Disclosure Overload? An Empirical Analysis of International Financial Reporting Standards Disclosure Requirements

Despite the positive effects of the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) noted in the literature, standard setters have issued reports suggesting that the required disclosures in IFRS have become too burdensome and should be reduced. We examine this disclosure overload problem by testing whether the disclosure reduction recommendations of the Excess Baggage Report issued by professional accounting bodies from Scotland and New Zealand in 2011 are associated with companies’ disclosure incentives and are value relevant for a sample of 196 Australian listed companies. The Excess Baggage Report classifies current IFRS disclosure requirement items into three categories: Retain; Delete; and Disclose if Material. We find that Retain items are disclosed the most, followed by those classified as Disclose if Material, and then by Delete items. Only Retain items are significantly associated with companies’ disclosure incentives. We also find that these disclosure categories are value relevant, especially for below-median profitability firms. Our findings may provide input to the IASB’s ongoing Disclosure Initiatives project.     

Small asymmetric fractional factorial plans for main effects and specified two-factor interactions

Fractional factorial plans represented by orthogonal arrays of strength two are known to be optimal in a very strong sense under a model that includes the mean and all the main effects, when all interactions are assumed to be absent. When a fractional factorial plan given by an orthogonal array of strength two is not saturated, one might think of entertaining some two-factor interactions also in the model. In such a situation, it is of interest to examine which of the two-factor interactions can be estimated via a plan represented by an orthogonal array, as also to study the overall efficiency of the plan when some interactions are in the model alongwith the mean and all main effects. In this paper, an attempt has been made to examine these issues by considering some practically useful plans for asymmetric (mixed level) factorials with small number of runs.     

MIXED OWNERSHIP,MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND BANK COMPETITION

We consider deposit competition between two banks, where prior to competition one bank is subjected to a nationalization decision and the other bank chooses managerial incentives. The government who maximizes a modified form of social welfare (with greater weight on profit than depositor surplus) chooses only partial nationalization, which still hurts the rival private bank. But by offering deposit‐linked managerial incentives the private bank recovers its lost profit and induces even less nationalization, leaving social welfare unchanged. However, under interest rate competition for differentiated deposits the private bank offers profit‐linked managerial incentives while the other bank may be completely nationalized.