COMPETITION VS. FRANCHISE MONOPOLY IN CABLE TELEVISION

A modern defense of public utility regulation has arisen from the “transactions costs” literature. Traditional economic theorists called for government to establish regulated, franchise monopolies to guard against over-investment and wasteful duplication in natural monopoly (i.e., cost subadditive) markets. However, the new view is that monopoly licenses are issued to promote investment into markets where suppliers must sink considerable sums of specific…nonsalvageable…capital. Consumers, in this scenario, “delegate” their choice-making to political or bureaucratic agents, who administer day-to-day and year-to-year arrangements with a monopoly producer in a long-term exclusive-dealing arrangement. This may be a plausible explanation for the issuance of legal monopoly rights. But the troubling question regarding the public agency is: why should self-interested political agents create proconsumer regulatory contracts? They might instead be expected to maximize political clout by erecting monopolistic restrictions and directing excess returns to effective distributional coalitions. These competing explanations for the political issuance of monopoly franchises are contrasted in this paper through the use of legal and economic evidence in the cable television industry.     

Using the Dunlop Report to Achieve Mutual Gains

The Dunlop Commission report opens what is likely to be a long-term debate over whether, and if so how, to modernize American labor and employment law. This article summarizes the major conclusions and recommendations of the commission report and outlines the steps needed to use it to full advantage. The potential benefits of using it to experiment with new approaches to employee participation, representation, and workplace dispute resolution are outlined and compared with the pitfalls of continuing the current stalemate over labor policy or attempting to implement only those recommendations that are consistent with the preferences of either business or labor.     

Flexible Work Hours and Productivity: Some Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry

Flexible work hours potentially influence productivity through effects on absenteeism and turnover, organizational attachment, job attitudes, work-related stress, and other areas. Prior studies suggest positive effects on productivity but are inconclusive because of small sample sizes, failure to apply direct productivity measures, or failure to account for other associated changes. We apply alternative fixed- and random-effects models to estimate production functions using panel data, with controls included for firm effects, time effects, capital quality, autocorrelation, and specification error. The results suggest that flexible work schedules contribute to improvements of about 10 percent in productivity.     

The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory

This paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter's curse and provides insights on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on "pivotal voter" models. Our experiment controls for different information levels of voters, as well as the size of the electorate, the distribution of preferences and other theoretically relevant parameters. The design varies the share of partisan voters and the prior belief about a payoff relevant state of the world. Our results support the equilibrium predictions of the Feddersen–Pesendorfer model. The voters act as if they are aware of the swing voter's curse and adjust their behaviour to compensate. While the compensation is not complete and there is some heterogeneity in individual behaviour, we find that aggregate outcomes, such as efficiency, turnout and margin of victory, closely track the theoretical predictions.     

Quantifying Optimal Growth Policy

We determine the optimal growth policy within a comprehensive endogenous growth model. The model accounts for important elements of the tax transfer system and for transitional dynamics. It captures the three main growth engines based on standard ingredients in order to understand the quantitative policy and welfare implications of the existing theory. Our calibrated model indicates that the current policy leads to severe underinvestment in both R&D and physical capital, implying that both R&D and capital investment subsidies should be increased substantially. We argue that previous research has overlooked a strong evidence for the welfare significance of the quest for the optimal growth policy by failing to calibrate the distortionary tax system.     

CRIMINAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION

This article studies the institutional structure of criminal sentencing, focusing on the interaction between legislatures, which set sentencing ranges ex ante, and judges, who choose actual sentences from within those ranges ex post. The key question concerns the extent to which judges are afforded discretion in sentencing, given the possibly divergent interests of legislatures and judges regarding the social function of criminal punishment. The ongoing debate over federal sentencing guidelines provides a context for discussing the policy implications of the model. ( JEL K14, K42)     

Redistribution and Provision of Public Goods in an Economic Federation

This paper concerns redistribution and public good provision in an economic federation with two levels of government: a local government in each locality and a (first mover) central government. Each locality is characterized by two ability‐types, and the ability‐distribution differs across localities. The central government redistributes via a nonlinear income tax and a lump‐sum transfer to each local government, while the local governments use proportional income taxes and provide local public goods. We show how the redistributive role of taxation is combined with a corrective role, and how the central government can implement the second best resource allocation.     

UNEMPLOYMENT AND CONSUMPTION

In this paper we argue that the aggregate unemployment rateis a valuable measure of aggregate income uncertainty. Accordingto the theory of precautionary saving, an increase in incomeuncertainty would be expected to increase saving. We use U.S.quarterly data on the consumption of motor vehicles first toexamine whether unemployment has a negative effect on consumptionand then to differentiate between the various explanations forthis phenomenon. We conclude that the negative relationshipbetween unemployment and consumption is due in large part toprecautionary saving motives.     

KINKED DEMAND CURVE THEORY AND THE MICRO FOUNDATIONS OF KEYNESIAN INVOLUNTARY UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper presents a macroeconomic model in which firms have kinked demand schedules owing to asymmetries in the dissemination of price information amongst consumers. It is then shown that nominal wage reductions may be unable to increase employment, let along secure full employment. The necessary condition is that the lower branch of the kinked marginal revenue schedule be negative. In this case, prices are unresponsive to nominal wage declines, and there is no Pigou effect from lower nominal wages.