Duration of Executive Compensation

Extensive discussions on the inefficiencies of “short‐termism” in executive compensation notwithstanding, little is known empirically about the extent of such short‐termism. We develop a novel measure of executive pay duration that reflects the vesting periods of different pay components, thereby quantifying the extent to which compensation is short‐term. We calculate pay duration in various industries and document its correlation with firm characteristics. Pay duration is longer in firms with more growth opportunities, more long‐term assets, greater R&D intensity, lower risk, and better recent stock performance. Longer CEO pay duration is negatively related to the extent of earnings‐increasing accruals.     

THE EFFECT OF REPUTATION ON THE DECISION TO JOINT VENTURE

This paper focuses on the impact that reputation has on the decision to proceed with a strategic alliance. Employing reputation constructs adapted from the Fortune Corporate Reputation Survey, we manipulated a target firm’s reputation in an experimental design. The subjects were placed in the role of CEO of the partner firm and asked whether they would engage in the alliance. Findings indicate that (1) reputation is a multidimensional construct, (2) the personal information-processing characteristics of the decision-maker mediate the reputation effect and may suppress the reputation information, (3) subjects may compensate weaker elements of reputation for stronger ones when making decisions, (4) product and management reputation are the most important factors, and (5) reputation is a factor affecting the decision regardless of whether the proposed target is a supplier or a competitor. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Interdependent and Intertemporal Nature of Financial Decisions: An Application to Cash Flow Sensitivities

We develop a dynamic multiequation model where firms make financing and investment decisions jointly subject to the constraint that sources must equal uses of cash. We argue that static models of financial decisions produce inconsistent coefficient estimates, and that models that do not acknowledge the interdependence among decision variables produce inefficient estimates and provide an incomplete and potentially misleading view of financial behavior. We use our model to examine whether firms are constrained from accessing capital markets. Unlike static single‐equation studies that find firms underinvest given cash flow shortfalls, we conclude that firms maintain investment by borrowing.     

The Marginal Revenue Product of a Women's College Basketball Player

This paper estimates the marginal revenue product of a premium women's college basketball player. Ordinary least squares estimates indicate that acquiring another one of these players generates nearly $250,000 annually for her team. Quantile regression estimates, however, show that these quantitative effects vary substantially across teams: Players at less successful programs generate little revenue for their team, while those at the elite programs generate considerable revenues. The results provide empirical evidence that schools may have the ability to capture economic rents from the best players at the top women's basketball programs.     

Time Variation in the Inflation Passthrough of Energy Prices

From Bayesian estimates of a vector autoregression that allows for both coefficient drift and stochastic volatility, we obtain the following three results. First, beginning in approximately 1975, the responsiveness of core inflation to changes in energy prices in the United States fell rapidly and remains muted. Second, this decline in the passthrough of energy inflation to core prices has been sustained through a recent period of markedly higher volatility of shocks to energy inflation. Finally, reduced energy inflation passthrough has persisted in the face of monetary policy that became less responsive to energy inflation starting around 1985.     

DETERRENCE: CREDIBILITY AND PROPORTIONALITY

This paper extends the analysis of deterrence to examine terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and rogue nations. Such situations are characterized by differential pre-emptive and response capacity, in contrast to the traditional deterrence literature on nuclear superpowers, where such factors are absent. We focus on the credibility of deterrence responses to pre-emption and show that credible (subgame-perfect) responses are rarely proportional. The analysis is also extended to asymmetric deterrence scenarios whereby credibility and proportionality depend on the potential aggressor's access to conflict technology and the responder's preferences for indirect conflict vs. the status quo.