Uniform Commercial Policy, Illegal Trade, and the Real Exchange Rate: A Theoretical Analysis

Countries on fixed exchange rates sometimes use uniform tariffcum subsidy (UTCS) schemes as a way of achieving a real depreciationwithout disturbing the nominal exchange rate. A potential drawbackof this policy in relation to an across-the-board devaluationis that a UTCS scheme provides incentives for illegal trade.Using an optimizing model with currency convertibility and illegaltrade. I find that welfare is lower under a UTCS scheme thanunder a corresponding across-the-board devaluation and thatin some cases the real exchange rate actually appreciates inresponse to an increase in the UTCS rate.     

The composition of interest: The judaic prohibition

An interest charge is made up of an award for waiting known as the real rate of interest, a premium for risk and compensation for transaction costs. Where inflation exists the lender seeks further compensation. In order to understand the composition and evolution of different versions of the usury prohibition it is necessary to ask which components of an interest charge are prohibited by each version. The Judaic prohibition has two aspects which are of particular interest to business historians and students of usury. First, the general rule is that a reward for waiting is prohibited. This focuses on the time-based part of interest charge. Second, interest is prohibited because it amounts to placing a stumbling block before the blind. This focuses on the typical gullibility of the borrower confronted by a more expert, better funded lender. Economics confirms and enriches our understanding of these important aspects of the prohibition. They achieve this by increasing our understanding of two facts: first, that the borrower is a gullible individual subject to irrational and inconsistent behaviour; and, second, that this behaviour relates to the waiting aspect of interest which is proscribed in the prohibition. How far these insights apply to other civilisations' prohibition, particularly those which derive from the Judaic prohibition, merits further study; so also do the ethical lessons of the Mosaic rules for a globalised society based on capitalism.     

Combating Corruption in Indonesia? The Ombudsman and the Assets Auditing Commission

Early optimism that post-Soeharto governments would lead a systematic campaign against corruption has largely been disappointed. The creation of the ombudsman and the Assets Auditing Commission (KPKPN) were hopeful signs, but both initiatives are symptomatic of the weaknesses besetting Indonesia's anti-corruption efforts. Despite their best endeavours, both organisations have weak powers, are under-resourced, receive only token political support and exist in isolation from other investigative and enforcement agencies. International research suggests that official efforts to eliminate corruption are effective only as part of a coordinated campaign to reform administration, policy making, legislative institutions and the judiciary. Threatened exposure or punishment of corrupt officials is not enough: all the institutional incentives and disincentives for abuse of public office for private gain must be confronted. In Indonesia the problem is that most of those empowered to take such initiatives have no incentive to do so because they profit from the status quo.     

Does an Industry Effect Exist for Initial Public Offerings?

We examine the impact of initial public offerings (IPOs) on rival firms and find that the valuation effects are insignificant. This insignificant reaction can be explained by offsetting information and competitive effects. Significant positive information effects are associated with IPOs in regulated industries and the first IPO in an industry following a period of dormancy. Significant negative competitive effects are associated with larger IPOs in competitive industries, those in relatively risky industries, those in high‐performing industries, and those in the technology sector. IPO firms that use the proceeds for debt repayment appear to represent a more significant competitive threat to rival firms relative to IPO firms that use their proceeds for other purposes.     

Exact Ruin Probabilities and the Evaluation of Program Trading On Financial Markets

For a compound Poisson process with negative drift and jump distribution consisting of a mixture of exponentials on [0) and on (-, 0), an exact expression is derived for the probability of hitting the level c, c > 0. the problem is motivated by modeling the returns from trading on financial markets.     

WARRANT PRICING USING OBSERVABLE VARIABLES

The classical warrant pricing formula requires knowledge of the firm value and of the firm‐value process variance. When warrants are outstanding, the firm value itself is a function of the warrant price. Firm value and firm‐value variance are then unobservable variables. I develop an algorithm for pricing warrants using stock prices, an observable variable, and stock return variance. The method also enables estimation of firm‐value variance. A proof of existence of the solution is provided.     

Syndicated Loan Announcements and Borrower Value

Announcements of syndication loans increase borrowers' shareholder wealth if they are revolving credit agreements but not if they are term loans. Share price responses to revolving credit announcements are positive and significant, whereas the wealth effect for term loans is negative and significant. The results show that announcements from both the financial press and commercial information providers can affect borrower share price reaction. Overall, single syndication announcements appear to be more newsworthy than multiple announcements reported in the financial press, and we find evidence of information leakage, post‐announcement drift, or both.     

Golden Parachutes: Incentive Aligners,Management Entrenchers,or Takeover Bid Signals?

In this paper we investigate the effect of golden parachute (GP) adoptions on shareholder wealth. We control for the potential effect a GP adoption has on the probability that a firm will receive a takeover bid by investigating the wealth effects for firms that are in play when the GP is adopted. We find that announcements are wealth neutral when firms are in play and wealth increasing when firms are not in play when a GP is adopted. The results suggest that GPs have no influence on the success of a tender offer, refuting the hypotheses that they either align manager and shareholder interests or that they entrench inefficient managers. The difference in the results for in-play and not-in-play firms is consistent with the hypothesis that GPs signal an increased likelihood that a firm will receive a takeover bid.     

Relationship of direct nursing care hours to DRG and severity of illness

Great variation in nursing resource use is documented within DRGs. Much of this variation may be explained by patient severity of illness. Variance in nursing resource use within DRGs can be reduced by using a severity of illness instrument to score patients.