What Lies beneath? A Sub-National Look at Okun’s Law in the United States

We find that Okun’s Law holds quite well for most U.S. states but the Okun coefficient—the responsiveness of unemployment to output—varies substantially across states. We are able to explain a significant part of this cross-state heterogeneity on the basis of the state’s industrial structure. Our results have implications for the design of state and federal policies and may also be able to explain why Okun’s Law at the national level has remained quite stable over time despite an enormous shift in the structure of the U.S. economy from manufacturing to services.     

INTIMIDATION: LINKING NEGOTIATION AND CONFLICT

A challenger wants a resource initially held by a defender, who can negotiate a settlement by offering to share the resource. If Challenger rejects, conflict ensues. During conflict, each player could be a tough type for whom fighting is costless. Therefore, nonconcession intimidates the opponent into conceding. Unlike in models where negotiations happen in the shadow of exogenously specified conflicts, offers made during negotiations determine how conflict unfolds if negotiations fail. In turn, how conflict is expected to unfold determines the players' negotiating positions. In equilibrium, negotiations always fail with positive probability, even if players face a high cost of conflict. Allowing multiple offers leads to brinkmanship—the only acceptable offer is the one made when conflict is imminent. If negotiations fail, conflict is prolonged and not duration dependent.     

The Effect of Legal Environment and Regulatory Structure on Performance: Cross-Country Evidence from REITs

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - We study the relationship between international REIT regulatory structures and real estate returns and find that the legal requirements that REITs...     

Innovations in financing: The impact of anchor investors in Indian IPOs

In 2009, the Securities Exchange Board of India allowed qualified institutional investors to anchor initial public offerings (IPOs) by participating in the issue at a price and allocation publicly disclosed preceding the issue. We study anchor investors (AIs) in Indian IPOs during 2009–2017. We find the share allotment and the number of AIs separately have significant impacts on valuation and underpricing; however, the net effect is nonsignificant. Further, AIs significantly influence other institutional investors' participation in the IPO and induce lower aftermarket volatility. Overall, our evidence suggests that AIs boost demand for and mitigate ex ante information uncertainty of IPOs.     

How Entrenchment, Incentives and Governance Influence REIT Capital Structure

Although recent literature has confirmed the importance of viewing a firm??s capital structure choices of leverage and debt maturity as jointly determined, to date there has been little analysis of the importance of traditional governance variables on a firm??s capital structure decisions using a simultaneous equations approach. We examine the influence of managerial incentives, traditional managerial monitoring mechanisms and managerial entrenchment on the capital structure of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). Using panel data, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations for leverage and maturity and find that firms with entrenched CEOs use less leverage and shorter maturity debt. This is consistent with the expectation that managers acting in their own self interest will choose lower leverage to reduce liquidity risk and use short maturity debt to preserve their ability to enhance their compensation and reputations by empire building. We also find evidence that traditional alignment mechanisms such as equity and option ownership have an offsetting effect; and that firms where the founder serves as CEO choose higher leverage and longer maturity debt. The results also provide evidence that leverage and maturity are substitutes, firms with high profitability and growth opportunities use less leverage and firms with liquid assets use more leverage and longer maturity debt.     

Samuelson Hypothesis & Indian Commodity Derivatives Market

Samuelson (1965) devised that futures price volatility increases as the futures contract approaches its expiration. The relation amid the volatility and time to maturity has significant inference for hedging strategies. Interestingly, so far the empirical evidence in favor of the Samuelson Hypothesis (maturity effect) is mixed in various markets. Considering no significant work to examine the relationship is so far carried out in commodity derivative markets of India, this paper ordeal the Samuelson Hypothesis on 8 commodities traded on Multi-Commodity Exchange (MCX), India. We have examined the issue by applying different regression techniques to test the hypothesis for 8 commodities (Aluminium, Nickel, Copper, Gold, Silver, Natural Gas, Crude Oil and Wheat) using inter-day data on MCX India. In order to test the Samuelson’s hypothesis, tests have been conducted using a series of GARCH, EGARCH and TGARCH models by including trading volume, open interest and time-to-maturity in the conditional variance equation. From our results, it is concluded that Samuelson’s hypothesis does not hold true for majority of commodity contracts considered. Our results also find that volatility series depend on the trading volume, compared to the time-to-maturity or open interest. As Samuelson hypothesis does not hold true for majority of commodity contracts, traders in Indian commodity derivative markets should not bias their decisions solely based on the time-to-maturity, but should also consider trading volume and open interest as they are an important determinant of price volatility. They should also consider the possibility of leverage effect while predicting future price volatilities, and the associated margin requirements.     

Arbitrage with hedging by forward contracts: exploited and exploitable profits

The theoretical conditions for covered interest arbitrage and exploitable profit opportunities out of simple and triangular arbitrage in the absence and presence of market imperfection are enunciated. A distinction is made between pure arbitrage profits and arbitrage-induced total profits attainable under the risk-free environment. Operational feasibility of iterative arbitrage is also examined.