'Let your science be human': Hume's economic methodology

This essay examines David Hume's economic methodology. The authorcharacterises Hume's understanding of human actions as interactionism.Its key point is that interactions generate the disinterestedview of ‘the spectator’ in the human mind. Humeapplies this idea of the disinterested spectator to the positionof social scientists in understanding social phenomena. ThusHume's approach to social science can be regarded as interpretive.The author also points out the difference between Hume's methodin social science and historical study. Considering this difference,the author argues that we should refer to Hume's social theoryrather than historical works in order to understand his economicmethodology.     

Public versus Private Ownership and Fund Manager Turnover

We examine the correlation between organizational structure (public vs. private) and managerial turnover in a large sample of United States offered mutual funds. Consistent with the hypothesis that publicly traded and privately held firms have different incentive structures and, as such, should differ in their treatment of internal control mechanisms, we find that public sponsors are more sensitive to prior fund performance when making replacement decisions and experience smaller post turnover performance improvements. Additional testing suggests a greater likelihood of fund manager replacement when mutual funds are team managed and when fund boards are more independent.     

A comparison of the Amemiya GLS and the Lee-Maddala-Trost G2SLS in a simultaneous-equations Tobit model

This paper proposes a class of GLS estimators for the structural parameters of a simultaneous-equations Tobit model and shows that this class contains an estimator which is asymptotically more efficient than an alternative estimator proposed by Lee, Maddala and Trost in 1980.     

A note on a heteroscedastic model

In this article the author considers a regression model where the variance of the error term is a linear combination of certain independent variables and compares four different estimators of the coefficients of this linear combination, They are (1) the estimator proposed by Goldfeld and Quant and called the Modified Glejser Method, (2) the estimator proposed by Hildreth and Houck, (3) the generalized least squares method, and (4) the maximum likelihood estimator. It is shown that the first two are asymptotically not fully efficient whereas the last two are.     

Complementing Cournot’s analysis of complements: unidirectional complementarity and mergers

We study the price and welfare effects of a merger of firms producing unidirectional complements: a firm is producing a product (called an optional good) that is valuable only if it is consumed with the other product (called a base good) produced by another firm. Under the assumption that there are two types of consumers: (i) those who consume one unit of the base good only or nothing (having zero valuation of the optional good), and (ii) those who consume one unit of the composite good or nothing, we show that a merger of the two firms raises the price of the base good, resulting in lower consumer surplus for the former consumer group, if and only if the average willingness to pay in the latter consumer group is sufficiently low. This result is in sharp contrast to Cournot’s (Researches into the mathematical principles of the theory of wealth, 1838) classical implication that a merger of firms producing strict complements makes all consumers strictly better off.