Household Saving in Developing Countries: First Cross-Country Evidence

Although most studies have relied on domestic or private sectorsaving data, this article uses household data available fromthe U.N. System of National Accounts for a sample of 10 countries.Household saving functions are estimated using combined time-seriesand cross-country observations in order to test households'responses to income and growth, rates of return, monetary wealth,foreign saving, and demographic variables. The results showthat income and wealth variables affect saving strongly andin ways consistent with standard theories. Inflation and theinterest rate do not show clear effects on saving, which isalso consistent with their theoretical ambiguity. Foreign savingand monetary assets have strong negative effects on householdsaving, which suggests the importance of liquidity constraintsand monetary wealth in developing countries.     

The persistence of real estate cycles

This paper presents a model that attempts to explain the underlying causes of the prolonged cycles observed in real estate markets. In addition, the paper characterizes the features that make some property types more prone to such boom-and-bust behavior. The combination of demand uncertainty, adjustment costs, and construction lags leads to two phenomena that may help explain market persistence. The first phenomenon is the reluctance of owners to adjust occupancy levels, even in the face of large shifts in renter demand. The second phenomenon is the occurrence of periods of sustained overbuilding: the addition of new supply in the face of already high vacancy rates.     

Taxation,imperfect competition,and discontinuities

Most work on taxation assumes that market adjustments to taxation will be small and continuous and so analyzes the effects of taxation using standard marginal methods. However, the world often changes in large and discontinuous ways. This paper looks at the effects of taxation when discontinuities in market adjustments are allowed because market structure is determined endogenously by the discrete entry and exit decisions of firms. The results indicate that the potential for discontinuities generates tax effects that are considerably different from those that emerge when adjustments are small and continuous. With discontinuities, taxes can have large and discrete effects, for example, by increasing prices far in excess of the tax itself or by changing utility in a highly nonmarginal way. Of more significance, with discontinuities taxes can actually increase welfare even when they lessen competition and raise prices. Taxes can also have markedly different effects on the income and welfare of different groups. Consumers are always made worse off by a tax, but a tax may be supported by the firms in an industry if the tax limits entry and thereby increases firm profits.     

Swinburne's Challenge: A Note on Probability Estimates for Nontypical Potential Evidence Instances

General confirmation theory, and especially its Bayesian variant, has never been able to adequately address the issue of how to handle qualitative evidence instances. Such statements encompass a wide class including historical claims, those of the human sciences not incorporating quantitative models, legal statements and the like. The issue was recognized by the philosopher Swinburne (1973) who puzzled how such statements as, Caesar crossed the Rubicon, could be assigned a meaningful probability estimate. The present paper suggests that such statements can be transformed into, at least, plausible probability estimates. This requires a two step process: judgements made by credible raters, and the transformation of judgements into one or more reliability co-efficients. These reliability estimates can then be utilized in the standard Bayesian model to yield plausible degrees of belief between hypothesis and evidence.     

Contract theory and agricultural policy analysis: a discussion and survey of recent developments*

This paper surveys some recent developments in contract theory and illustrates how this theory might be useful for conceptualising policy issues related to vertical coordination and contracting in the agro‐food industry. The article begins by surveying contract theory to identify key economic distortions that can potentially justify government involvement. Next, the general ingredients of agricultural contracts that are most likely to create inefficiencies are discussed. Finally, controversial aspects of real‐world agricultural contracts are highlighted and lessons from the theory are used to determine whether government intervention is justified. Actual legislation that has been proposed in the USA is analysed where appropriate and topics that await further research are also discussed.     

Trade policy under imperfect competition: The economics of Russian roulette

Summary Neo-classical economic theory shows that managed trade or protectionism is (almost) always welfare decreasing. However, measurements of the welfare costs of protectionism based on neo-classical models seem to suggest that these costs are quite small. We discuss general new insights and developments in the theory, policy and empiricism of international trade. The observation that intra-industry trade and the services sector are important has led to a shift in theory away from constant returns to scale and perfect competition towards economies of scale and scope, externalities, market imperfections, and imperfect competition. Although this, in principle, opens the door to beneficial government intervention in the economic process, we emphasize that the true costs of protection can potentially be much higher than is generally acknowledged as a result of the above mentioned shift.We would like to thank, without implicating, Martin Fase, Harry Garretsen, Catrinus Jepma, Simon Kuipers, Ger Lanjouw, Tenn Schmidt, Albert de Vaal, and Jean-Marie Viaene for stimulating conversations and useful suggestions. We thank Thijs Knaap for excellent research assistance.     

Determinants of the 1991–1993 Japanese recession: Evidence from a structural model of the Japanese economy

The objectives of this paper are to determine the extent to which various factors contributed to the most recent recession in Japan and to assess whether the recent behavior of the Japanese economy differs from that in previous recessions. Toward that end, we develop a small, structural macroeconometric model of the Japanese economy and estimate it using data from 1971 Q1 to 1991 Q1, the period just prior to the recent downturn. The important results can be summarized as follows. First, the severity of the recent recession probably does not reflect structural economic changes. Second, the poor economic performance in 1991–1993 period was to some extent predictable, reflecting the unwinding of imbalances that developed during the preceding expansion. Finally, unpredictable movements in exchange rates, land prices, and stock prices occurring after 1991 played an important, but not predominant, part in accentuating the downturn, while unusually stimulative fiscal and monetary policies appear to have contributed substantially to GDP during the recession.     

Group competition for rents

This paper examines rent dissipation in a two-stage group rent-seeking contest without a predetermined distribution rule. the rent in this setting exhibits both public and private good characteristics depending on the stage of the contest. Focusing on the relationship between group size and aggregate rent seeking we find that social waste depends not only on total numbers but also on the distribution of population across groups. We show that group size asymmetry acts to reduce rent dissipation.     

Personal and nonpersonal incentives in mail surveys: Immediate versus delayed inducements

A mail survey was conducted to empirically investigate contributions to charity as a method of stimulating responses to a mail survey. The research design included a control group and four experimental groups with the following treatments: a prepayment of $1.00 enclosed with the questionnaire (immediate personal reward), $1.00 promised upon return of the questionnaire with the respondent identified (delayed personal reward, no anonymity), $1.00 promised upon return of the questionnaire with no identification of the respondent (delayed personal reward, anonymity), and the promise of $1.00 contribution to a respondent-selected charity (delayed non-personal reward). The $1.00 prepayment yielded a statistically significant higher response rate than the $1.00 promised to charity or $1.00 promised upon return of the questionnaire. This study generally supports existing empirical foudnations of equity theory. An immediate personal reward yields a higher response rate than a delayed personal or non-personal reward.