moins précises (c'est-à-dire à intervalle ouvert et à intervalle fermé). Les auteurs démontrent aussi qu'il se produit une réaction à la publication de prévisions par la direction en période de fermeture, dans les vingt-quatre heures qui suivent la publication. Les résultats de l'étude sont conformes au principe de la présentation facultative d'information dont l'explication repose sur une politique, préalablement adoptée, de réduction de l'asymétrie de l'information (voir Diamond, 1985; King, Pownall et Waymire, 1990). Cette explication mène à des prédictions voulant que l'on choisisse, à des fins stratégiques, les périodes de non-négociation des titres pour publier les prévisions de bénéfices dont l'impact est plus grand, de manière à laisser aux investisseurs moins bien informés un certain laps de temps pour évaluer l'information.     

FREE TRADE, NATIONALISM, AND THE COMMON MAN: THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

This paper discusses the forces that have been at play in the debate over the recently concluded Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Most economists agree that free trade is desirable and that both parties likely will gain from specialization and exchange. But many objections to this agreement have been raised, some of which are very different from those that economists usually consider. A review of the agreement and many of the arguments raised against it reinforces the basic credo that freer exchange between consenting parties leads to improved economic well-being.     

The Number of Factors in Security Returns

Both factor analysis of security returns and the analysis of eigenvalues seem to indicate that a market factor explains the major part of security returns. We find that such evidence is consistent with an economy where there are in fact k “equally important” priced factors; eigenvalue analysis in the context of such an economy will lead an investigator to the false inference that the one important “factor” is the return on an equally weighted market index.     

Union Representation Elelctions and Firm Profitability

Union representation elections are associated with significant declines in firm profitability. In addition to the significant mean effect of union elections on the equity value of firms, there exists substantial variation in the magnitude of equity losses across individual election events. Cross-sectional variation in shareholder equity losses can be explained by the labor intensity of the firm, the size of the union wage premium and fraction of workers organized in "the firm's industry,." the presence or absencse of right-to-work lows in the state where the election is held, the member of workers covered in the representaion election, and the number of previous union representation election in the firm. The empirical results indiacte the equity losses are the greatest in industries where union wage gain are the highest and unionization rates are the largest, and in the most labor-intensive firms, independent of the size of the bargaining unit involved in the election. The latter result indicates the presence of union spillover effects.