Rational expectations in the overlapping generations model

This paper reports results on the character of the rational expectations equilibria of a stochastic overlapping generations model with heterogenous markets. The model considered is a stationary overlapping generations model in which the endowments of young agents are subject to i.i.d. random shocks. The main result shown is that if there are l > 1 commodities traded in every period, then for most preferences, the rational expectations equilibrium stochastic process of prices and allocations necessarily exhibits serial correlation. This is in marked contrast to the one commodity model in which there always exists an equilibrium which is measure isomorphic to the endowment process.     

向网民派发十亿元数字星空逆市挺进团购

7月12日,“团到惊喜——数字星空团购业务上线暨中小商户成功团购论坛”主题发布会在北京钓鱼台国宾馆隆重举行．而开创业界先河的“向网民派发十亿现金”豪礼活动也同步展开．在现场数百位来宾及媒体记者的见证下，这家以“团商品”与“团服务”并重的综合性团购网站开始面向亿万网民与千万中小商户提供可信赖的团购服务以及可持续的成长服务...     

THE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISES: EVIDENCE FROM A UK EMPIRICAL STUDY

ABSTRACT:  The social enterprise sector in the UK is going through a period of rapid growth, and is being seen by government as another important vehicle for delivering public services. As a result the issue of public trust in social enterprise is of growing importance. While there is a growing literature on the governance of voluntary and non-profit organizations, with some exceptions (e.g. co-operatives) there has been little research on the governance challenges and support needs of social enterprises. The research reported here aimed to help fill that gap. Based on interviews and focus groups with governance advisers, board members and chief executives it explores the typical governance challenges faced by social enterprises. Based on the research the paper develops a new, empirically-grounded typology of social enterprises based on their origins and development path, and presents findings about some of the governance challenges that are common across the sector and some that are more distinctive to the different types of social enterprise.     

When to fire a CEO: optimal termination in dynamic contracts

Existing models of dynamic contracts impose that it is both optimal and feasible for the contracting parties to bind themselves together forever. This paper introduces optimal termination in dynamic contracts. We modify the standard dynamic agency model to include an external labor market which, upon the dissolution of the contract, allows the firm to return to the labor market to seek a new match. Under this simple closure of the model, two types of terminations emerge. Under one scenario, the agent is fired after a bad output and he becomes too poor to be punished effectively. Under the second scenario, the agent is forced out after a good output and he becomes too expensive to motivate.     

The Value Relevance and Timeliness of Write-downs During the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009

This study examines the value relevance and timeliness of write-downs reported by North American and European banks during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. Our study extends Vyas (2011), considering the association between write-downs and stock returns to evaluate the performance of fair value standards during the crisis. Specifically, we investigate claims that strict enforcements of standards resulted in write-downs that were excessive or unnecessary due to temporary market price distortions, or conversely, that standards were flexible enough to allow managers to engage in earnings or capital management. Our empirical results show that both fair-value and aggregate write-downs are associated dollar-for-dollar with contemporaneous security returns, suggesting that, on average, write-downs were timely throughout the financial crisis.