Monetary Policy Games and International Migration in a Small Open Economy

The paper shows that international migration may improve the position of both policymakers and unions in small open economies irrespective of whether they cooperate or not. This result implies that both unions and policymakers in small open economies may welcome a further increase in international labor flow in the future. When allowance is made for real GDP per capital considerations on behalf of the policymaker, it is found that aggressive union behavior may increase the inflationary bias. Aggressive unions may insulate themselves, while soft unions lose. The presence of migration does not necessarily lead to a better outcome.     

Efficiency, monotonicity and rationality in public goods economies

Summary. In economies with public goods, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of cost monotonic, Pareto optimal and individually rational mechanisms. These exist if and only if the preferences of the agents satisfy what we call the equal ordering property. We also show that when this condition holds the egalitarian equivalent correspondence is the only cost monotonic selection from the core of the economy. Furthermore, it is unambiguous in the sense that the agents are indifferent among all the allocations in it. Received: February 26, 1996; revised version: January 31, 1997     

Bush v. Gore and the Effect of New Source Review on Power Plant Emissions

New Source Review (NSR) is a Clean Air Act regulation that requires electric utilities to meet emission standards when making modifications to existing power plants. The regulation increases the cost of replacing worn out parts, and limits the firm’s scope of potential capital investments. Such restrictions may lead to greater retirements and lower utilization, adversely affecting profits. Prior to the 2000 presidential election, investors expected Bush to have a narrower interpretation of NSR than Gore. Therefore, we use changes in stock prices to estimate the effect on profits of differences in NSR policy. Our results indicate that investors expected the average boiler to be $38 million more valuable under the Bush administration. Over the boilers’ lifetimes, the additional utilization will have increased emissions by 19 million tons of sulfur dioxide, 5.9 million tons of nitrogen oxides and 980 million tons of carbon dioxide, relative to natural gas generation.      

Compositional data analysis and zeros in micro data

The application of compositional data analysis methods in economics has some attraction. The methodology relies upon the use of 'log-ratios' in the statistical analysis. Such an approach is not possible when the data to be analysed include observations where the observed budget share is zero. We, therefore, consider and extend the methods of compositional data analysis in the situation where the data to be analysed include observations where the observed budget share is zero. The modified compositional data methods are discussed both in statistical terms and through potential economic interpretations of the method. Further, the modified methodology is applied to the 1988-89 Australian Household Expenditure Survey yielding estimates for a system of Engel curves.     

Exclusions of infertility treatment in the aftermath of Bragdon v. Abbott

This article analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon v. Abbott to determine whether the Court's reading of ADA necessarily leads to the conclusion that a group health plan's or insurer's exclusion or limitation of coverage with respect to infertility is prohibited by ADA. The authors conclude that it may be advisable for plans to perform at least minimal actuarial calculations with respect to the current or anticipated costs of covering infertility treatments prior to adopting any exclusions or limitations of coverage.     

Cost Uncertainty and Unilateral Abatement

Unilateral abatement is sometimes advocated in order to set a good example that will make other countries follow. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether existence of correlated cost uncertainty provides an incentive for a country to undertake unilateral abatement. The theoretical model is driven by two main mechanisms; first, a learning effect, as the follower country might reduce its risk premium as it can observe the cost level in the leader country. Second, there is the public good effect, i.e., the marginal benefit of abatement declines when abatement is a public good and other countries contribute to pollution reductions. Results shows that unilateral abatement would be efficient in reducing uncertainty about the unit costs of abatement if a country with low cost uncertainty would undertake abatement first, while a country with initially high cost uncertainty would follow. However, countries may prefer to act simultaneously because of the larger uncertainties that are inherent in a sequential game.