Integrated water and economic modelling of the impacts of water market instruments on the South African economy

A static computable general equilibrium model of South Africa is adapted to compare new taxes on water demand by two industries, namely forestry, and irrigated field crops. Comparisons are made with respect to both the short and the long run, in terms of three target variables, namely (i) the environment; (ii) the economy; and (iii) equity. Since the taxes on the two industries do not raise the same amount of revenue, the target variables are calculated per unit of real government revenue raised by the new taxes (also referred to as the marginal excess burdens of the taxes). The model results are robust for moderate values of the water elasticity of demand in the two industries, in both the long and the short run. The tax on irrigated field crops performs better in terms of all three the target variables in the short run. In the long run the tax on irrigated filed crops is better in terms of water saving, but reduces real GDP and the consumption by poor households.     

Self-regulation and governmental oversight: a theoretical and experimental study

Journal of Regulatory Economics - A self-regulatory organization (SRO) is a non-governmental organization owned and operated by its members, with the power to create and enforce industry...     

Turning the page? EU fiscal consolidation in the wake of the crisis

The fiscal cost of the financial and economic crisis in Europe is huge. The paper provides provisional estimates of this cost and looks at its implications for the sustainability of public finances, taking into account also the impact of aging populations. The historical experience suggests that economic growth is persistently lowered in the aftermath of financial crisis, making fiscal consolidation more difficult yet all the more essential. Meanwhile the timing of the exit from fiscal stimulus and subsequent fiscal consolidation must reconcile sustainability and stabilisation goals—a delicate balancing act. The paper will argue in favour of structural reform to boost the economic growth potential alongside fiscal consolidation. The fiscal coordination framework in the EU, together with the Europe 2020 strategy, is seen to underpin this approach.     

The trend in female labour force participation: what can be expected for the future?

This study investigates the increase in the labour force participation rate of women. We estimate a binary age–period–cohort model for a sample of Dutch women born between 1925 and 1986. The results indicate that the increasing level of education and the diminishing negative effect of children have played an important role. Moreover, we find important unobserved cohort effects for pre-1955 generations, which is in line with results of studies on social norms. It is shown that the growth in female participation is likely to slow down in the near future, as such cohort effects are not relevant for younger generations.     

On the (in)effectiveness of rewards in sustaining cooperation

We study the effectiveness of costly rewards in mitigating excess extraction in a standard Common Pool Resource (CPR) game experiment. We implement two treatments. In the first, rewards are a pure transfer from one player to the other. In the second, the benefits of receiving a reward are higher than the cost of providing it. Referring to the latter as “net positive” rewards, we observe that these are used more frequently than transfer rewards, and that, unlike transfer rewards, they are effective in sustaining cooperation in the CPR game. JEL Classification C72, C92, D74     

Regulating an externality-generating public utility: A multi-dimensional screening approach

In this paper, I present a monopoly screening model in which a firm holds private information on fixed abatement costs. Because of the nature of the optimal contracts, bunching is never optimal even with ‘n’ distinct types. A characterization of full and limited information solutions is offered and it is shown that the design standards alone determine the value of an information rent. The variable charge is completely free of any marginal information costs. This allows the variable charge to track marginal damages and thereby ensures that marginal social costs are covered. A fixed charge implements the optimal solution.     

Co-optimization of enhanced oil recovery and carbon sequestration

In this paper, we present an economic analysis of CO₂-enhanced oil recovery (EOR). This technique entails injection of CO₂ into mature oil fields in a manner that reduces the oil's viscosity, thereby enhancing the rate of extraction. As part of this process, significant quantities of CO₂ remain sequestered in the reservoir. If CO₂ emissions are regulated, oil producers using EOR should therefore be able to earn revenues from sequestration as well as from oil production. We develop a theoretical framework that analyzes the dynamic co-optimization of oil extraction and CO₂ sequestration, through the producer's choice of the fraction of CO₂ in the injection stream at each moment. We find that the optimal fraction of CO₂ is likely to decline monotonically over time, and reach zero before the optimal termination time. Numerical simulations, based on an ongoing EOR project in Wyoming, confirm this result. We also find that cumulative sequestration is less responsive to the carbon tax than to the oil price. Only at very high taxes does a tradeoff between revenues from oil output and sequestration arise.     

Optimal Conservation Programs, Asymmetric Information and the Role of Fixed Costs

An increasing number of environmental protection programs offers financial compensation to farmers in exchange for conservation services. Incentive-compatible contracts can be designed to mitigate excess compensation, but the extant literature suggests that outcomes are always second-best so that other instruments (such as conservation auctions) may be preferred. We argue that the claim regarding the first-best solution never being incentive-compatible is correct if all conservation costs are variable in nature; if there are fixed costs too, the first-best compensation scheme may be incentive-compatible after all. Given the relevance of fixed costs in conservation issues, we conclude that incentive-compatible contracts should be given a second chance as a policy measure to induce conservation.