Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications

Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. We investigate a class of cooperative games that generalizes some economic applications with a similar structure. These are the so-called line-graph games being cooperative TU-games in which the players are linearly ordered. Examples of situations that can be modeled like this are sequencing situations and water distribution problems. We define four properties with respect to deleting edges that each selects a unique component efficient solution on the class of line-graph games. We interpret these solutions and properties in terms of dividend distributions, and apply them to economic situations. This research has been done while the third author was visiting Tinbergen Institute at the Free University, Amsterdam. The research is part of the Research Programme “Strategic and Cooperative Decision Making” at the Department of Econometrics. Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in the framework of the Russian-Dutch programme for scientific cooperation, is gratefully acknowledged. The third author also appreciates partial financial support from the Russian Leading Scientific Schools Fund (grant 80.2003.6) and Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (grant 02-02-00189a). We thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

INTEREG: A Twenty-region Input–Output Model for Italy

Since the regional scale turns out to be the scale at which fiscal devolution is likely to be accomplished in Italy, and that at which trade and growth interdependencies as well as regional convergence can be most conveniently investigated, a new 20-region input–output model for Italy seems to be a useful tool of analysis. Although various regional and interregional models have been constructed since the 1950s, none has been implemented for the whole system of 20 Italian administrative regions considered in their tight mutual dependence; also, the pool approach has not been greatly favoured, even in situations where direct information on regional trade is lacking. The main purpose of this paper is to report on the structure of the model, the rather complex procedure used in the model construction and the adopted solution technique. Some space is devoted to the problems encountered in handling regional trade endogenously in an input–output setting and to a comparison between the pool approach, used in the Italian model, and other current techniques. The paper also reports on some preliminary results regarding the regional impact of fiscal policy.     

Introduction to “Economic and Financial Governance in the European Union after a decade of Economic and Political Crises.”

ABSTRACT

This paper offers the Introduction to the Special Issue “Economic and Financial Governance in the European Union after a decade of Economic and Political Crises.” We introduce the five papers. We distill three important lessons they offer for EU integration.     

The Geopolitics of Protected Areas

ABSTRACT

The conservation enterprise is embedded in ideas of the environment through which it promotes a vision of the world and the relations between the non-human and human. The papers in this forum analyse conservation from various vantage points to draw the links between geopolitics and conservation. The authors use three themes to demonstrate these links. The first theme draws on the concept of environmentality to show the mobilization of ecological rationalities and power towards the creation of protected areas. The second pays attention to networks formed across the distance, and how they influence the location and governance of protected areas. The third focuses on the strategies the conservation lobby uses to align local identities with global conservation ideals and goals. Collectively, these themes highlight features of conservation geopolitics.     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

Diversification Strategies and Corporate Coherence Evidence from Italian Leading Firms

This paper investigates the determinants of coherence and coherence change usinga sample of Italian leading firms in the period 1993–1996. Consistently with thehypotheses advanced by Teece et al. (1994), the econometric analysis highlightsthat relatedness between pairs of sectors and coherence of diversification strategiesare higher when firms are active in sectors sharing similar technological and marketingcharacteristics, and when they are positioned at different stages of the productive chain.Moreover, the findings that firms which enter the group of top 5 industry leaders aremore coherent than the average and that coherence is increasing for firms active insectors more sensitive to EU integration are consistent with the prediction that coherentfirms tend to outperform less coherent ones and that coherence is increasing in morecompetitive environments. Finally, the results show that a deepening of vertical integration strategies is good for coherence change, while an increase of diversification brings a reduction in coherence.     

On the source of contrarian and momentum strategies in the Italian equity market

This paper investigates the source of momentum profits, while inferring the validity of the assumptions underlying rational and behavioural theories. Using a unique sample of securities listed in the Italian Stock Exchange from 1950 to 1995, we observe that buying better performing stocks in the previous 3-12 months and selling worse performing stocks over the same period yields significant profits in the short term (less than 1 year). Results also hold when conditioned upon different risk specifications. On the other hand, the continuation effect seems to significantly revert over a longer period. More importantly, in contrast with Conrad and Kaul [Rev. Financ. Stud. 11 (1998) 489], bootstrap and Monte Carlo simulations show that momentum profits are more likely to be generated by stock returns time series properties rather than by their cross-sectional differences. While the overall findings cannot reject the market efficiency hypothesis, we argue that behavioural theory may be a possible “story” to interpret the continuation effect.     

Business cycles,financial cycles and capital structure

We perform peridogram based cycle analysis of firm capital structure and find evidence that firms’ leverage is both persistent and cyclical. The cyclicality of leverage is supported by the trade-off, pecking order and market timing capital structure theories (Korajczyk and Levy in J Financ Econ 68:75–109, 2003; Bhamra et al. in Rev Financ Stud 23:645–703, 2010). Although market timing theory research supports persistence, previous literature dictates that the trade-off and pecking order theories may predict either persistent or mean reverting leverage. Our tests reject mean reversion in favor of persistent and cyclical leverage. We corroborate pecking order theory literature that predicts leverage is persistent. In these models, when firms’ investment spending is below earnings, leverage decreases. In addition, we examine whether firms change their capital structure as a result of business and financial cycles. Since financial cycles last longer than business cycles, financial cycles should have a long term effect on leverage. Our findings confirm the persistent leverage business cycle models that suggest firms change their capital structure due to financial and credit cycles (Jermann and Quadrini in Am Econ Rev 102:238–271, 2012; Azariadis et al. in Rev Econ Stud 83:1364–1405, 2016). We conclude that leverage is persistent due to the cyclicality of the financing decision.