Regulatory Barriers and Entry into a New Competitive Industry

We model the effects of license fees and bureaucratic delay on firm entry into a new competitive industry, whose profitability is initially unknown. A license fee alone reduces the number of first movers and the steady‐state number of firms. The combination of license fee and delay may cause some entrepreneurs to purchase licenses speculatively, only using them to enter production later if profitability is revealed to be sufficiently favourable. Alternatively, some entrepreneurs may wait, possibly buying a license only after profitability is revealed; but it is never found that some entrepreneurs adopt one of these strategies and some the other.     

Is the variability of world wheat prices increasing?

Estimates are derived of the potential variability of world wheat prices and the sources of this variability. These indicate a sizable increase in the probability of large short-run fluctuations in price. The bulk of this variability is due to fluctuations in the domestic grain production of developing and centrally-planned economies. However, most market participants are unresponsive to short-run changes in world price, and transmit a substantial amount of domestic variability to the world market. The key factor in world price stability is the short-run responsiveness of wheat exports from the USA. It is likely that both the physical and policy factors that have contributed to increased variability will persist.     

商业模式创新失败的五个原因

CEO及高管团队并不热衷于商业模式创新,他们对当前的模式很满意,希望组织中的其他人都集中精力来优化它。每当提到新的商业模式或者颠覆性的技术时,他们一般仅仅视为威胁。     

Platform Competition With Cash-Back Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules

We analyze competing strategic platforms setting fees to a local monopolist merchant and cash-back rebates to end users, when the merchant may not surcharge platforms’ customers, a rule imposed by some credit card networks. Each platform has an incentive to gain transactions by increasing the spread between its merchant fee and user rebate above its rival's spread. This incentive yields non-existence of a pure strategy equilibrium in many natural environments. In some circumstances, a mixed strategy equilibrium exists where platforms choose fee structures that induce merchants to accept only one platform with equal probability, a form of monopolistic market allocation.     

Establishing the need for a low‐cost Canadian debt relief procedure

Canada does not have a low‐cost bankruptcy option for debtors with low incomes and low assets. In this article, we present empirical evidence of the need for such an option by estimating the number of debtors who might benefit from it. We then review the successful low‐cost bankruptcy options in operation in New Zealand and in the United Kingdom and recommend that Canada adopt a similar system.