Power and responsibility: Advertising self-regulation and consumer protection in a digital world

While advertising self-regulation is generally considered effective in a closed, largely country-based system, the digital world in which we now live is an open and global system. This raises challenges for consumer protection from national regulators trying to enforce compliance from global media platforms, advertisers, and consumers. Applying the power-responsibility equilibrium, this study explores who has the power and who has the responsibility for advertising self-regulation in a digital world. In doing so, it takes an ethnographic approach, eliciting insights from 18 key stakeholders in the self-regulatory process, across the three geographical areas of Europe, United States, and Asia-Pacific. The findings highlight the need for more collaboration and alignment of self-regulatory systems and build a framework for action through embedding responsibility, aligning standards, initiating processes, and improving outcomes. Six recommendations are offered to restore the balance of power and responsibility.     

The influence of cooperative relations of small businesses on environmental protection intensity

This study examines the relationship between cooperative business relations in small businesses (fewer than 50 employees) and environmental protection, one of the most important policies of social responsibility in manufacturing. We reviewed the literature and carried out an empirical study of 930 small manufacturing firms in Spain. Results indicate that small businesses that maintain and improve their cooperative relations through business networking with universities, competitors, suppliers and customers spend more on environmental protection. The managerial, practical, research and policy implications of the obtained research findings are discussed.     

Facilitative Leadership and the Challenge of Renewing Local Democracy in Italy

Participatory arrangements have become a popular way of addressing modern challenges of urban governance but in practice face several constraints and can trigger deep tensions. Facilitative leadership can play a crucial role in enabling collaboration among local stakeholders despite plural and often conflictual interests. Surprisingly, this style of leadership has received limited attention within debates linking urban governance and participatory democracy. We summarize the main insights of the literature on facilitative leadership and empirically develop them in the context of participatory urban governance by comparing recent participatory processes in two Italian cities. Whereas in one city facilitative leadership gradually emerged and successfully transformed a deep conflict into consensual proposals, in the other city, participatory planning further exacerbated pre‐existing antagonism, and local democratic culture was only later slowly reinvigorated through bottom‐up initiative. These diverging pathways explain how facilitative leadership is: (1) important for making things happen; (2) best understood as situated practices; (3) an emergent property of the practices and interactions of a number of local actors and (4) a democratic capacity for dealing with continuous challenges. Key to this style of leadership is understanding participatory urban governance as an ongoing democratic process.     

Facing ‘fairness at work’: union perception of employer opposition and response to union recognition

The introduction of statutory mechanisms by which unions can gain union recognition in Britain has stimulated employer activity to avoid and subvert union recognition campaigns. This article examines the nature and extent of such employer activities and how unions have responded.     

Optimal auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders

Summary. The paper analyzes a problem of optimal auction design when the seller faces asymmetrically informed bidders. Specifically, we consider a continuum of risk-neutral uninformed bidders taking part into the auction along with n risk-averse informed bidders. The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, we fully characterize the optimal auction in this non standard environment and in a very general set-up. We find that when informed bidders reveal “bad news” about the value of the good, the seller optimally awards the object to the uninformed bidders. Secondly, we show that the seller is better off in presence of uninformed bidders because this allows to lower the informational rents paid to the informed bidders. Last, we find that, with bi-lateral risk neutrality, the seller always awards the good to the uninformed bidders thereby keeping all the surplus.Received: 22 October 2004, Revised: 21 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: D44, D82.We are very grateful to two anonymous referees, Jacques Crémer, Patrick François, Angel Hernando-Veciana and seminar participants at the 2004 SCSE conference (Quebec, Canada) for their valuable comments. Moez Bennouri acknowledges the financial support by the Initiative of the New Economy (INE) program of SSHRC (Canada).