POLITICAL PREDATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

We analyze a game between citizens and governments, whose type (benevolent or predatory) is unknown to the public. Opportunistic governments mix between predation and restraint. As long as restraint is observed, political expectations improve, people enter the modern sector, and the economy grows. Once there is predation, the reputation of the government is ruined and the economy collapses. If citizens are unable to overthrow this government, the collapse is durable. Otherwise, a new government is drawn and the economy can rebound. Consistent with stylized facts, equilibrium political and economic histories are random, unstable, and exhibit long-term divergence.     

Determinants of Decertification Activity: An Interstate Analysis

In this paper, a model of union decertification activity in the U.S. is estimated for 1960, 1970, 1975, and 1980. Cross-state data permit the use of regressors capturing the effects of demographic, political, and organizational factors not included in previous research on decertification. The estimated results confirm these effects. Tests for stability over the pooled sample periods 1960–1970 and 1975–1980 show some variability in the strength of the variables' effects.     

The Crash of ʼ87: Was It Expected? The Evidence from Options Markets

Transactions prices of S&P 500 futures options over 1985-1987 are examined for evidence of expectations prior to October 1987 of an impending stock market crash. First, it is shown that out-of-the-money puts became unusually expensive during the year preceding the crash. Second, a model is derived for pricing American options on jump-diffusion processes with systematic jump risk. The jump-diffusion parameters implicit in options prices indicate that a crash was expected and that implicit distributions were negatively skewed during October 1986 to August 1987. Both approaches indicate no strong crash fears during the 2 months immediately preceding the crash.     

Measuring Distress Risk: The Effect of R&D Intensity

Because of upward trends in research and development activity, accounting measures of financial distress have become less accurate. We document that (1) higher research and development spending increases the likelihood of misclassifying solvent firms, (2) adjusting for conservative accounting of research and development increases the number of correctly identified distressed firms, and (3) adjusted measures of distress alleviate previously documented anomalously low returns of large, high distress risk, low book‐to‐market firms. The results hold after updating stale parameters and under various tax assumptions. Our evidence raises concerns about interpretation of extant literature that relies on accounting measures of distress.     

Fiscal Multipliers at the Zero Lower Bound: The Role of Policy Inertia

The presence of the lagged shadow policy rate in the interest rate feedback rule reduces the government spending multiplier nontrivially when the policy rate is constrained at the zero lower bound (ZLB). In the economy with policy inertia, increased inflation and output due to higher government spending during a recession speed up the return of the policy rate to the steady state after the recession ends, which in turn damps the expansionary effects of the government spending during the recession via expectations. In our baseline experiment intended to capture the effectiveness of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the output multiplier at the ZLB is 1.9 when the weight on the lagged shadow rate is zero, and 0.5 when the weight is 0.85.     

Fiscal Multipliers under an Interest Rate Peg of Deterministic versus Stochastic Duration

This paper revisits the size of the fiscal multiplier. The experiment is a fiscal expansion under the assumption of a pegged nominal rate of interest. We demonstrate that a quantitatively important issue is the articulation of the exit from the policy experiment. If the monetary‐fiscal expansion is stochastic with a mean duration of T periods, the fiscal multiplier can be unboundedly large. However, if the monetary‐fiscal expansion is for a fixed T periods, the multiplier is much smaller. Our explanation rests on a Jensen's inequality type argument: the deterministic multiplier is convex in duration, and the stochastic multiplier is a weighted average of the deterministic multipliers. The quantitative difference in the two multipliers also arises in a model with capital, and in the baseline nonlinear model. However, the differences between the two are less pronounced in the nonlinear models. The errors from a linear approximation are much larger for the stochastic exit model then for the deterministic exit model.