Insurance demand in the presence of loss-dependent background risk

We analyze insurance demand when insurable losses come with an uninsurable zero-mean background risk that increases in the loss size. If the individual is risk vulnerable, loss-dependent background risk triggers a precautionary insurance motive and increases optimal insurance demand. Prudence alone is sufficient for insurance demand to increase in two cases: the case of fair insurance and the case where the smallest possible loss exceeds a certain threshold value (referred to as the large loss case). We derive conditions under which insurance demand increases or decreases in initial wealth. In the large loss case, prudence determines whether changes in the background risk lead to more insurance demand. We generalize this result to arbitrary loss distributions and find conditions based on decreasing third-degree Ross risk aversion, Arrow–Pratt risk aversion, and Arrow–Pratt temperance.     

Die Risikoübernahme von Versicherungsunternehmen: Eine empirische Analyse für Deutschland und Großbritannien

In this paper we analyze the risk resulting from an insurer’s investment policy. For this a hypothetical asset return rate is defined, based on which the German and British insurance market is analyzed. The study design allows an investigation of the investment risk in different countries or for different lines of business. The aim of the analysis is to detect general market trends in the investment policy and an analysis of effects of important changes over time on the investment risk of insurers. The questions analyzed in this paper are also of particular relevance beyond the background of current reform proposal for insurance regulation in Europe in the field of risk management and capital adequacy (Solvency II).     

Wie viel Europa braucht die Energiewende?

It is often argued that Germany’s energy transition (the so-called “Energiewende”) needs to be “Europeanized”, so as to make the transition process more efficient. In particular, the German system of feed-in tariffs for renewables is criticized for being an obstacle to efficient European energy supply. However, we point out that Germany’s approach is no outlier but rather well embedded in the European context of heterogeneous energy policies. Also, full centralization and harmonization of political decisions on the EU-level may not be desirable in many fields of energy policy beyond climate protection if the full economic costs of energy supply are taken into account. In addition, legal and politico-economic constraints need to be considered. Against this background, we identify priorities for fostering the European dimension of the Member States’ energy policies, such as the coordination of grid extensions and capacity markets.     

Estimation of linear dynamic panel data models with time‐invariant regressors

We present a sequential approach to estimating a dynamic Hausman–Taylor model. We first estimate the coefficients of the time‐varying regressors and subsequently regress the first‐stage residuals on the time‐invariant regressors. In comparison to estimating all coefficients simultaneously, this two‐stage procedure is more robust against model misspecification, allows for a flexible choice of the first‐stage estimator, and enables simple testing of the overidentifying restrictions. For correct inference, we derive analytical standard error adjustments. We evaluate the finite‐sample properties with Monte Carlo simulations and apply the approach to a dynamic gravity equation for US outward foreign direct investment.     

The nonlinear effect of financial literacy on wealth: evidence from Germany

Empirica - This paper investigates the nonlinearity in the relationship of financial literacy and wealth and addresses the potentially inadequate measurement of financial literacy. Using data from...     

Sustainable Project Finance,the Adoption of the Equator Principles and Shareholder Value Effects

Recent trends in the project finance industry include an increasing volume and a growing awareness of sustainable development. This has raised the question of whether and a how voluntary code of conduct such as the Equator Principles (EP) could enhance its impact on the project finance industry. We apply an event study methodology, and also consider the market model and conditional variance. We find positive abnormal returns for financial institutions adopting the EP, which supports the reputational risk hypothesis. Furthermore, we document that adopters outperform the global project finance market, especially in terms of market share. However, we do not find evidence that non‐adopters are excluded from lending syndicates. Results include practical recommendations for environmental policy. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

SYSTEMATIC MONETARY POLICY AND THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SHIFTS IN RESIDENTIAL LOAN-TO-VALUE RATIOS

What are the macroeconomic consequences of changing aggregate lending standards in residential mortgage markets, as measured by loan-to-value (LTV) ratios? Using a structural vector autoregression (VAR), we find that GDP and business investment increase following an expansionary LTV shock. Residential investment, by contrast, falls after a small initial uptick, a result that depends on the systematic reaction of monetary policy. We show that, historically, the Fed tended to respond to expansionary LTV shocks by raising the monetary policy instrument, and, as a result, mortgage rates increased and residential investment declined. House prices are affected in a similar manner.     

Imperfect legal unbundling of monopolistic bottlenecks

We study an industry with a monopolistic bottleneck supplying an essential input to several downstream firms. Under legal unbundling the bottleneck must be operated by a legally independent upstream firm, which may be partly or fully owned by an incumbent active in downstream markets. Access prices are regulated but the upstream firm can perform non-tariff discrimination. Under perfect legal unbundling the upstream firm maximizes only own profits; with imperfections it is biased and to some extent accounts also for the incumbent’s downstream profits. We show that increasing the incumbent’s ownership share increases total output if the upstream firm’s bias is sufficiently small, while otherwise effects are ambiguous. Stronger regulation that reduces the bias without changing ownership shares generally increases total output. We also endogenize the bias and show that it can depend non-monotonically on the ownership share.     

中国经济腾飞中的分级制政策试验

政策试验是指把来自基层的建议和地方积累的经验注入国家政策的一种机制,这常被视为促进制度创新的有力手段和避免因情况不明而导致改革震荡的有效方法。在某些经济领域内,大规模的试验有效地刺激了政策学习和经济扩张,原因是政治精英们从支持新型的私营和跨国企业中获益。与此相反,在有效提供社会公共产品方面,许多政策试验却不了了之,原因是这些试验要求社会主动监督和中央政府严格执法相结合,否则试验发挥不了作用。尽管在不同政治领域内转型试验效果不一,中国以试验为基础的政策制定过程还是对重新定义整个政策框架起到了实质作用。在中国式政策制定过程的核心,我们发现了一个中央和地方互动的机制,我们称其为“分级制试验”,这个发现对经济转型方式的研究是一个明显补充。     

Leadership effectiveness and institutional frames

Leadership mechanisms provide a potential means to mitigate social dilemmas, but empirical evidence on the success of such mechanisms is mixed. In this paper, we explore the institutional frame as a relevant factor for the effectiveness of leadership. We compare subjects’ behavior in public-goods experiments that are either framed positively (give-some game) or negatively (take-some game). We observe that leader and follower decisions are sensitive to the institutional frame. Leaders contribute less in the take-some game, and the correlation between leaders’ and followers’ contribution is weaker in the take-some game. Additionally, using a strategy method to elicit followers’ reactions at the individual level, we find evidence for the malleability of followers’ revealed cooperation types. Taken together, the leadership institution is found to be less efficient in the take- than in the give-frame, both in games that are played only once and repeatedly.