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141.
Toshihiko Mukoyama 《Journal of Economic Growth》2004,9(4):451-479
This article presents a model of innovation and diffusion of machines which embody a new technology. Users of the machines are heterogenous in their skill level. Skilled machine-users adopt new machines first, while unskilled users wait until machines become more user-friendly and reliable. The improvement of machines is the engine of diffusion, and it is carried out by the monopolist machine producer. The speed of diffusion is affected by the skill distribution in the economy. At any point in time, the machine producer can innovate a new generation of machines. The timing of innovation is also influenced by the skill distribution. 相似文献
142.
Summary. For Bertrand duopoly with linear costs, we establish via a single (counter-)example that: (i) A new monotone transformation
of the firms' profit functions may lead to the supermodularity of transformed profits when the standard log and identity transformations
both fail to do so, and (ii) Topkis's notion of critical sufficient condition for monotonicity of a Bertrand firm's best-reply
correspondence cannot be extended to rely only on positive unit costs.
Received: January 16, 2001; revised version: March 20, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This work was completed while the first author was visiting the Institute for Industrial Economics at the University
of Copenhagen during Spring 2000. Their financial support and stimulating research environment are gratefully acknowledged.
The views expressed here are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the European Commission.
Correspondence to: R. Amir 相似文献
143.
Oscar Alfranca 《International Advances in Economic Research》2005,11(2):201-213
The objective of this paper is to present econometric evidence of the effects of economic incentives, public policies, and institutions on national aggregate private agricultural R&D investments. The main hypothesis we will test in this paper is whether agricultural R&D spillovers represent a disincentive for national private R&D. More specifically, we will test if the spillovers function, which is a determinant of private R&D, follows a quadratic form and if private R&D is determined by the role of incentives and institutions.A previous draft of this paper was presented at the 57th International Atlantic Economic Conference, Lisbon, Portugal, 10–14 March 2004. Comments from participants have been very useful to improve the paper. 相似文献
144.
145.
Michael Mandler 《Economic Theory》2007,32(3):523-549
Can the Pareto criterion guide policymakers who do not know the true model of the economy? If policymakers specify ex ante preferences for agents, then Pareto improvements from a distorted status quo are usually possible, and with more commodities than states, one can implement almost every Pareto optimum. Unlike the standard second welfare theorem, planners cannot dictate allocations: agents must trade. Unfortunately ex ante preferences impose interpersonal comparisons. If policymakers merely aim to maximize some social welfare function then optimal policies form an open set; hence small changes in the environment do not necessitate any policy response. Planners with symmetric information about agents can sometimes intervene without making interpersonal comparisons. 相似文献
146.
147.
Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. We investigate a
class of cooperative games that generalizes some economic applications with a similar structure. These are the so-called line-graph
games being cooperative TU-games in which the players are linearly ordered. Examples of situations that can be modeled like
this are sequencing situations and water distribution problems. We define four properties with respect to deleting edges that
each selects a unique component efficient solution on the class of line-graph games. We interpret these solutions and properties
in terms of dividend distributions, and apply them to economic situations.
This research has been done while the third author was visiting Tinbergen Institute at the Free University, Amsterdam. The
research is part of the Research Programme “Strategic and Cooperative Decision Making” at the Department of Econometrics.
Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in the framework of the Russian-Dutch programme
for scientific cooperation, is gratefully acknowledged. The third author also appreciates partial financial support from the
Russian Leading Scientific Schools Fund (grant 80.2003.6) and Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (grant 02-02-00189a). We
thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. 相似文献
148.
Tetsuo Ono 《Economic Theory》2007,33(3):549-577
Pension benefits in old age establish a disincentive to save in youth, thereby yielding lower levels of capital stock and
the wage rate. As a result, the trade union has an incentive to change the composition of its two targets: employment and
the wage rate. This paper develops a model that includes employment effects of public pensions via capital accumulation and
union wage setting. Within this framework, we consider how contribution rates to the pension system influence the level and
time path of the unemployment rate. It is demonstrated that (1) a higher contribution rate results in a lower unemployment
rate, and (2) the economy with a high (low) contribution rate experiences monotone convergence towards (oscillatory convergence
towards or a period-2 cycle around) the steady state.
The author would like to thank an anonymous referee, Kazutoshi Miyazawa, and seminar participants at Osaka University for
their useful comments and suggestions, and Masako Ikefuji and Hiroaki Yamagami for their research assistance. Financial support
from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) through a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) (No.17730131),
the Asahi Glass Foundation, the Japan Economic Research Foundation and the 21st Century COE Program (Osaka University) is
gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are mine. 相似文献
149.
This paper deals with the problem of explaining the survival of cooperative behavior in populations in which each person interacts
only with a small set of social ‘neighbors’, and individuals adjust their behavior over time by myopically imitating more
successful strategies within their own neighborhood. We identify two parameters—the interaction radius and the benefit–cost
ratio—which jointly determine whether or not cooperation can survive. For each value of the interaction radius, there exists
a critical value of the benefit–cost ratio which serves as the threshold below which cooperation cannot be sustained. This
threshold itself declines as the interaction radius rises, so there is a precise sense in which dense networks are more conducive
to the evolution of cooperation. 相似文献
150.
This paper develops a new technique for proving the existence and indeterminacy of monetary equilibria in money search models
with divisible money. Our technique is substantially simpler than standard constructive proofs in the literature.
This paper is based on the second half of Kamiya and Shimizu (2002). We are very grateful to the associate editor and an anonymous
referee of this journal for their very detailed suggestions and comments. This research is financially supported by Grant-in-Aid
for Scientific Research from JSPS and MEXT. The second author also acknowledges the financial support by Zengin Foundation
for studies on Economics and Finance. 相似文献