An optional scrambled randomized response technique for practical surveys

Eichhorn and Hayre (J Stat Plan Inference 7:307–316, 1983) introduced the scrambled response technique to gather information on sensitive quantitative variables. Singh and Joarder (Metron 15:151–157, 1997), Gupta et al. (J Stat Plan Inference 100:239–247, 2002) and Bar-Lev et al. (Metrika 60:255–260, 2004) permitted the respondents either to report their true values on the sensitive quantitative variable or the scrambled response and developed the optional randomized response (ORR) technique based on simple random sample with replacement (SRSWR). While developing the ORR procedure, these authors made the assumption that the probability of disclosing the true response or the randomized response (RR) is the same for all the individuals in a population. This is not a very realistic assumption as in practical survey situations the probability of reporting the true value or the RR generally varies from unit to unit. Moreover, if one generalizes the ORR method as developed by these authors relaxing the ‘constant probability’ assumption, the variance of an unbiased estimator for the population total or mean can not be estimated as this involves the unknown parameter, ‘the probability of revealing the true response’. Here we propose a modified ORR procedure for stratified unequal probability sampling after relaxing the assumption of ‘constant probability’ of providing the true response. It is also demonstrated with a numerical exercise that our procedure produces better estimator for a population total than that provided by the method suggested by the earlier authors.     

Entry Threats and Inefficiency in ‘Efficient Bargaining’

We study limit pricing in a model of entry with asymmetric information, where the incumbent firm's wage is endogenously determined through ‘efficient bargaining’ with its union. In the presence of entry threat, the incumbent firm‐union pair may face a conflict between rent sharing and transmitting its cost information. When the wage is not observable to outsiders and employment is the only signalling instrument, over‐employment features in all entry deterring contracts. When the wage is also observable, information transmission becomes easier. Most of the time, then, but not always, the efficient contract deters (induces) entry against the low (high) cost incumbent.     

Join hands or walk alone? Evidence on lobbying for trade policy in India

Using primary evidence for 146 Indian manufacturing firms, I examine single and dual lobbying strategies for trade policy influence, and the factors driving firm's choice of these strategies. Firms can adopt a single strategy, by lobbying collectively as a group (Join Hands), or lobbying individually as a firm (Walk Alone). Firms can also adopt a dual strategy, that is, a combination of collective and individual lobbying. The choice of strategy is affected by sector concentration and by tradeoffs between lobbying intensity for sector‐wide and firm‐specific outcomes. The following findings are new for India: First, majority of Indian firms (more than 64% in the sample) use a dual strategy, suggesting the importance to better understand what drives dual strategies. Second, the likelihood of adopting a dual lobbying is higher in sectors that are characterized by low concentration (dispersion is higher), indicating a strong competition effect over free‐riding. Third, relative to the single strategy of collective lobbying, Indian manufacturing firms are likely to join hands while walking alone when targeting firm‐specific outcomes, but prefer to walk alone (single strategy of individual lobbying) when there are tradeoffs between different outcomes, to react quickly. Finally, the availability of resources and firm's perceived effectiveness of its lobbying are significant drivers for the strategy choice.     

Drivers of technical efficiency in Malaysian banking: a new empirical insight

Restructuring and rationalisation of Malaysian banking in 2000 and the subsequent policy of deregulation and liberalisation adopted by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) have resulted in a significant transformation of Malaysian banking. Banks are now poised to play a pivotal role in the economic transformation of the economy as envisaged in the Financial Sector Blue Print 2011–20 of BNM. Using the data envelopment analysis technique, the technical efficiency of 19 commercial banks (8 domestic banks and 11 foreign banks) operating in Malaysia during 2005–12 is evaluated. Then, using bootstrap‐corrected efficiency scores, the drivers of bank efficiency were estimated using the Tobit regression approach. Results clearly show that three large domestic banks are not only more efficient than their counterparts, but are also more efficient than the foreign banks. Bank size and return on assets are found to be the significant drivers of technical efficiency of Malaysian banks. Capital adequacy and the advances to deposit ratio also have a role in driving technical efficiency. The results also indicate that banks that are more effective in managing credit risk, as reflected in a lower level of non‐performing assets as a percentage of total assets, and have lower levels of personnel expenses to total assets, are more efficient. The findings have significant implications at the individual bank level and also at the policy level.     

MIXED OWNERSHIP,MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND BANK COMPETITION

We consider deposit competition between two banks, where prior to competition one bank is subjected to a nationalization decision and the other bank chooses managerial incentives. The government who maximizes a modified form of social welfare (with greater weight on profit than depositor surplus) chooses only partial nationalization, which still hurts the rival private bank. But by offering deposit‐linked managerial incentives the private bank recovers its lost profit and induces even less nationalization, leaving social welfare unchanged. However, under interest rate competition for differentiated deposits the private bank offers profit‐linked managerial incentives while the other bank may be completely nationalized.     

Disclosure Overload? An Empirical Analysis of International Financial Reporting Standards Disclosure Requirements

Despite the positive effects of the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) noted in the literature, standard setters have issued reports suggesting that the required disclosures in IFRS have become too burdensome and should be reduced. We examine this disclosure overload problem by testing whether the disclosure reduction recommendations of the Excess Baggage Report issued by professional accounting bodies from Scotland and New Zealand in 2011 are associated with companies’ disclosure incentives and are value relevant for a sample of 196 Australian listed companies. The Excess Baggage Report classifies current IFRS disclosure requirement items into three categories: Retain; Delete; and Disclose if Material. We find that Retain items are disclosed the most, followed by those classified as Disclose if Material, and then by Delete items. Only Retain items are significantly associated with companies’ disclosure incentives. We also find that these disclosure categories are value relevant, especially for below-median profitability firms. Our findings may provide input to the IASB’s ongoing Disclosure Initiatives project.     

Corruption control,shadow economy and income inequality: Evidence from Asia

Developing countries often suffer from high corruption, high income inequality and poor institutional arrangements that give rise to large shadow economies. Earlier evidence shows that shadow economies moderate the negative effects of corruption on income inequality in highly unequal South American countries. For Asia, we show that the persistence of shadow economies raises inequality even if corruption control is strong. Supported by static and dynamic panel data analyses of 21 countries in Asia between 1995 and 2015, we show that in order to combat rising inequality, corruption control must be complemented by the ability to translate secondary and tertiary school enrolment into industrial and, more importantly, service sector jobs. Countries with low corruption but high inequality can reduce inequality by committing to higher public consumption expenditures. Further, combining greater trade openness with low corruption lowers inequality, except for countries in South Asia.     

Small asymmetric fractional factorial plans for main effects and specified two-factor interactions

Fractional factorial plans represented by orthogonal arrays of strength two are known to be optimal in a very strong sense under a model that includes the mean and all the main effects, when all interactions are assumed to be absent. When a fractional factorial plan given by an orthogonal array of strength two is not saturated, one might think of entertaining some two-factor interactions also in the model. In such a situation, it is of interest to examine which of the two-factor interactions can be estimated via a plan represented by an orthogonal array, as also to study the overall efficiency of the plan when some interactions are in the model alongwith the mean and all main effects. In this paper, an attempt has been made to examine these issues by considering some practically useful plans for asymmetric (mixed level) factorials with small number of runs.