Financial leverage changes associated with corporate mergers

We empirically examine whether firms increase financial leverage following mergers. Firms could increase financial leverage either because of an increase in debt capacity or because of unused debt capacity from pre-merger years. We find that financial leverage of combined firms increases significantly following mergers. A cross-sectional analysis shows that the change in financial leverage around mergers is significantly positively correlated with the announcement period market-adjusted returns. Further tests indicate that the increase in financial leverage is an outcome of an increase in debt capacity, although there is weak evidence that some of the increase in financial leverage is a result of past unused debt capacity.     

Outcome effect, controllability and performance evaluation of managers: some field evidence from multi-outlet businesses

This field study provides evidence of the outcome effect in performance evaluations of managers in an organization. Specifically, in a retail chain, subjective evaluations of store managers by their supervisors were negatively impacted by unfavorable outcome knowledge. As expected, outcome determinants over which the managers have control influence their performance evaluations and environmental determinants of outcome over which they have no control do not influence their evaluations. However, unexpectedly, central management determinants of outcome over which the managers have no control also influence their evaluations. After these outcome determinants are considered, we find evidence of an outcome effect since failure of the store to meet its target outcome results in a more negative performance evaluation of the managers. Also, the extent to which store managers' evaluations are prone to the outcome effect is not contingent on the measure of the outcome used.     

Cross-hedging foreign currency risk: Empirical evidence from an error correction model

In this article, the traditional price change hedge ratio estimation method is extended by applying the theory of cointegration in the case of cross-hedging of spot exchange risk of the Belgian franc (BF), the Italian lira (IL), and the Dutch guilder (NG) with U.S. Dollar Index futures contracts. Previous studies ignore the last period's equilibrium error and short-run deviations. The findings of this study indicate that the hedge ratio estimated by the error correction method is superior to that obtained from the traditional method, as evidenced by the likelihood ratio test and out-of-sample forecasts. Hedgers will be able to control the risk of their portfolios more effectively at a lower cost.     

Job Characteristics and Labor Market Discrimination in Promotions

We extend promotion signaling theory to generate new testable implications concerning racial differences in promotions. In our model, promotions signal worker ability. When tasks differ substantially across job levels, the opportunity cost of not promoting qualified non‐whites/non‐Asians is large, so employers are less likely to inefficiently withhold their promotions. Thus, given prepromotion performance, the extent to which non‐whites/non‐Asians have lower promotion probabilities decreases when tasks vary more across levels. Racial differences in wage increases at promotion diminish when tasks vary more across levels. Evidence from a single firm's personnel records supports the model's predictions concerning promotion probabilities.     

Does the Confucius Institute Network Impact Cultural Distance? A Panel Data Analysis of Cross‐Border Flows in and out of China

This paper examines the impact of cultural distance in general and the Confucius Institute Network in particular on cross‐border flows of tourists, goods and investment in and out of China. We estimate a panel gravity model of inbound and outbound flows between 2004 and 2012. We find that the presence of Confucius Institute(s) in the source country increases inbound tourism and equity flows and outbound export and FDI flows for China, while other measures of cultural distance have less of an impact.     

Corruption,market quality,and entry deterrence in emerging economies

In many emerging economies incumbent firms often use dubious means to deter entry of other firms. We analyze this scenario in a three‐stage game of entry deterrence. The incumbent has incomplete information about the entrant's costs but can increase this cost by resorting to unfair means (e.g. bribing a politician who harms the entrant). We completely characterize the optimal bribe and show that this depends on the “fairness index” and the “differentiation” parameter. We also show that zero bribes need not maximize welfare and market quality. Our results seem to be compatible with anecdotal evidence from emerging economies such as India.     

Some Variants of Constrained Estimation in Finite Population Sampling

This is a review article that unifies several important examples using constrained optimisation techniques. The basic tools are three simple mathematical optimisation results subject to certain constraints. Applications include calibration, benchmarking in small area estimation and imputation. A final illustration is constrained optimisation under a general divergence loss.     

Underpricing and aftermarket performance of American depositary receipts (ADR) IPOs

American depositary receipts (ADRs) are negotiable instruments representing foreign company shares traded in US dollars in the US capital market. We present comparative analyses of the pricing and aftermarket performance of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) by ADRs and a matching sample of US firms over the 1990–2001 period. Offered by large, well-known multinationals, ADR IPOs go through a detailed scrutiny, and incur significant costs, during the pre-IPO period to recast financial statements in conformity with SEC rules and the US GAAP. This mitigates the information asymmetry between the IPO firm and investors. We categorize the ADR issuing country as developed or emerging, and our sample includes several cases of privatization of state owned corporations. The analyses indicate that (1) ADR IPOs are significantly less underpriced than comparable US IPOs; (2) IPOs from developed countries are more underpriced; and (3) Privatization IPOs are less underpriced than non-privatizations. The lower underpricing of ADR IPOs persists even after differential IPO attributes, the traditional proxies for information asymmetry and, the unique characteristics associated with ADR IPOs, are accounted for. We conclude that extant literature offers only partial explanation for this puzzling phenomenon.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.