Debt Financing under Asymmetric Information

We analyze the optimal design of debt maturity, coupon payments, and dividend payout restrictions under asymmetric information. We show that, if the asymmetry of information is concentrated around long-term cash flows, firms finance with coupon-bearing long-term debt that partially restricts dividend payments. If the asymmetry of information is concentrated around near-term cash flows and there exists considerable refinancing risk, firms finance with coupon-bearing long-term debt that does not restrict dividend payments. Finally, if the asymmetry of information is uniformly distributed across dates, firms finance with short-term debt.     

An Analysis of Intraday Patterns in Bid/Ask Spreads for NYSE Stocks

The behavior of time-weighted bid–ask spreads over the trading day are examined. The plot of minute-by-minute spreads versus time of day has a crude reverse J-shaped pattern. Schwartz identifies four determinants of spreads: activity, risk, information, and competition. Using a linear regression model, a significant relationship between these same factors and intraday spreads is demonstrated, but dummy variables for time of day have a reverse J-shape. For given values of the activity, risk, information and competition measures, spreads are higher at the beginning and end of the day relative to the interior period.     

U.S. Foreign Production and Unions

Based on analysis of industry by region data the author finds little evidence that U.S. unions have been a significant factor in the decision of U.S. firms to produce abroad. In effect, the composition of U.S. foreign production does not appear to be drawn from U.S. industries with especially high domestic unionization. Corresponding with previous research, the research do indicate that monopoly power, foreign tariffs and barriers, and the size and distance of foreign markets and important determinants of U.S. foreign production.     

The Effect of Service Capability on Operating Costs: An Empirical Study of Ontario Hospitals*

Abstract. We examine variations in the relation between a hospital's level of service capability and the operating costs of its departments and activities (e.g., surgery, laboratory, laundry). We propose a model of the hospital as a set of concentric, interrelated services organized around a core mission to provide patient care. We hypothesize that increases in service capability (i.e., complexity of operations) will increase overall operating costs. At the departmental level, we expect variations in service capability to have a greater cost impact in departments that are closer to the patient. We examine these issues using 1986 data from 154 acute-care hospitals. We disaggregate total operating costs into 18 pools that together account for 84 percent of all operating costs. We find that models with aggregate drivers explain about 90 percent of the variance in overall hospital costs. Complexity is found to be a significant determinant of overall operating costs. At the departmental level, models with department-specific drivers dominate models that employ aggregate drivers. We find that approximately 45 percent of hospital operating costs are significantly associated with the complexity of care provided. There is only limited support for the claim that the effect of the complexity of care provided on operating costs increases as the extent of a department's direct contact with the patient increases. Hence, although our results suggest that the complexity of care should be accounted for in any cost allocation and reimbursement scheme, they also suggest that finding the “right” level of adjustment is a difficult task because complexity differentially affects costs in the various departments. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent les variations observées dans la relation entre le niveau de la capacité de service d'un hôpital, d'une part, et les coûts d'exploitation de ses services et de ses activités (chirurgie, laboratoire, blanchisserie, par exemple), d'autre part. Dans le modèle qu'ils proposent, l'hôpital est une organisation de services concentriques reliés entre eux et qui s'articulent autour d'une mission principale, celle de la prestation de soins aux patients. Ils posent l'hypothèse selon laquelle l'augmentation de la capacité de service (c'est-à-dire de la complexité de l'exploitation) entraîne une hausse des coûts d'exploitation globaux. À l'échelon des services, les variations dans la capacité de service devraient, selon les auteurs, avoir une incidence plus marquée sur les coûts des services qui sont plus près des patients. Ces questions sont analysées à l'aide de données de 1986 relatives à 154 hôpitaux de soins actifs. Les auteurs procèdent à la désagrégation des coûts totaux d'exploitation en 18 groupes de coûts qui, ensemble, représentent 84 pour cent du total des coûts d'exploitation. Ils constatent que les modèles dont les inducteurs de volume sont agrégés expliquent environ 90 pour cent de l'écart dans les coûts globaux des hôpitaux. La complexité, concluent-ils, est un déterminant majeur des coûts globaux d'exploitation. À l'échelon des services, les modèles dont les inducteurs de volume sont propres aux services ont préséance sur les modèles qui font appel à des inducteurs agrégés. Les auteurs constatent qu'environ 45 pour cent des coûts d'exploitation des hôpitaux présentent un lien marqué avec la complexité des soins dispensés. L'affirmation selon laquelle l'incidence de la complexité des soins dispensés sur les coûts d'exploitation augmente avec l'intensité du contact du service avec les patients n'est que faiblement étayée. En conséquence, bien que les résultats obtenus par les auteurs donnent à penser que la complexité des soins doit être prise en compte dans tout plan de répartition et de remboursement des coûts, ces résultats indiquent également que la détermination du niveau approprié d'ajustement est une tâche difficile, étant donné que l'influence de la complexité sur les coûts varie selon les services.     

NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY: THE NEED FOR A PUBLIC CHOICE PERSPECTIVE

This paper argues that the issues raised by the industrial policy debate are as much political as they are economic. There is every reason to believe that, without substantial reform of political institutions, efforts to administer a rational new industrial policy would soon degenerate into the type of inconsistent morass of special-interest-generated policies which industrial policy advocates rightfully criticize as our de facto set of industrial policies.
This important political dimension has been overlooked by many industrial policy advocates. An important exception is Robert Reich, who has proposed a new centralized industrial policy agency in hopes that the battle of conflicting interests would promote greater aggregate efficiency. We argue that on theoretical grounds, however, such centralization might either increase or decrease efficiency. The competition of the military services under the Defense Department gives us a close analogue for study. Unfortunately, however, our review of efficiency in defense policy suggests that this would be a very poor model on which to base a broader industrial policy. To promote substantial increases in defense and industrial policy efficiency appears to require that much more fundamental institutional reforms be considered.     

Bargaining Effects of the Mandatory-Permissive Distinction

This study uses a laboratory experiment to examine empirically the effect of the mandatory permissive distinction on the negotiation of wages, employment guarantees, and advertising expenditures. Results suggest that negotiators spend more time bargaining over a smaller settlement range when an issue is mandatory than when it is permissive. Further, tentative findings provide no evidence that negotiators can circumvent the distinction through the use of tradeoffs across issues or bargaining power.     

BANK RUNS: DEPOSIT INSURANCE AND CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS*

Diamond and Dybvig provide a model of intermediation in which deposit insurance can avoid socially undesirable bank runs. We extend the Diamond–Dybvig model to evaluate the costs and benefits of deposit insurance in the presence of moral hazard by banks and monitoring by depositors. We find that complete deposit insurance alone will not support the first‐best outcome: depositors will not have adequate incentives for monitoring and banks will invest in excessively risky projects. However, an additional capital requirement for banks can restore the first‐best allocation.