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Collaborative research projects form a specific project type, aimed at organizing innovation endeavors between industry, academic, and public partners. They've become increasingly widespread and their management is challenged due to ambiguously defined goals and the heterogeneous interests of many partners. We present a situation‐specific approach that enables managers to select established project management knowledge according to changing needs along the project life cycle. Making use of thematic analysis, we develop a graphical framework to describe and analyze project situations. Further we establish situation profiles as a concept to relate each situation to a management method that corresponds with its managerial needs.  相似文献   
104.
Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
Summary. The paper analyzes a problem of optimal auction design when the seller faces asymmetrically informed bidders. Specifically, we consider a continuum of risk-neutral uninformed bidders taking part into the auction along with n risk-averse informed bidders. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we fully characterize the optimal auction in this non standard environment and in a very general set-up. We find that when informed bidders reveal “bad news” about the value of the good, the seller optimally awards the object to the uninformed bidders. Secondly, we show that the seller is better off in presence of uninformed bidders because this allows to lower the informational rents paid to the informed bidders. Last, we find that, with bi-lateral risk neutrality, the seller always awards the good to the uninformed bidders thereby keeping all the surplus.Received: 22 October 2004, Revised: 21 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D44, D82.We are very grateful to two anonymous referees, Jacques Crémer, Patrick François, Angel Hernando-Veciana and seminar participants at the 2004 SCSE conference (Quebec, Canada) for their valuable comments. Moez Bennouri acknowledges the financial support by the Initiative of the New Economy (INE) program of SSHRC (Canada).  相似文献   
105.
Recent writing about the ‘service encounter’ suggests that high-quality service requires employee commitment and this will involve a more developed and sophisticated approach to HRM than has traditionally characterised the sector. Through an in-depth study of a sample of high service level hotels in the US and UK this paper argues, in contrast, that commitment can be created through a workplace culture that draws on family discourses and practices. It explores the ways in which this culture is developed and endorsed by both management and employees. This approach to generating commitment has costs in terms of the time and priority employees can give to their ‘real’ friends and family. By drawing on the highly gendered and hierarchical organisation of the family, it is argued that culture also contributes to gender stereotyping and hierarchies within and outside the workplace in ways that limit women's career opportunities.  相似文献   
106.
In this paper I analyze the effect of market uncertainty in an overlapping generations economy with strategic interactions among agents. I demonstrate the existence of sunspot-like equilibria, in which arbitrarily small amounts of intrinsic uncertainty in agents’ offers generate large fluctuations in equilibrium bids and prices. I would like to express my gratitude to Stephen Spear for his guidance during the realization of this project. I thank an anonymous referee for providing insightful comments and suggestions. I have benefited from comments by Alexander Elbittar, Cesar Guerrero, and Vivek Ramachandran.  相似文献   
107.
Summary. For perfectly competitive economies under uncertainty, there is a well-known equivalence between a formulation with contingent goods and one with state-specific securities followed by spot markets for goods. In this paper, I examine whether this equivalence carries over to a particular form of imperfect competition. Specifically, I look at three Shapley-Shubik strategic market games: one with contingent commodities, one with Arrow securities traded under imperfect competition and one with Arrow securities traded under perfect competition. First I compare the feasibility constraints of these three games. Then I compare their equilibrium sets. As in Peck and Shell (1989), the only common equilibria between the first and the second game are those which involve no transfer of income across states. However, if the securities markets are competitive, then the set of equilibria of the contingent commodities game and the securities game coincide. Received: June 16, 1997; revised version: April 30, 1998  相似文献   
108.
We examine the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover and the performance of listed Chinese firms and obtain two results. First, we find a negative relationship between the level of pre-turnover profitability and CEO turnover when firms are incurring financial losses, but no such relationship when they are making profits. Second, there is an improvement in post-turnover profitability in loss-making firms, but no such improvement in profit-making firms. These results indicate the existence of a time-varying objective function, whereby shareholders have a greater incentive to discipline their CEOs on the basis of financial performance when their firms are incurring financial losses rather than profits.  相似文献   
109.
This article investigates the hypothesis that child labour is compelled by poverty. It shows that a testable implication of this hypothesis is that the wage elasticity of child labour supply is negative. Using a large household survey for rural Pakistan, labour supply models for boys and girls in wage work are estimated. Conditioning on non-labour income and a range of demographic variables, the article finds a negative wage elasticity for boys and an elasticity that is insignificantly different from zero for girls. Thus, while boys appear to work on account of poverty compulsions, the evidence for girls is ambiguous.  相似文献   
110.
We examine the potential for the price-to-rent ratio to be used as a macroprudential tool. In addition to using standardized appraisal methods, appraisers could estimate the current market rent for a property. The resulting price-to-rent ratio would provide a useful signal for speculative pressures. We show this by estimating price-to-rent ratios using the American Housing Survey. The distribution of price-to-rent ratios shifted up dramatically during the housing boom with the 75th and 95th percentile reaching a historic peak in 2006 at 22 and 44, respectively. We propose a lending policy that incorporates the price-to-rent ratio to generate countercyclical loan-to-value ratios.  相似文献   
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