Examining the positive and negative effects of <Emphasis Type="Italic">guanxi</Emphasis> practices: A multi-level analysis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">guanxi</Emphasis> practices and procedural justice perceptions

In this research, we compared and contrasted the effects of managers’ interpersonal level guanxi practice and group level guanxi practice on employees’ procedural justice perceptions. Results indicated that interpersonal guanxi practice was associated with increased employee fairness perceptions whereas group level guanxi practice (the sense that guanxi is used often to make human resource decisions within a management group) was negatively related to perceived fairness. Thus, while individuals may like the personal favors of managers’ interpersonal guanxi practice, their sense of justice is undermined by the broad use of guanxi. In addition, group level guanxi practice moderated the relationship between interpersonal guanxi practice and procedural justice such that this relationship was stronger in work units with high levels of group level guanxi practice. Thus, when employees see many others affected by guanxi, their sense of justice is even more strongly influenced by interpersonal guanxi practice.     

Health insurance reform and economic growth: Simulation analysis in Japan

This paper evaluates the drastic reforms of Japanese public health insurance initiated in 2006. We employ a computable general equilibrium framework to numerically examine the reforms for an aging Japan in the dynamic context of overlapping generations. Our simulation produced the following results: first, an increase in the co-payment rate, a prominent feature of the 2006 reform, would promote economic growth and welfare by encouraging private saving. Second, the ex-post moral hazard behavior following the increase in co-payment rates, however, reduces economic growth. Third, Japan's trend of increasing the future public health insurance benefits can mainly be explained by its aging population, and increasing the co-payment rate does little to reduce future payments of public health insurance benefits. Fourth, the effect on future economic burdens of reducing medical costs through efficiencies in public health insurance, emphasis on preventive medical care, or technological progress in the medical field is small. Finally, a policy of maintaining public health insurance at a fixed percentage of GDP will require reducing public health insurance benefits, perhaps up to 45% by 2050. Such a policy also reduces economic growth until approximately 2035. Our simulation indicates that the reform does not significantly reduce future public health insurance benefits, but it can enhance economic growth and welfare by encouraging private saving.     

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Mergers: a Global Analysis*

We analyze the effects of bilateral tariff reductions on the profitability of cost‐reducing horizontal mergers. Given Cournot competition in a two‐country world, for any positive tariff below a certain threshold, marginal trade liberalization is shown to encourage only those domestic mergers with sufficiently large cost‐savings and to discourage the rest. For tariffs close to, but smaller than, the prohibitive tariff, however, marginal trade liberalization necessarily encourages all domestic mergers. Moreover, we show that for a given level of cost‐savings, the impact of marginal trade liberalization may not reliably predict that of nonmarginal liberalization. Although at high tariffs, domestic mergers are shown to be unambiguously more profitable than cross‐border mergers, near free trade, mergers which yield the most cost‐savings become the most profitable. Thus, when comparing domestic and cross‐border mergers, trade liberalization encourages the type which yields the most cost‐savings.     

Gains from trade and the size of a country,II

This paper establishes the generalized, multicountry, classical presumption that larger countries gain less from free trade than do smaller countries. The proposition is then used to clarify a recent contribution by Alok Ray.     

The Babu and the Boxwallah: Managerial Incentives and Government Intervention in a Developing Economy

In developing economies a firm's strategy is directed more often at the government than at other competing firms. As an initial step towards modeling such interactions this paper considers a situation where a government confronts a monopoly. The latter chooses price and maximizes profit and the former chooses a tax rate and maximizes tax revenue. The government and the monopoly can delegate the final decision-making to, respectively, a bureaucrat and a manager. The incentive equilibrium of the model is characterized. It is shown that this kind of industrial setting is likely to exhibit greater inefficiencies than that which arises in standard models.     

Technology for Sale

Free trade in commodities typically leads to gains for all participating countries. These gains can be augmented by trade in productive factors if returns differ between countries. But such trade would not exhaust potential gains if technological knowledge, not embedded in productive factors, differs between countries. Using a Ricardian model this paper shows how a country which has an absolute advantage based on technology in both commodities in a two-commodity world can gain by selling, giving, or even bribing the other country into using the advanced technology in the other country's export sector. If each country has an absolute advantage in the single commodity it produces, an exchange of technology for the other commodity can nonetheless lead to extra gains for both countries.