Just about money? CEO satisfaction and firm performance in small family firms

This paper examines how family ownership and family ties influence the relative importance of economic and non-economic goals on the CEO’s satisfaction with the firm. Using a sample of small high-tech family and non-family firms, we show that the influence of past firm economic performance on CEO satisfaction is weaker in the case of CEOs leading a family firm. Our results also suggest that this influence becomes weaker as the family firm transitions into subsequent generations. However, contrary to our expectations, we were not able to find a differential effect of firm performance on CEO satisfaction between CEOs who belong to the controlling family and those who do not.     

Toward a conceptual framework of the harmonization of bank financial reporting standards in transition economies: The case of Mexico

In recent years banks in emerging and transition economies throughout the world have been compelled to change lending and financial reporting practices in response to the economic transition of their countries. Correspondingly, on the basis of the theory of soft budget constraints (SBC), economists have studied the relationship between economic development, banks' lending practices, and banks' penchant to overstate loans. However, very little research has been performed by accounting researchers regarding the nature of bank loan overstatement during times of financial crisis in emerging markets. Accordingly, this paper uses the theory of soft budget constraints to develop a four stage conceptual framework of the harmonization of bank financial reporting standards during times of economic transition. Emphasis is placed on using the theory of soft budget constraints to characterize the harmonization of standards and practices with respect to bank loan overstatement. The framework is applied to the harmonization of Mexican bank financial reporting during the country's economic transition of the late 1990s. The Mexican harmonization process during this period generally followed the framework.     

Technology transfer in Mexico: Past patterns and new problems related to the North American free trade agreement

As the Mexican economy prepares to transition from a relatively closed and protected market to a regionally integrated free market which is part of the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a change in its technology licensing environment will be needed to enable Mexican companies to compete for technology with firms from the other member countries of the NAFTA. This study identifies the national sources which have provided Mexico with technology and the Mexican industrial sectors which have been able to attract this technology in the 1980s. It further evaluates the current licensing environments in Canada, Mexico, and the U.S.A. as well as in the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). The study provides recommendations for changes to the Mexican licensing environment and proposes strategies for attracting technology to Mexican industry under the changed conditions which would be introduced by the NAFTA. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Beyond financing: crowdfunding as an informational mechanism

Besides providing financial support for new ventures, crowdfunding can bring additional advantages for entrepreneurs. In this paper, we test the hypothesis that crowdfunding also serves as an informational mechanism. Using a unique dataset built with publicly available data from Internet-based sources, and after controlling for alternative explanations, we empirically show that when not successful on crowdfunding, thus not accessing capital, project owners may decide to release the product in the market if contributions suggest positive valuation from the “crowd”.     

Trade law and trade flows

This paper develops and estimates a model to study the effect of improving the quality of commercial trade law on trade flows. We focus on improvements aimed to privately resolve disputes among trading partners: international commercial arbitration and conciliation. The main novelty of the model is to explicit the balance between the contractual quality of importer and exporter (contractual distance) in an environment with informational frictions (contractual noise). Using a structural gravity estimation with high-dimensional fixed effects, the main contribution of the empirical exercise is to confirm previous results and unravel new traits that align with our theoretical results. Arbitration has a moderate and positive effect on exports that increases (decreases) with the contractual quality of the exporter (importer) and the remoteness of markets. The effects of conciliation are similarly positive, but only for similar trading partners with high levels of income. Results also suggest both domestic trade law reform and international treaties have a positive effect on trade, with a stronger effect of the latter.     

EMU and trade: A PPML re-assessment with intra-national trade flows

This paper examines the EMU effect on trade for the eleven early joiners and Greece relying for the first time on data that include both international and intra-national trade flows, in line with all the microfoundations of the structural gravity model of trade. We find that the overall EMU impact on trade is positive between its members and, specially, for trade between members and non-members. Interestingly, we further show that the effect of the EMU on bilateral trade remarkably differs across countries. For Ireland, Belgium–Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal and Austria, we find robust evidence that EMU has boosted trade both with other members and with third countries, while for Finland, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, the results suggest that only trade with third countries has been enhanced by the EMU. Greece is the only country that shows a negative impact in trade with other EMU members and no effect in trade with non-members. Finally, the results across countries according to the direction of the trade flows (exports versus imports) do not show significant differences in any case.     

Implementability via protective equilibria

We present a notion of non-cooperative strategic equilibrium for games generated by social choice functions, and fully characterize the class of those functions which are directly implementable under this equilibrium concept. Correct preference revelation turns out to always be such an equilibrium for the games generated by this class of implementable functions.     

Incentive Regulation and Telecommunications Service Quality

We examine the impact of incentive regulation—price regulation and earnings sharing regulation—on retail service quality in the U.S. telecommunications industry between 1991 and 2002. We find that incentive regulation is associated with significantly higher service quality on several dimensions (e.g., more rapid installation of new telephone service, fewer trouble reports, and increased customer satisfaction) but significantly lower quality on some dimensions (fewer installation commitments met and longer delays in resolving reported service problems)JEL Classification: L51, L96, L15We thank Michael Crew and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to Vanessa Cruz and Mircea Marcu for excellent research assistance.     

Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms

We consider a simple case of team production, where a set of workers have to contribute a single input (say labour) and then share the joint output amongst themselves. Different incentive issues arise when the skills as well as the levels of effort expended by workers are not publicly observable. We study one of these issues in terms of a very simple model in which two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, supply effort inelastically. Thus, we assume away the problem of moral hazard in order to focus on that of adverse selection. We also consider a hierarchical structure of production in which the workers need to be organised in two tiers. We look for reward schemes which specify higher payments to workers who have been assigned to the top-level jobs when the principal detects no lies, distribute the entire output in all circumstances, and induce workers to revel their true abilities. We contemplate two scenarios. In the first one, each individual worker knows only her own type, while in the second scenario each worker also knows the abilities of all other workers. Our general conclusion is that the adverse selection problem can be solved in our context. However, the range of satisfactory reward schemes depends on the informational framework.