Policy Discrimination with and without Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility

Can the Pareto criterion guide policymakers who do not know the true model of the economy? If policymakers specify ex ante preferences for agents, then Pareto improvements from a distorted status quo are usually possible, and with more commodities than states, one can implement almost every Pareto optimum. Unlike the standard second welfare theorem, planners cannot dictate allocations: agents must trade. Unfortunately ex ante preferences impose interpersonal comparisons. If policymakers merely aim to maximize some social welfare function then optimal policies form an open set; hence small changes in the environment do not necessitate any policy response. Planners with symmetric information about agents can sometimes intervene without making interpersonal comparisons.     

Does a factor Phillips curve help? An evaluation of the predictive power for U.S. inflation

This article evaluates various models’ predictive power for U.S. inflation rate using a simulated out-of-sample forecasting framework. The starting point is the traditional unemployment Phillips curve. We show that a factor Phillips curve model is superior to the traditional Phillips curve, and its performance is comparable to other factor models. We find that a factor AR model is superior to the factor Phillips curve model, and is the best bivariate or factor model at longer horizons. Finally, we investigate a New Keynesian Phillips curve model, and find that its forecasting performance dominates all other models at the longer horizons.     

How does the design of international environmental agreements affect investment in environmentally-friendly technology?

In this paper, we investigate how the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs) affects the incentives for the private sector to invest in environmentally-friendly technology. The givens are a transboundary pollution problem involving two asymmetric countries in terms of benefits arising from global abatement. There is a single polluting firm in each country. We account for two types of IEAs: an agreement based on a uniform standard with transfers and an agreement based on differentiated standards without transfers. To carry out this study, we use a two-stage game where the private sector anticipates its irreversible investment given the expected level of abatement standards resulting from future negotiations. Our findings indicate that the implementation of the agreement based on a uniform standard with transfers may be preferable for the two countries, as it creates greater incentives for firms to invest in costly abatement technology. This result arises when this technology’s level of the sunk cost of investment is low. If this level is sufficiently high, the implementation of the same agreement is not beneficial to countries, because it takes away the incentive of each firm to invest in new abatement technology. Moreover, this agreement is not able to generate any positive gains for either country through cooperation, thus no country is motivated to cooperate.     

Environmental Policy and the International Diffusion of Cleaner Energy Technologies

Technology transfer is an important channel of technological change and sustainable development for countries with less innovative ability than technological leaders. This paper studies whether domestic environmental policies affect the inward technology transfer of cleaner innovation from abroad. We focus specifically on the power sector, for its important role in the decarbonization process, by looking at zero-carbon (renewable) and carbon-saving (efficient fossil) technologies for energy production. Using data on cross-country patent applications, we provide evidence that environmental policy contributes to attracting foreign cleaner technology options to OECD markets but not to non-OECD markets. We show that this is due to the nature of the implemented policy instruments. Market-based approaches positively impact technology transfer to both OECD and non-OECD economies, while non-market based approaches have at best only a weak effect in OECD countries. Domestic environmental policies may provide too weak a signal for foreign innovators in countries off the technological frontier. This calls for a strengthening of policy incentives for technology transfer in light of pressing climate change objectives.     

Poor institutions as a comparative advantage

Classic theories of comparative advantage point to factor productivity and factor abundance as determinants of specialization and trade. Likewise, geography and topography can determine trade patterns. Institutions, however, are increasingly seen as important sources of comparative advantage. A global drug prohibition regime implies that institutional quality matters more than traditional sources in the drug trade. This paper theoretically models trade patterns of illicit goods and confirms the role of institutions empirically with respect to the drug trade. In particular, illicit enterprises gain force in countries where resources are scarce, drug enforcement is uncertain, and institutions are weak in absolute terms and relative to neighboring countries. I propose several policy alternatives that emphasize economic opportunity for the poor and institutional quality that complement drug prohibition.     

Do casinos pay their customers to become risk-averse? Revising the house money effect in a field experiment

The house money effect predicts that individuals show increased risk-seeking behavior in the presence of prior windfall gains. Although the effect’s existence is widely accepted, experimental studies that compare individuals’ risk-taking behavior using house money to individuals’ risk-taking behavior using their own money produce contradictory results. This experimental field study analyzes the gambling behavior of 917 casino customers who face real losses. We find that customers who received free play at the entrance showed not higher but significantly lower levels of risk-taking behavior during their casino visit, expressed through lower average wagers. This study thus provides field evidence against the house money effect. Moreover, as a result of lower levels of risk seeking, endowed customers yield better economic results in the form of smaller own-money losses when leaving the casino.     

Exchange rate volatility and bilateral exports of Malaysia to Singapore,China, Japan,the USA and Korea

This study examines the impact of exchange rate volatility on bilateral exports of Malaysia to Singapore, China, Japan, the USA and Korea. Exchange rate volatility is estimated by an autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity model. The Johansen cointegration method and the dynamic ordinary least squares estimator are used in the estimations. There is some evidence of exchange rate volatility to have significant impact on real total exports in the long run, but more evidence of exchange rate volatility is found to have significant impact on sub-categories of real total exports in the short run. The impact of exchange rate volatility differs across bilateral exports. The impact of exchange rate volatility on exports can be negative or positive. Generally, exchange rate volatility is not harmful to bilateral exports of Malaysia.     

A strategic analysis of surging Chinese manufacturers: The case of Galanz

Recent years have witnessed the surging of Chinese manufacturers, as China has become the world’s factory floor. This paper presents a case study of one of the most successful manufacturers in China, the Galanz Group, now the world’s largest microwave manufacturer. Based on theories of multinational corporations from emerging economies, the paper examines the process of Galanz’s integration into the global market. The company has developed unique competitive strategies that have made it a great success within China and in overseas markets. The Galanz model suggests strong strategic implications for both Chinese firms and incumbent multinational corporations.

Francesco Forte’s Contributions to <Emphasis Type="Italic">Essentials of Fiscal Sociology</Emphasis>

Francesco Forte has made major contributions to many areas of economics with the result that his theoretical work and applications have opened new areas of inquiry. This paper connects Forte’s work with the work of Jürgen Backhaus on fiscal sociology. Positioned at the crossroads of economics and sociology, the answers to these questions helped fill the void which gave rise to the field of fiscal sociology. Fiscal sociology is primarily a study of taxation and fiscal policies which illuminates core issues in the sociology of contemporary capitalism. It includes the causes of poverty and inequality in rich countries and adds to our understanding the basis for the inequality between rich and poor countries. Our paper reviews several of Forte’s papers on Pareto’s fiscal sociology and the failure of European planning for less-developed regions. The paper highlights Forte’s contributions to economic theory focusing on Pareto’s sociological theory and the influence of the European Union on regional development.     

Consumer welfare from publicly supplemented private goods: age and income effects on demand for health care

In spite of major advances in the theoretical, positive and normative, literature analysing the welfare implications of public provision of private goods, empirical investigation is often limited to contingent valuation studies, for example, of health care programmes. In this article we argue that when a market for a (subsidised or free of charge) publicly provided good exists, a consumer demand approach can be used to construct a money metric of welfare corresponding to the consumption of public provision. We illustrate this approach in investigating age and income effects on household demand for health care in Cyprus, where free public provision is not universal and those entitled to it often resort to private supplementation. Our findings suggest that the money metric of welfare, which consumers attach to free access to publicly provided health care, varies with age and to a lesser extent with household income.