Optimal design of trade institutions

We model an economy with social institutions that facilitate trade and induce three types of costs: establishment costs, access costs, and use costs. Use costs are specific transaction costs related to the use of these trade institutions. We assume that a trade institution is economically completely determined by the costs it imposes and by the effects on the trades it facilitates. We extend the Pareto efficiency concept to include various modes of organization of social institutions: the costs and benefits of these organizations are expressed in the trades they facilitate.Within this setting we discuss a valuation equilibrium concept, in which all agents use a common conjectural price system that assigns to every trade institution the price vector that would prevail under it. This feature of the equilibrium is important in securing the second welfare theorem, and is new to the analysis of economies with costly trade. Since the use costs can be nonlinear, there are non-convexities that prevent the second welfare theorem from obtaining in a finite economy, but we show it for large economies.Received: 3 April 2002, Accepted: 30 April 2003, JEL Classification: D59, D70, H49Robert P. Gilles: donewhile visiting the Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands. Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), grant B46-390, is gratefully acknowledged.Dimitrios Diamantaras: Part of this research wasSupport from Temple University via a Fuller research fellowship is gratefully acknowledged.The authors would like to thank Suzanne Scotchmer, Andreu Mas-Colell, Marcus Berliant, Shlomo Weber, Hans Haller, Dhanajay Gokhale, Julian Manning, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and discussions of previous drafts of this paper. A previous version of this paper was circulated as Equilibria of economies with costly trade.     

An empirical examination of the effectiveness of dollar-cost averaging using downside risk performance measures

Some studies find the dollar-cost averaging investment strategy to be sub-optimal using a traditional Sharpe ratio performance ranking metric. Using both the Sortino ratio and the Upside Potential ratio, we empirically test four investment strategies for alternative asset investments. We find the relative ranking of dollar-cost averaging remains inferior to alternative investment strategies. (JEL G1, G11, N2)     

SMEs and public procurement policy

In this paper, we characterize an optimal procurement policy as a mechanism design problem when an allotment of the contract is available, i.e., when a government faces both SMEs and large firms for carrying out a heterogeneously divisible project. Our model allows us to analyze all procurement policies (set-asides, favoritism, non-discriminatory rules), taking into account both efficiency and distributive arguments and derive a normative framework. We show that set-asides are not generally optimal, whatever the industrial preferences of the government are, while the optimal preferential treatments of firms implies complex non-linear rules. We prove that the optimal policy can be implemented using a modified Vickrey-type auction. We also consider that the firms can reduce their cost by a non observable effort, and exhibit the specific impact of cost reduction incentives on the optimal policies.Received: 24 September 2001, JEL Classification: D44Pierre-HenriMorand : I am grateful to the anonymous referees for comments. The usualdisclaimer applies.     

A baseline model of industry evolution

The paper analyses some general dynamic properties of industries characterized by heterogeneous firms and continuing stochastic entry.After a brief critical assessment of some significant drawbacks of recent contributions to modeling of stochastic industrial dynamics, we propose a novel analytical apparatus able to derive some generic properties of the underlying competition process combining persistent technological heterogeneity, differential growth of individual firms and turnover. The basic model, we suggest, is indeed applicable with proper modifications to a large class of evolutionary processes, well beyond industrial dynamics.JEL Classification: L11, O30, C60Support to this research by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Austria; the Fujitsu Research Institute for Advanced Information (FRI), Japan; the Italian National Research Council (CNR), the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR, prot. 2002132413 003) and the Free University of Bozen Bolzano, Italy, is gratefully acknowledged. Comments by Andrea Bassanini, Francesca Chiaromonte, Steven Klepper, Uwe Cantner, Drew Fudenberg and the anonymous referees helped in shaping the paper to its present form. Mariele Berté provided the computer simulations of the model. The usual caveats apply.Correspondence to: G. Dosi     

A general framework for the analysis of fiscal equalisation systems

This paper shows that, despite the existing diversity of models of fiscal equalisation, there is a common underlying structure that links all of them. To this end, a framework of analysis sufficiently general so as to encompass the main schemes present in the literature is developed. This allows to uncover the common features of these schemes and to identify more readily the origin and nature of their differences. The formal approach is complemented with a numerical simulation of the models considered. The paper also shows the usefulness of the approach for reform policy and suggests two new models.JEL Classification: H2, H7I would like to thank three anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions to a previous draft of this article.     

Job and worker flows in high adjustment cost settings

This paper analyses the relationship between the size of adjustment costs and the intensity of labor market flows. I argue that high adjustment costs inhibit adjustment to temporary shocks, leaving adjustment to long-lived shocks unchanged. Worker turnover is also reduced because of the negative impact that adjustment costs have on churning.Received: January 2002, Accepted: November 2002, JEL Classification: J23, J63I am grateful to the FCT for funding this research (research grant Praxis/PCSH/C/CEG/13/96), and to Pedro Portugal, Daniel Hamermesh and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I thank the Department of Statistics at the Ministry of Labor for providing the data. CETE is supported by the FCT.     

On the performance of the Chow-Lin procedure for quarterly interpolation of annual data: Some Monte-Carlo analysis

Most of the countries of the OECD offer quarterly estimates of their national growth or of their Gross National Product. Official Statistical Agencies in western countries have to deal with the problem of estimating Quarterly National Accounts series congruently with Annual National Accounts. In Spain, the Instituto Nacional de Estadística uses the Chow-Lin disaggregation method, which is based on information provided by a group of high-frequency related variables, to estimate the quarterly components of National Accounts from annual components. In this paper, we analyse the relative quality of the estimates obtained through the Chow-Lin procedure, under different sets of hypotheses.JEL Classification: C15, C43, M40We are grateful to Maria Amparo Ripoll for her assistance. The authors also wish to thank three anonymous referees and an editor for their constructive suggestions and comments. This research was partially made during the stay of the first author at the Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. It has been partially supported by the research project DGCYT PB98-1460.     

Der prognostische Gehalt der Nachrichtenwert-Theorie

In this article, news value theory is reformulated in a way that allows for predicting the length of news stories by the news value of news factors, and by the news factors of single stories. From a part of a sample, the news value of news factors is determined, and the expected length of stories is calculated for another part of the sample. Calculated length is then compared with measured length. There is a correlation of r =.54 between theoretical and empirical values. Theoretical and methodological conclusions are drawn from the results of the various analytic steps.     

Demand for the truth in principal–agent relationships

Consider the following puzzle: If earnings management is harmful to shareholders, why don’t they design contracts that induce managers to reveal the truth? To answer this question, we model the shareholders–manager relationship as a principal–agent game in which the agent (the manager) alone observes the economic outcome. We show that the limited liability (LL) of the agent, defined as the agent’s feasible minimum payment, might explain the demand for earnings management by the principal. Specifically, when the LL level is high (low), a contract that induces earnings management may be less (more) costly than a truth-revealing contract. This finding offers a new explanation of the demand for earnings management.     

On the stability of value added indicators

This paper shows how relevant concepts in educational effectiveness can support public policy in order to improve the performance of educational systems. Specifically, value-added indicators and the property of their stability over time is addressed with reference to application to school/teacher improvement. Findings of a longitudinal study developed in Portugal concerning primary education in mathematics are presented. Variance component models are fitted in order to obtain those indicators yearly to class-school units. Results of this study reveal that value-added indicators can be a useful instrument for progressive improvement in education, particularly in countries with high rates of student retention and evasion. The novelty of this paper is to measure value added over a single year rather than all stage of schooling that refers to more than 1 year.