首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
文章检索
  按 检索   检索词:      
出版年份:   被引次数:   他引次数: 提示:输入*表示无穷大
  收费全文   1342篇
  免费   51篇
财政金融   198篇
工业经济   48篇
计划管理   241篇
经济学   371篇
综合类   17篇
运输经济   18篇
旅游经济   23篇
贸易经济   221篇
农业经济   41篇
经济概况   212篇
邮电经济   3篇
  2024年   3篇
  2023年   12篇
  2022年   18篇
  2021年   42篇
  2020年   59篇
  2019年   57篇
  2018年   82篇
  2017年   99篇
  2016年   90篇
  2015年   44篇
  2014年   62篇
  2013年   197篇
  2012年   90篇
  2011年   72篇
  2010年   74篇
  2009年   61篇
  2008年   45篇
  2007年   44篇
  2006年   29篇
  2005年   35篇
  2004年   21篇
  2003年   8篇
  2002年   10篇
  2001年   9篇
  2000年   10篇
  1999年   11篇
  1998年   5篇
  1997年   4篇
  1996年   7篇
  1995年   5篇
  1994年   5篇
  1993年   5篇
  1992年   2篇
  1991年   5篇
  1990年   6篇
  1987年   4篇
  1985年   2篇
  1984年   2篇
  1982年   3篇
  1980年   2篇
  1976年   3篇
  1962年   3篇
  1960年   2篇
  1959年   3篇
  1958年   2篇
  1955年   2篇
  1947年   2篇
  1900年   2篇
  1893年   2篇
  1872年   1篇
排序方式: 共有1393条查询结果,搜索用时 46 毫秒
991.
This paper investigates optimal mechanisms in a principal–agent framework with a two-dimensional decision space, quadratic payoffs and no monetary transfers. If the conflicts of interest between the principal and the agent are different on each dimension, then delegation is always strictly valuable. The principal can better extract information from the agent by using the spread between the two decisions as a costly screening device. Delegation sets no longer trade off pooling intervals and intervals of full discretion but instead take more complex shapes. We use advanced results from the calculus of variations to ensure existence of a solution and derive sufficient and necessary conditions for optimality. The optimal mechanism is continuous and deterministic. The agent?s informational rent, the average decision and its spread are strictly monotonic in the agent?s type. The comparison of the optimal mechanism with standard one-dimensional mechanisms shows how cooperation between different principals controlling various dimensions of the agent?s activities facilitates information revelation.  相似文献   
992.
In response to the position of Steve Toms, this article argues that risk must be understood not as it has been posited by capital but rather as it might be taken up by labour. It uses Marx's socialization thesis to maintain that risk is a symptom of possibility for labour. Drawing on the work of Randy Martin the argument culminates in a consideration of the interanimation of capital in labour occasioned by the second helping of risk produced by its commoditisation. It concludes that far from being just what Michel Aglietta calls a social evaluation of private economic activity, risk offers the opportunity to develop an accounting not just to provoke capital's contradictions with its own tools but to develop an immanent accounting of socialized labour in revolution, an accounting to come.  相似文献   
993.
We use a spatial model of endogenous growth to investigate the likely impact of discriminatory integration between two advanced insider countries on their own welfare as well as on the welfare of an outsider transition economy. A first point is that, since convergence in per capita income levels depends on relative market access and local market size, piece-wise integration causes insider-outsider divergence. Nonetheless, outsiders can gain in absolute terms if integration fosters the global growth rate. We also show that exclusion from a regional agreement and on-going transition have unpredictable joint effects on the structural adjustment, which might even exhibit a swinging behaviour. Such swings may imply large adjustment costs, which can be reduced by careful integration design. With this respect, the asymmetric phasing-out of trade barriers built into the Europe Agreements seems to work in the right direction. Finally, we point out that the predictions of the model in terms of direct investment and terms-of-trade dynamics are broadly consistent with some actual developments in transition economies.  相似文献   
994.
An important unanswered question in the area of Internet auctions is what dynamics influences consumer preferences for shopping on these online auctions. Two key aspects of studying what sells on the Internet auctions are (a) the characteristics of products to be purchased and (b) consumer characteristics. This research focuses on the relationship between product purchase preference, prior experience, and socioeconomic characteristics for the online auction participants. It uses product classification theory rooted in information economics and marketing. The study results are based on a US national sample of online auction participants. The findings suggest that product class affects online auction patronage, yet socioeconomic characteristics may not be as influential as once perceived. The online merchants can benefit from the inquiry to improve auctions for search, experience, and credence goods. The five key contributions of the findings add value to the theory and practice of consumer behavior.  相似文献   
995.
996.
In a matching model in which the job destruction rate and the output are endogenous, we show that the presence of a binding minimum wage prompts firms to choose too risky jobs. Introducing layoff taxes therefore reduces unemployment and improves market efficiency.  相似文献   
997.
Journal of Quantitative Economics -  相似文献   
998.
999.
1000.
The article discusses the current state of production facilities and infrastructure and provides a detailed assessment of their development and depreciation. It is emphasized that it is appropriate to consider the underfunding of this area of the economy, including the subsequent high accident rate and the increase in technological risks, as a set of socioeconomic (investment) debts. An assessment of these debts is given. The trends of technological risks of the economic growth and options for an investment maneuver to address the accumulated socioeconomic debts and reduce economic risks are considered in the context of two basic scenarios of economic development for the period 2011–2030.  相似文献   
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号