The relationship between product and international diversification: the effects of short‐run constraints and endogeneity

We examine the relationship between growth along the product and international dimension in the short run. We argue that while the presence of fungible intangible resources and economies of scope may create opportunities for a firm to expand along both dimensions, the effect of short‐ run constraints may lead to a trade‐off and a negative association between the two dimensions. In addition, we suggest that rather than being independent, decisions concerning the extent of growth along the two dimensions are likely to be made simultaneously and endogenously by firms after taking into consideration the availability of various resources. We test these propositions by observing a sample of 1,299 firms over the period of 1993–1997. Our results show strong evidence of endogeneity and a negative association between growth along the two dimensions. These findings provide important support for theories of firm growth that have long held that firms are limited in the number of opportunities they can exploit in the short run by various constraints. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Integration into a Global Production Network: Impacts on Labour in Tiruppur's Rural Hinterlands

External and internal development funds may be substitutes or complementary in financing development projects. We construct a welfare-maximizing model of a community, explicitly incorporating the decision-makers' choice between internal and external resources for development purposes. The model is estimated with Mauritian data, which include periods of rising foreign aid and substantial repayment. The computed values of substitution elasticity between the two sources of funds, derived from the social choice process, indicate that internal and external funds are complementary and therefore external funds do not seem to be fungible.     

Deprivation and Incidence of Urban Public Services: A Tale of Three Cities

We approach the problem of deprivation and incidence of urban public services by quantifying the extent of deprivation of different income groups in relation to both desired and minimum levels. Three types of deprivation are clearly established. First, deprivation in both Bombay and Calcutta is higher than that of Delhi. Second, there is a serious concern for primary health and education because it is established that the lack of these local services is the major source of deprivation among urban settlers. Finally, we report how well different income classes are served in these cities: the rich are worst-off in Calcutta and best-off in Bombay. Middle income and poor citizens are best-off and worst-off in Delhi and Bombay, respectively.     

Institutional ownership and the informativeness of disclosure tone

Disclosure tone is an important qualitative characteristic of managerial disclosures. There is mixed evidence on the role of tone in disclosure strategy. While some studies highlight the informativeness of disclosure tone, other studies provide evidence consistent with an information obfuscation role. We conjecture that the mixed evidence may be because prior studies have not explicitly modeled the role of oversight over managerial disclosure. Using an exogenous shock to institutional ownership, an important source of managerial oversight, we find that abnormal disclosure tone is informative of a firm's future earnings and cash flows when institutional ownership is high. This positive association between institutional ownership and informativeness of abnormal tone is stronger when there is an increase in quasi-indexer institutional ownership and the contemporaneous performance is negative. Collectively, the results highlight a more complex role for disclosure tone. Abnormal disclosure tone could be reflective of managerial sentiment and convey forward-looking information to investors in the presence of greater oversight over managerial actions.     

Adverse effects of uniform written reporting standards on accounting practice,education, and research

When transactions have multiple attributes, achieving uniformity in their classification depends on whether similarities or dissimilarities are of interest; uniformity with respect to both is not possible. The pursuit of uniform written standards at the expense of social norms diminishes the effectiveness of financial reporting in stewardship and governance, and in keeping the security markets informed. A shift to written standards discourages thoughtful classroom discourse on alternatives which develop professional judgment. It also engenders ‘‘by the book” attitudes and drives talent away from accounting programs and, ultimately, from the accounting profession. Judgment and personal responsibility being the hallmarks of a learned profession, the dominance of uniform written standards weakens the claim that accounting programs belong in universities alongside architecture, dentistry, engineering, law, and medicine. Uniformity discourages research and debate in academic and practice forums and promotes increasingly detailed rule-making. It shuts the door on learning through experimentation, making it difficult to discover better ways of financial reporting through practice and comparison of alternatives. Improved financial reporting calls for a careful balance between written standards and unwritten social norms.     

Privacy in E-Commerce: Development of Reporting Standards, Disclosure, and Assurance Services in an Unregulated Market

Government regulation of financial reporting by publicly listed firms, coupled with a punitive regime for violation of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), has been in place in the United States for seven decades. Whether this regime is effective or useful is an open question, especially in the absence of data on the behavior of unregulated economies. Privacy disclosure in e‐commerce is essentially an unregulated environment with some parallels to financial disclosure. A study of privacy standards, disclosures practices, and demand for audits can help accountants and security regulators project the consequences of a competitive regime sans regulation for accounting standards, disclosure and audit practices. In this article we set up a framework for such a study, gather data from the field, and analyze privacy standards, privacy disclosure practices, and the effectiveness of opt‐out practices of 100 high‐traffic e‐commerce Web sites. We observe four diverse sets of privacy standards (TRUSTe, BBB Online, WebTrust, and PWC Privacy) competing in this market, attracting clienteles of their own as reflected in privacy policies and the disclosure of such policies. With a few exceptions, actual disclosure and opt‐out practices correspond reasonably well to stated policies in e‐commerce. There is little evidence that the prevailing competitive regime induces a race to the bottom with respect to privacy standards and disclosures. We explore the implications of these results for the consequences of a competitive regime for regulation of financial reporting.     

Expectations and learning under alternative monetary regimes: an experimental approach

Summary We design and analyze experimental versions of monetary overlapping generations economies under alternative policy regimes. Economies with a constant level of real deficit financed through seignorage, economies in which the level of deficit is adapted in order to follow a monetary policy with a target rate of inflation, and economies with preannounced changes in deficit levels are reported here. We also examine the behavior of an economy with no stationary competitive equilibrium. Our time series are compared to rational expectations equilibrium paths and to adaptive learning dynamics.Financial support for our work from the Graduate School of the University of Minnesota, the National Science Foundation (SES-8912552), Richard M. and Margaret Cyert Family Funds, and the Ministry of Education of Spain is gratefully acknowledged. We wish to thank Javier Diaz-Giménez, Jean Michael Grandmont, Robert Lucas, Albert Marcet, Charles Plott, Edward Prescott, Thomas Sargent, Neil Wallace and Michael Woodford for commenting on our work. We also thank Vijay Rajan for developing the software for the computerized experimental environment, and Jackie Cuccaro and Dhananjay Gode for their research assistance.     

Earnings Management and the Revelation Principle

When the Revelation Principle (RP) holds, managing earnings confers no advantage over revelation. We construct an explanation for earnings management that is based on limitations on owners' ability to make commitments (a violation of the RP's assumptions). Traditionally, earnings management is seen as sneaky managers pulling the wool over the eyes of gullible owners by manipulating accruals; our limited commitment story suggests that the owners, too, can benefit from earnings management. We categorize a variety of extant explanations of earnings management, along with our own, according to which of the assumptions of the RP each explanation violates. Plausibility of multiple simultaneous violations of the assumptions, and strategic use of various accounting and real instruments of earnings management, complicate the task of detecting such management in field data.