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31.
We study limit pricing in a model of entry with asymmetric information, where the incumbent firm's wage is endogenously determined through ‘efficient bargaining’ with its union. In the presence of entry threat, the incumbent firm‐union pair may face a conflict between rent sharing and transmitting its cost information. When the wage is not observable to outsiders and employment is the only signalling instrument, over‐employment features in all entry deterring contracts. When the wage is also observable, information transmission becomes easier. Most of the time, then, but not always, the efficient contract deters (induces) entry against the low (high) cost incumbent. 相似文献
32.
Bibhas Saha 《Journal of Economics》2009,98(1):25-43
We determine optimal privatization in a symmetric differentiated duopoly when the public firms do not bear the full cost of
production and hence their objective functions differ from the government’s objective function. In the social optimum firms
will generally have mixed ownership, and it will depend on the type of uncovered cost, the degree of substitutability of the
two products and the output decision rule of the partially public firms. Different types of mixed duopoly emerge, ranging
from both firms being partially privatized, to one being fully privatized. We also derive an optimal tax-subsidy scheme as
a substitute for privatization.
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34.
Developing countries often suffer from high corruption, high income inequality and poor institutional arrangements that give rise to large shadow economies. Earlier evidence shows that shadow economies moderate the negative effects of corruption on income inequality in highly unequal South American countries. For Asia, we show that the persistence of shadow economies raises inequality even if corruption control is strong. Supported by static and dynamic panel data analyses of 21 countries in Asia between 1995 and 2015, we show that in order to combat rising inequality, corruption control must be complemented by the ability to translate secondary and tertiary school enrolment into industrial and, more importantly, service sector jobs. Countries with low corruption but high inequality can reduce inequality by committing to higher public consumption expenditures. Further, combining greater trade openness with low corruption lowers inequality, except for countries in South Asia. 相似文献
35.
Sudipa Majumdar Bibhas Saha 《The journal of international trade & economic development》2013,22(4):389-403
This paper develops a model where labour supply is constrained because training new workers is costly and redundant workers cannot be fired. An entrant draws labour from an incumbent firm through a wage contest while wages in the latter are bargained with its unionized workers. In a Cournot equilibrium, the union's bargaining power has a positive effect on the incumbent's output, but a negative effect on the industry output. Social welfare under duopoly may fall short of the monopoly level. The distribution of bargaining gains within the incumbent firm is sensitive to whether wage and output choices are made sequentially or simultaneously. 相似文献
36.
We study bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining between firms and unions in a Cournot duopoly. Incentive delegation creates frictions for each party between its objectives of within‐firm rent extraction and market/job stealing from the rival firm. The net effect is restraint in production, resulting in a larger bargaining pie. But each player's payoff will be inversely related to his bargaining power. We also show that if players are given a choice to delegate, they will not resort to delegation when their bargaining power is sufficiently high. This is in contrast to the scenarios commonly assumed in many models. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
37.
We propose a polynomial logit model to quantify the price effects of mergers in a static Nash setting. The proposed model is parsimonious in parameters and is shown to have excellent predictive power, rivaling the in-sample and out-of-sample predictive accuracy of the widely-used AIDS model.The analysis, using actual scanner data on bread sales, demonstrates that a linear logit model is likely to over-estimate the merger price effect. 相似文献
38.
It is well-known that with free entry, more firms than is socially optimal typically enter provided there are economies of
scale. This paper investigates the possibility of excess entry in the absence of scale economies
We thank Simon Anderson, Tom Holmes, the late Arijit Mukherji, and Xavier Vives for helpful comments. We also thank the participants
at the July 2001 Australasian Meetings of the Econometric Society in Auckland, June 2002 University of Melbourne-National
University of Singapore Symposium and seminar participants at the University of Sydney and University of New South Wales for
useful suggestions. We are especially thankful to an anonymous referee whose meticulous comments have helped us to improve
the paper 相似文献
39.
Amitava Saha 《Oxford Development Studies》2013,41(2):220-238
Gender discrimination in household expenditure on education has led to unsatisfactory progress in educational attainment for women in many countries across the world. It has been observed that households across different states in rural and urban India prefer to incur more expenditure on education for male members than for females. Kingdon (2005) [Where has all the bias gone? Detecting gender bias in the intra-household allocation of educational expenditure, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 53(2), 409–452] has observed significant gender bias in household educational expenditure in a number of Indian states utilizing the household survey data of the National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi. Other researchers, such as Chaudhuri & Roy (2006) [Do parents spread educational expenditure evenly across the two genders? Evidence from two North Indian states, Economic and Political Weekly, 41, pp. 5276–5282] and Lancaster et al. (2008) [Household expenditure patterns and gender bias: evidence from selected Indian states, Oxford Development Studies, 36(2), 133–157], have also confirmed the presence of significant gender bias in the expenses incurred on education by households in India. However, few of these studies are based on the analysis of sufficiently large, contemporary datasets, and hence they are unable to provide a picture of gender discrimination at the disaggregated level, i.e. at the state level. Since there is wide variation in social, cultural, anthropometrical, economic and many other factors among Indian states, it is important to analyse gender disparity in India at the level of the state. Here, utilizing individual-level data on educational expenditure from the 64th round of the National Sample Survey, an attempt is made to assess the current scenario in gender inequality in household educational expenditure in India at both the national and state level. It is observed that significant gender disparity exists in intra-household educational expenses and that this discrimination is not confined to the “backward” or developing states in India. 相似文献
40.
We consider deposit competition between two banks, where prior to competition one bank is subjected to a nationalization decision and the other bank chooses managerial incentives. The government who maximizes a modified form of social welfare (with greater weight on profit than depositor surplus) chooses only partial nationalization, which still hurts the rival private bank. But by offering deposit‐linked managerial incentives the private bank recovers its lost profit and induces even less nationalization, leaving social welfare unchanged. However, under interest rate competition for differentiated deposits the private bank offers profit‐linked managerial incentives while the other bank may be completely nationalized. 相似文献