Cognitive‐Experiential Leadership Model: How Leaders’ Information‐Processing Systems Can Influence Leadership Styles,Influencing Tactics,Conflict Management,and Organizational Outcomes

The current article provides empirical evidence in support of a new Cognitive‐Experiential Leadership Model. The foundation of the model is based on the integration of the Cognitive‐Experiential Theory (CET; Epstein, 2014), a personality‐based theory, and the Full‐Range Leadership Theory (FRLT; Bass, 1985). Results show a strong connection between the rational system and constructive elements of the CET’s experiential system, and transformational leadership and conflict‐handling styles. There is also preliminary evidence that developing leaders’ CET information‐processing systems could increase transformational leadership. Leaders who are high in rational thinking and constructive thinking may also elicit extra effort from their followers, effectively manage conflict, choose effective influencing tactics, and achieve positive organizational outcomes. Implications and future research directions examining the Cognitive‐Experiential Leadership Model are discussed.     

State Foreclosure Laws and Mortgage Origination in the Subprime

Foreclosure procedures in some states are considerably swifter and less costly for lenders than in others. In light of the foreclosure crisis, an empirical understanding of the effect of foreclosure procedures on the mortgage market is critical. This study finds that lender-favorable foreclosure procedures are associated with more lending activity in the subprime market. The study uses hand-coded state foreclosure law variables to construct a numerical index measuring the favorability of state foreclosure laws to lenders. Mortgage origination data from state-border areas shows that lender-friendly foreclosure is associated with an increase in subprime originations, but has less effect on the prime market.     

Software for continuous game experiments

ConG is software for conducting economic experiments in continuous and discrete time. It allows experimenters with limited programming experience to create a variety of strategic environments featuring rich visual feedback in continuous time and over continuous action spaces, as well as in discrete time or over discrete action spaces. Simple, easily edited input files give the experimenter considerable flexibility in specifying the strategic environment and visual feedback. Source code is modular and allows researchers with programming skills to create novel strategic environments and displays.     

The Effects of Contextual and Wrongdoing Attributes on Organizational Employees’ Whistleblowing Intentions Following Fraud

Recent financial fraud legislation such as the Dodd–Frank Act and the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (U.S. House of Representatives, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, [H.R. 4173], 2010; U.S. House of Representatives, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Public Law 107-204 [H.R. 3763], 2002) relies heavily on whistleblowers for enforcement, and offers protection and incentives for whistleblowers. However, little is known about many aspects of the whistleblowing decision, especially the effects of contextual and wrongdoing attributes on organizational members’ willingness to report fraud. We extend the ethics literature by experimentally investigating how the nature of the wrongdoing and the awareness of those surrounding the whistleblower can influence whistleblowing. As predicted, we find that employees are less likely to report: (1) financial statement fraud than theft; (2) immaterial than material financial statement fraud; (3) when the wrongdoer is aware that the potential whistleblower has knowledge of the fraud; and (4) when others in addition to the wrongdoer are not aware of the fraud. Our findings extend whistleblowing research in several ways. For instance, prior research provides little evidence concerning the effects of fraud type, wrongdoer awareness, and others’ awareness on whistleblowing intentions. We also provide evidence that whistleblowing settings represent an exception to the well-accepted theory of diffusion of responsibility. Our participants are professionals who represent the likely pool of potential whistleblowers in organizations.     

Improving public services by sharing the right information

This article looks at the role that information sharing plays in supporting new models of public service delivery. It sets out the barriers to information sharing, attempts to overcome them and considers some of the factors involved in shaping a new direction for information sharing, such as changing public expectations and the rapidly changing regulatory environment.     

Revealing Corporate Financial Misreporting

This study examines how frequently firms restate when they materially misstate their financial statements using stock option backdating as the setting. Stock option backdating provides a unique opportunity to study this issue because it is possible to estimate misstatements with publicly available information to a high level of confidence, and the extensive media coverage of backdating notified boards of directors of the significant risk of misstatement. After identifying firms that materially misstated earnings due to stock option backdating with 95 percent (99 percent) probability, we find that only 11.5 percent (16.1 percent) of these firms subsequently restated. Restating firms are larger, have greater board independence, higher litigation risk and ROA, a lower market‐to‐book ratio, less discretionary accruals, and are more likely to have a CFO that was not involved in backdating. Restating firms are also more likely to disclose other adverse news, face securities litigation, and turn over the CFO than firms that appear to materially backdate but do not restate. Since nearly 9 of 10 firms failed to restate, our results give pause to researchers who use restatements as an indicator of misreporting, and to regulators who levy penalties on those who do self‐report.     

The block metric and the law of markets

The “Law of Markets” as originally stated by Fetter and amended by Hyson and Hyson is based on the assumption that the transportation of goods is along a line segment from firm to customer. In many situations the assumption that transportation is along a block-like network of roads is a better approximation of reality. In this paper we establish the “law of markets” appropriate to the block metric. We discover that with such a metric there exist significant discontinuities in a firm's demand functions and we argue that these discontinuities have important implications for the types of competitive strategies open to firms.