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951.
In this paper, we argue that the influence product market competition exerts on disclosure is defined by the combined effect of the incentives and disincentives to disclose raised by the multiple competition dimensions. We distinguish between firm‐ and industry‐level competition measures, and we hypothesize that the former raises agency and proprietary costs, whereas the latter creates incentives to disclose either to fulfil the owners’ need for information to monitor managers or to deter the entrance of new competitors in the industry. Our research design allows for non‐monotonic relationships between competition and disclosure as well as for interactions between competition dimensions. Using a sample of US manufacturing companies, we gather evidence that is consistent with our hypotheses. First, we find an inverted U‐shape relationship between corporate disclosure and a firm's abnormal profitability, which is suggestive of firms being reluctant to disclose when they are underperforming (outperforming) their rivals because of the fear of unveiling agency conflicts (raising proprietary costs). Second, we observe a U‐shape relationship between corporate disclosure and industry profitability, although this U design evolves to approximate a rising function as the protection provided by entry barriers increases.  相似文献   
952.
In March 1977, the $560 million limit on liability in the Price-Anderson Act was declared unconstitutional. The Price-Anderson Act sets forth a combination private-public insurance and compensation system for handling risks associated with commercial nuclear operations. The limit was found to violate the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This paper examines the salient points of the decision which include: (a) the effects of nuclear plant operations on the plaintiffs; (b) the dependence of nuclear power development on the Price-Anderson Act; (c) the plaintiff's right to bring suit; and (d) the rationale for declaring the Act unconstitutional. The potential effects include the possibility that many utilities and suppliers of nuclear plant components will terminate their nuclear business, the availability of capital funds for nuclear plants will be reduced, and that cost of capital will be increased to reflect the greater risk of nuclear development.  相似文献   
953.
954.
We evaluate the predictive power of leading indicators for output growth at horizons up to 1 year. We use the MIDAS regression approach as this allows us to combine multiple individual leading indicators in a parsimonious way and to directly exploit the information content of the monthly series to predict quarterly output growth. When we use real‐time vintage data, the indicators are found to have significant predictive ability, and this is further enhanced by the use of monthly data on the quarter at the time the forecast is made. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.  相似文献   
955.
This paper addresses an existing gap in the developing literature on conditional skewness. We develop a simple procedure to evaluate parametric conditional skewness models. This procedure is based on regressing the realized skewness measures on model-implied conditional skewness values. We find that an asymmetric generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity specification on shape parameters with a skewed generalized error distribution provides the best in-sample fit for the data, as well as reasonable predictions of the realized skewness measure. Our empirical findings imply significant asymmetry with respect to positive and negative news in both conditional asymmetry and kurtosis processes.  相似文献   
956.
随着会计电算化的普及,计算机舞弊犯罪现象也越来越严重。通过阐述会计电算化舞弊特点及篡改输入数据、木马计、截尾术、拾遗、数据泄露、乘虚而入和冒名顶替等各种会计电算化舞弊手段,分析了这些舞弊现象产生的原因,并提出了加强法制建设、完善内部控制、发挥审计人员的监督作用等防范会计电算化舞弊的措施。  相似文献   
957.
朱丹 《特区经济》2005,(7):159-160
财政部、国家税务总局于2004年9月14日联合下发了《财政部国家税务总局关于东北地区扩大增值税抵扣范围若干问题的规定》,从而正式拉开了讨论已久增值税转型改革序幕。虽然此次增值税转型改革是以在东北地区的试点为开始,但改革在全国范围内的推广也是可以预期的。本文以增值税  相似文献   
958.
M BO是M anagem ent Buy-outs的简称,意即管理层融资收购,是指公司的管理层利用借贷所融资本或股权交换及其它产权交易手段收购本公司,进而达到重组本公司并获得预期收益的一种收购行为。管理层融资收购起源于英国。1980年,英国经济学家迈克·莱特(M ikeW right)在研究公司的分  相似文献   
959.
960.
We analyze the incentives of a vertically integrated firm, which is a regulated monopolist in the wholesale market and competes with an entrant in the retail market, to invest and to give access to a new wholesale technology. The new technology represents a non-drastic innovation that produces retail services of a higher quality than the old technology, and is left unregulated. We show that for intermediate values of the access price for the old technology, the vertically integrated firm may decide not to invest. When investment occurs, the vertically integrated firm may be induced to give access to the entrant for a low access price for the old technology. Furthermore, when both firms can invest, investment occurs under a larger set of circumstances, and it is the entrant the firm that invests in more cases. We also discuss the implications for the regulation of the old technology.  相似文献   
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